By Andy Delaney
Two opinions on April 18, 2025: one about jurisdiction and one about partition and ouster.
We’ll start with jurisdiction. In 2019, respondent pled guilty to assault and robbery. In 2023, she filed a motion in the criminal division asking the court to vacate and expunge her conviction based on this statute, which allows for that result if one is convicted of a qualifying crime as a result of being a victim of human trafficking. Wasn’t that sentence a model of clarity?
The State opposed her motion. It argued that the criminal division lacked jurisdiction and that respondent didn’t meet the statute’s requirements. The trial court disagreed. It concluded that it had jurisdiction, that respondent met the requirements, and granted the motion.
So the State filed an appeal. While it acknowledged that it had no direct path to appeal, it sought review for extraordinary relief. Here’s today’s legal lingo lesson for the day. A writ of mandamus is a judicial writ ordering a lower court to do something. In this case, the State sought such a writ ordering the criminal division to vacate its order and send it over to the civil division.
SCOV says, “Yeah. No.” SCOV first discusses the differences between criminal and civil jurisdiction. SCOV notes that the civil division is a court of general jurisdiction and is presumed to have jurisdiction unless a showing is made otherwise. In this case, a showing is, well, made otherwise. SCOV notes that the statute itself doesn’t mention which court the motion should be filed in. “But, oh hey. Look at this!” says SCOV. “It’s in Title 13, which is Crimes and Criminal Procedure.” SCOV also reasons that most of the relevant statutory scheme doesn’t mention any specific jurisdiction but when it does, it removes jurisdiction from the criminal division. Ergo, in this structure, the criminal division has default jurisdiction and that’s where the motion belongs.
The State makes a nice attempt at equating this type of motion to a post-conviction-relief proceeding, but SCOV isn’t having it. SCOV reasons that the nature of the cases brought under each statute are substantially different. SCOV also notes that there are restrictions present in a PCR that are not present in a motion under the statute. Additionally, SCOV observes that the relief provided for under the statute is expungement—something over which the criminal division typically has jurisdiction. SCOV declines to transfer jurisdiction to the civil division. Writ denied. State v. Morrill, 2025 VT 19.
Next up we have a partition action and an argument about ouster. I have litigated partition actions before. They are cursed, ugly things. In this case, plaintiff and girlfriend bought a property. Girlfriend got a temporary RFA at some point, but ultimately moved out. Plaintiff was violent one time that she returned to the property. But nobody finds that girlfriend was ousted. Girlfriend transferred her interest in the property to a trust. Upon her death, the parties filed cross claims for partition. The trial court concluded that the trust was entitled to half the equity in the property adjusted for plaintiff’s contributions to the property. In part because of the no-ouster reasoning and in part because the trial court did not find trustee’s testimony on fair rental value very convincing, the trial court declined to offset for fair rental value.
Trust appeals. SCOV affirms.
Trustee argues that SCOV should remand to the trial court for a redetermination on ouster and further evidence on damages. SCOV reasons instead that defendant “failed to establish damages and does not demonstrate any reason why remand is warranted in this case.”
Justice Cohen concurs that the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion in not finding ouster. He writes separately to note that “the significant threat of domestic violence
may serve as a basis for ouster.” He explains: “Physical violence, domineering control, and patterns of threatened violence and verbal abuse can leave victims fearful for their safety and the safety of any children present in the home. One of the few ways to escape such abuse is to flee the home, even if the victim is a cotenant of the property.” The concurrence emphasizes that Vermont courts shouldn’t feel limited to only finding ouster with changed locks or “affirmative declarations of execution.” Serious domestic violence should be enough. Chief Justice Reiber joins the concurrence. Needham v. Smith Trust, 2025 VT 18.