What do you think about these facts in RLR Investments, LLC v. City of Pigeon Forge, No. 20-6375 (July 13, 2021), a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on what we might charitably call an obscure legal doctrine (RookerFeldman)?

City wanted some of RLR’s property to build a walkway and replacement parking for RLR’s parking that the walkway would displace. Eminent domain ensued. RLR objected to the take: no public use. The Tennessee trial court considering the condemnation suit disagreed, and concluded twice (once at the hearing on immediate possession, the other on a motion for summary judgment) that the taking was supported by a public use or purpose. 

Next step, valuation trial right?

Not in the view of the property owner, who, continuing to maintain that the taking was defective, filed its own civil rights lawsuit in federal court asserting that the city’s taking lacked a public use or purpose under both the U.S. and Tennessee constitutions. The district court predictably dismissed, relying on the RookerFeldman doctrine, which prohibits federal district courts from reviewing the final judgments of state supreme courts. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

But wait, you say, the the ruling being challenged is neither a final judgment, nor is it from the Tennessee Supreme Court. This was an interlocutory ruling on public use from a Tennessee trial court, right? What gives?

Well, despite this same court ruling not too long ago that “[a]bsent a claim seeking review of a final state court judgment, a federal court tempted to dismiss a case under RookerFeldman should do one thing: stop[,]” here we are with the Sixth Circuit affirming R-F dismissal in favor of an interlocutory trial court order. Most other circuits say that interlocutory is they key, and decline to apply R-F. But the Sixth Circuit goes a different way, concluding that an interlocutory ruling is a “judgment” for purposes of the doctrine. Slip op. at 8 (“Here, it’s clear that RLR asks us to review the state-court order of possession and that the order of possession counts as a judgment under Rooker-Feldman.”). Since the public use determination is a judgment, and the federal civil rights action asserts the state court judgment is unconstitutional, that’s the “type of review Rooker-Feldman forbids.” Slip op. at 9.

We think only true Federal Courts uber-nerds will take joy in reading the Sixth Circuit opinion. There’s a lot of mind-boggling minutiae, and very little about the stuff that readers of this blog come here for (property! eminent domain! takings!). But you may want to read this one for a couple of reasons.

First, this one may not be over just yet. With a panel merely applying existing circuit precedent, see slip op. at 19 (“our precedent circumscribes our jurisdiction”), an acknowledged circuit split, see slip op. at 14 (‘we are hesitant to deepen any conflicts between the circuits”), and a dissent from one member of the panel, see slip op. at 20 (interlocutory orders should not be included within R-F doctrine), we may see more on the en banc front or even further.

Second, the case’s posture it going to ring some bells for us takings types, and it may remind you of those situations where even after a trial court holds that a taking is for a public use or purpose, the owner still thinks that it isn’t. Does it make sense in those cases to go forward with a trial of the compensation question when — if the owner is right about the lack of public use or purpose — a compensation trial would not be necessary? Some places, you get an immediate interlocutory appeal on public use as of right. But in others no — you have to spent the effort, time, and money to adjudicate compensation before you can appeal the foundational ruling. In the latter case, can you run to federal court to challenge the adverse public use ruling? 

This case tells you no. But maybe not for the right reason. We’re certainly not Rooker-Feldman mavens, so we can’t really say whether the panel majority was correct when it concluded that R-F prevented the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the property owner’s civil rights claim. But we do read and nod our heads at the dissent’s note that the more straightforward route to the same result might be plain-old abstention, under the doctrine that counsels federal district courts to avoid considering cases where there’s an ongoing, concurrent state proceeding:

Furthermore, when a litigant files suit in federal court before the state court in the parallel proceeding enters a judgment that carries preclusive effects, the federal courts have tools at their disposal to ensure that judicial resources are not wasted. For example, under the doctrine of Colorado River abstention—which the City raised as an alternative argument in its motion to dismiss—“a federal district court may abstain from exercising its subject matter jurisdiction due to the existence of a concurrent state court proceeding, based on ‘considerations of wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.”’

See slip op. at 32 (Clay, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

RLR Investments, LLC v. City of Pigeon Forge, No. 20-6375 (6th Cir. July 13, 2021)