By Andy Delaney

It’s kind of a rainy, yucky day today. I’m not a big conspiracy theorist, but it sure seems like someone is doing their best to make sure I don’t get my lawn mowed until June. 

Anywho . . . speaking of lawns and things people don’t want on them (besides “you kids!”), we have an appeal from the environmental court this week. Now, I could get into the nuance between appeals of a zoning administrator’s decision as opposed to a DRB appeal. And in fact, the majority and the dissent do exactly that, in great detail. 

Here’s the story. Neighbors (“neighbors one”) sent an email to the zoning administrator saying that other neighbors (“neighbors two”) were running an unpermitted wood-processing facility on their property. The zoning administrator takes a look and goes, “Yeah, you’re right. But they’ve been doing it forever and the SOL means there’s nothing to be done about it.” 

Now the reason this gets squirrelly is that at the end of the zoning administrator’s decision, there was a 30-days-to-appeal notice. Problem is that it’s actually a 15-day-appeal period to the DRB, and then an appeal to the environmental division. Neighbors one filed the notice of appeal in the environmental division after 29 days. Neighbors two moved to dismiss. The environmental division accepted neighbors one’s statutory-exception argument that it would be manifestly unjust to dismiss the appeal on this kind of technicality and granted neighbors one’s request for a remand to the DRB on the merits. 

As they so often say, “This appeal followed.” A four-justice majority reverses, concluding—with me grossly oversimplifying as usual—that the statutory provision relied on by neighbors one (and in turn the environmental division) doesn’t apply to zoning administrator appeals. I’d love to tell you in great detail how the majority gets there, but I’m way too lazy to do that. That’s why we include the link at the end. 

Justice Carroll dissents. The dissent reasons that the manifest-injustice statutory provision applies to all appeals within the statutory chapter and the majority is skimming over important words like “notwithstanding,” which has the effect of negating the referenced section. Is this a case of pedantic v. semantic? I don’t know, but I really wanted to use that line. Click the link and decide for yourself. In re Guillemette ZA Determination Appeal, 2025 VT 25.   

You know there are going to be issues when the opinion starts out “Both parents appeal . . .” 

Our second May 16 opinion is a family law matter. The parties have a complicated history, involving health and disability issues (both their kids and their own), a move (well, potential move) to Michigan, and the parents of the parents involved. The trial court concluded that dad should have primary legal rights and responsibilities for the kids, finding that most statutory factors were even, but that the kids’ ties to Vermont and uncertainty about mom’s proposed move to Michigan tipped the balance in dad’s favor. The trial court also awarded mom medical and dental decision-making authority but did not assign physical custody. 

As noted above, both mom and dad appeal. SCOV concludes that the trial court failed to address the primary-care-provider factor in this statute, made erroneous findings about mom’s relocation plans, divided legal responsibilities without adequate explanation, and did not assign physical rights and responsibilities as required. SCOV affirms the trial court’s finding that dad was less willing and able to foster a positive relationship with mom, but reverses and remands on legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities. The bottom line is that the trial court tried to issue a creative decision that it hoped would be the best for the kids (I’m reading between the lines here) but only succeeded in making everyone angry. Gordon v. Fogell, 2025 VT 24.