In a November 2024 case, the appellants were arrested and convicted in the Mahikeng High Court in 2004, receiving life sentences. They pursued appeals against their convictions and sentences but were unable to obtain a complete record of the trial proceedings until October 2012. Upon receiving the record, they lodged their appeals, which were initially unsuccessful in the North-West High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. However, the Constitutional Court ultimately upheld their appeals, setting aside their convictions and sentences. The second and third appellants were released in March 2015, and the first appellant was released in June 2015. The appellants instituted an action against the Minister for damages due to their wrongful detention.
The prescription period started in March 2015 for the second and third appellants and in June 2015 for the first appellant. Since the summons was issued within three years of their release, the appellants’ claims had not prescribed.
The Minister raised two special defences: one of prescription and one of non-compliance with section 3 of the Institution of Legal Proceedings Against Certain Organs of State Act of 2002. The appellants filed a condonation application for their non-compliance with section 3 of the Act.
The court had to determine whether the appellants’ claim had prescribed and whether their non-compliance with section 3 of the Act should be condoned. The court found that the appellants’ claim had not prescribed, as prescription only began to run upon their release from custody following the Constitutional Court’s decision. The court found that good cause existed for their failure to deliver the section 3 notice timeously and that the Minister was not unreasonably prejudiced by the delay.
A critical aspect of this case was the determination of when the prescription period began to run. The Minister argued that the appellants’ claim had prescribed, asserting that the prescription period started when the appellants were first detained in 2004. However, the court clarified that prescription could not begin until the appellants had a complete cause of action, which only occurred when the Constitutional Court set aside their convictions and sentences, leading to their release in 2015.
The court applied the principle that prescription begins to run when the creditor acquires a complete cause of action for the recovery of the debt. In this case, the appellants’ cause of action was only complete when the Constitutional Court’s judgment was delivered, and they were released from custody.
Read the matter here.