In In re Eisenbise, the parties, a mother and son, argued about a trial court’s order requiring an executrix to produce certain documents pursuant to her duty to provide initial disclosures in a dispute concerning the grandmother’s estate. No. 10-22-00090-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 3866 (Tex. App.—Waco June 8, 2022, original proc.). The trial court ordered:

 Mother, in her capacity as executor “to produce the following in her possession, custody, or control within ten (10) days from the signed date of this Order pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194.2: (1) The medical records of [Grandmother], including the documents, and electronic information; and (2) The documents and electronic information obtained by [Mother] from the [Grandmother’s] laptop(s) and cellular telephone(s).”

Id. The son relied upon Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194.2(b)(6) to require mother, in her capacity as executor, to make disclosure of “a copy—or a description by category and location—of all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the responding party has in its possession, custody, or control, and may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment.” Id. However, the son also attempted to obtain other documents that were or may be relevant to the proceeding. “In essence, without making a discovery request, Son wants Mother to be required to produce all of Grandmother’s information/documents that Mother has access to in her capacity as Executor of Grandmother’s estate.” Id. The trial court did not go that far.

The son filed a petition for writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied the mandamus without an opinion. One of the justices issued a concurring opinion, and stated:

The two categories are somewhat vague. And I concede that I do not fully understand the scope of the two categories. Nevertheless, the production ordered is circumscribed by the reference to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194.2, and thus limited to the documents/information that Mother “may use to support her claims or defenses.” Therefore, because the trial court’s order does not require production of anything beyond the initial disclosures required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194.2, and merely sets a time period by which those items must be produced, I respectfully concur in the Court’s denial of the petition for writ of mandamus.

Id.

Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

dfjohnson@winstead.com
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

dfjohnson@winstead.com
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law