By Andy Delaney
So far, so good. Maybe I’ll keep the blog reasonably updated this year. Time will tell.
Two opinions issued January 12.
First, we have an appeal from a Vermont Public Utility Commission
(PUC) order approving a contract for the purchase of out-of-state renewable
natural gas under this
statute. Vermont Gas Systems, Inc. (VGS) entered a contract to purchase
landfill gas from a NY landfill and asked the PUC to approve the contract.
Petitioner, a VGS ratepayer, intervened to protect against rate increases for
an energy source that presented no environmental benefit.
The PUC approved the contract, reasoning that the plan for the
contract would reduce greenhouse gas emissions and comply with the Vermont
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2020 (GWSA). I won’t dive into the procedural
and factual history other than to say a hearing officer made findings in favor
of the contract, which the PUC more or less adopted and upheld.
Petitioner appeals, arguing that the emissions-reductions findings
aren’t supported and that the contract doesn’t comply with least-cost planning
principles.
SCOV notes that it generally gives PUC decisions deference.
Because petitioner’s primary arguments—according to SCOV—are that the findings
aren’t supported by the evidence—it characterizes its review as “narrow and
restricted.” With this backdrop, it’s no surprise that SCOV ultimately affirms.
This opinion is worth a closer look if you’re dealing with any issues involving
the GWSA or least-cost planning principles. There’s a topical discussion of
both. And that’s why we include the link. In re Vermont Gas Systems, Inc.,
2024
VT 2.
Our second opinion this week deals with a no-stalking order. Plaintiff and
defendant own neighboring property and live across from one another on a
private road. The parties settled a prior adverse-possession action by
defendant by agreement at mediation. But that wasn’t the end of it. Plaintiff
testified that defendant has threatened her on several occasions, and one time
slapped her across the face and knocked her cellphone out of her hand.
Defendant testified that plaintiff drives a small ATV along the property line,
honking and shouting. The trial court concluded that this was “apparently just
to annoy” defendant. They both accused the other of “shouting, making obscene
gestures, and taking surreptitious photographs.” Mr. Rogers would be appalled.
The incident that led to the no-stalking order in this case
involved an arborvitae bush planted on defendant’s property but allegedly
encroaching on plaintiff’s property, and some not-very-neighborly-not-very-neighborly-at-all
behavior surrounding it. I won’t give a play-by-play account, but if this were
a Reddit thread, I think it’s safe to say it would get an ESH tag. Ultimately—and
this was on camera—“defendant shook and grabbed plaintiff while ‘screaming at
her in an enraged manner with profanity-laced language.’” The trial court
concluded that regardless of why, defendant did assault plaintiff twice—that
these constituted “threats” under the statute—and that plaintiff was entitled
to a no-stalking order under the statute.
Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding
the altercations were “threats” under the statute and that his conduct in
defending his property was constitutionally privileged. SCOV reasons that the trial
court was justified in considering that two physical incidents as “threats”
under the statute, despite defendant’s arguments to the contrary. SCOV also
reasons that defendant’s defense-of-property argument doesn’t apply in the
context of the anti-stalking statute, making a distinction between purely
statutory and the common law. SCOV holds that “the common law
defense-of-property privilege is not a defense to a civil stalking order,” but
still drops a footnote explaining that, while it may not be applicable as a
discrete defense, such evidence may be relevant for other purposes. In the end,
SCOV affirms. Haupt v. Langlois, 2024
VT 3.
