The en banc Eighth Circuit in S.A.A. v. Geisler, No. 23-3119 (8th Cir. Feb. 7, 2025), holds (9-2) that a plaintiff need not expressly allege in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint whether they are suing a named defendant in their individual capacity (the “clear statement rule”). The circuit adopts the “course of proceedings test” for determining whether a § 1983 defendant is sued in their individual or official capacity, overruling a prior, contrary decision in Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995).
“On September 20, 2021, S.A.A. brought § 1983 claims against [Minnesota police officer] Geisler, alleging false arrest and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The complaint, either as filed or as amended, did not specify the capacity in which Geisler was sued. On March 27, 2023, Geisler moved for summary judgment, arguing that under our clear statement rule S.A.A. did not sue her in her individual capacity [Egerdahl] . . . . S.A.A. conceded that she had no official capacity claims against Geisler. The district court therefore granted Geisler’s motion for summary judgment.”
The original panel affirmed summary judgment on the authority of Egerdahl, but the en banc court reverses and remands.
The majority opinion (signed by Judge Gruender) acknowledges that in the Eighth Circuit, the rule for decades had been that “[i]f a plaintiff’s [§ 1983] complaint is silent about the capacity in which she is suing the defendant, we interpret the complaint as including only official-capacity claims.” But this “clear statement” rule, the majority holds, “conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is in tension with Supreme Court decisions, and unwarrantedly sets us alone among the courts of appeals.”
First, Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(a)(1)(A) expressly disaffirms the need to allege a party’s capacity to be sued (“[e]xcept when required to show that the court has jurisdiction, a pleading need not allege . . . a party’s capacity to sue or be sued”). “Because the clear statement rule requires an express allegation of the defendant’s capacity for reasons other than to establish federal court jurisdiction, it erroneously extends, and explicitly conflicts with, Rule 9.”
Second, the Supreme Court has been generally hostile to courts interposing such technical pleading requirements that are not otherwise mandated by statutes or rules, citing Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam). “[O]ur circuit’s requirement of clear statement of the defendant’s capacity to be sued is an additional technicality beyond the requirements of Rule 9.”
Third, every other U.S. Court of Appeals had already rejected the “clear statement” pleading rule in favor of a “course of proceedings test,” making the Eighth Circuit an outlier.
“Faithfully applying Supreme Court precedent and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we join our sister circuits in rejecting the clear statement rule in favor of the course of proceedings test for determining the capacity in which a § 1983 defendant is sued.”
The majority then identifies how the “course of proceedings test” might proceed in a typical case. “Relevant factors include, but are not limited to, how early in the litigation the plaintiff first specified individual capacity claims, whether the plaintiff’s complaint included a prayer for punitive damages, and whether the defendant declined to raise a qualified immunity defense . . . . In other words, applying the ordinary rules of procedure, the manner and degree of clarity required to answer the capacity question will change over the course of proceedings.” And “[w]e emphasize that the considerations listed above do not constitute an exhaustive list of relevant factors.” The majority remands the case to the district court to carryo out this analysis.
Dissenting, Judge Shepherd (joined by Judge Loken) would sustain the clear statement rule. “First, the clear statement rule is grounded in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8[(a)(2)] and its requirement of a ‘short and plain statement.’ Second, the rule is sound; it is easy to understand and follow for even a pro se plaintiff; and, as we have often noted, it vindicates the important principle that qualified immunity is immunity from suit, not just from trial.”