Tuesday’s Superior Court decision in Goodyear v. Gorsuch 1726 MDA 2024 is not by any means a gross injustice. But it does raise concerns about how cases involving civil protections for present and former intimate partners should be treated. In a word, the remedy can sometimes exceed the need for protection.
Make no mistake; putting any other human in imminent fear of bodily harm is a matter that merits swift and meaningful judicial intervention. Liberty and happiness are not really attainable in a world where one’s life feels threatened. But we see a trend toward granting and sustaining Protection from Abuse orders where the defendant’s conduct seems more annoying than truly menancing. We should note at the outset that part of the problem is the speed of abuse proceedings in a world where a case is to be tried within 10 business days of the filing for relief 23 Pa.C.S. 6107. In this case, the trial was eight days from the initial complaint. If a person is charged with a crime based on the same conduct the criminal process typically consumes months before there is any form of judicial reckoning.
Ms. Goodyear and her ex-husband Mr. Gorsuch are reported to have had a fairly violent experience during marriage. But they had divorced “recently.” There was a physical incident between the parties in June 2024 which the court heard about but found that neither party related a credible story. Meanwhile four months later, Ms. Goodyear filed for protection under 23 Pa. C.S. 6101 (the abuse statute).
Aside from the murky events of June 2024, it appears that Mr. Gorsuch was not “getting over” the end of his 12 year marriage. Ms. Goodyear was then living with her brother. Mr. Gorsuch felt the need to park outside their dwelling. There was what we today would call “doorbell” evidence that he often drove past Goodyear’s home. A month before the October 2024 filing Gorsuch confronted Goodyear’s brother and threatened to “make her life unbearable.” At one point he sent their child into Goodyear’s home with instructions to come out with what had been the family dog when they were still a family.
Curiously, at some point not described, Mr. Gorsuch had secured a P.F.A. order against Ms. Goodyear. So, little wonder that the reversal of fortune prompted Gorsuch to appeal when a Cumberland County judge granted his former wife’s petition for relief.
Appeals like this are decided on an abuse of discretion standard. Thus the chance of reversing a decision based on an evidentiary hearing is remote at best. Meanwhile, we are seeing lots of these decisions appealed in recent years.
The thrust of the appeal was that the court relied too heavily on old conduct (which included an incident with a gun and another involving hands placed on the neck; the court uses “strangulation”) and that there was no conduct suggesting imminent danger to the petitioner of serious bodily injury.
So, aside from the old stuff what do we really have here? Hanging around the former wife’s home for no sensible reason. Threatening her brother and telling him that his sister’s life would be unbearable. And using the child to get possession of the family dog. Measure this against 23 Pa.C.S. 6102 which talks in terms of intentionally or recklessly causing bodily injury, placing a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury or engaging in conduct which instills reasonable fear of bodily injury. That last clause ( Section 6102 (a)(5)) for some reason omits the adjective “serious” before bodily injury. But, we digress.
In a word, the standard really wasn’t met. One can argue the “life will be unbearable” threat transmitted through Goodyear’s brother was enough, but courts hearing these kinds of cases are constantly deluged with these “I’m gonna get you” threats. There are times when associated physical conduct unites with non-specific threats to cross the line and merit protection. But, Gorsuch’s conduct, while creepy, isn’t really traversing that threshold.
The Superior Court affirms the ruling. The challenge this kind of order creates is in the future effects it can have. The appellate decision refers to a pending collateral custody proceeding. Under that law the custody court must consider the present and past abuse committed by a party or member of the party’s household, which may include past or current protection from abuse or sexual violence protection orders where there has been a finding of abuse. 23 Pa.C.S. 5328(a)(2). An abuse ruling is often “on record” at the local police station and can affect how cops respond to any incident involving the parties. Violation of an abuse order is treated as a criminal contempt (Sec. 6113) and today many employers who learn that an employee is “on record” for violent conduct find it provident to terminate employment out of concern that they are on notice that their employee is “violent.” For those employed in the security, medical and teaching fields, a PFA finding can alter their career.
The case comes with a history of past conduct meriting serious PFA penalties. But hanging around, making unspecified threats, and deploying your child to commit what may or may not be dognapping merits a different set of remedies than those needed where there is imminent danger of serious bodily harm. The more appropriate remedy here would seem to be the equivalent of a “peace bond,” a legal promise to keep a distance with your former partner. The remedies found as Section 6108 might allow such a thing to be crafted but the stigma of an “abuse” finding persists and can produce a whiplash effect in a setting where the “protection” causes a termination and unemployment. That may sound unfair, but we live in a world where workplace violence is starting to catch up to domestic violence. Employers don’t want to be sued because the employee found to have abused his/her spouse is next acting out in the workplace.
Courts should be authorized to divert cases like Goodyear to a separate term and number without the “Protection from Abuse” categorization while invoking a remedy that seeks to end what in this case, was “harassment” in contrast to “abuse” as defined by the P.F.A. statute.