The second Trump administration has come flying out of the starting blocks on international trade policy actions—imposing and rescinding, shaping and reshaping tariffs, sanctions, and export controls. The executive orders and directives have come so thick and fast that it is not always simple for businesses to chart a consistent policy direction and develop their plans to account for what might be coming next.
However, there is in fact a pretty clear map that could indicate the U.S. policy direction with respect to export controls.
The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) may well follow the map that was drafted by the same people who are now among the BIS leadership. The cartographers, as it were, are James Rockas and Robert Burkett. Rockas and Burkett now serve as the Deputy Under Secretary and Chief of Staff, respectively, at BIS. Both are listed as authors of the chapter on the Department of Commerce in the Project 2025 Mandate for Leadership publication by the Heritage Foundation.[1] Regardless of one’s views on Project 2025, the publication is a useful indicator of the future of U.S. export controls, among other policies.
In this article, we examine what the proposed “modernization” of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) outlined in Project 2025 looks like, and analyze how the Project 2025 proposals could be implemented in future U.S. export regulations.
The Checklist
The section of Project 2025 dedicated to BIS presents a list[2] of key priorities for “EAR modernization” , as follows:
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- Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole;
- Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E);
- Eliminating license exceptions;
- Broadening foreign direct product rules;
- Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies;
- Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern;
- Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment;
- Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and
- Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.
On first reading, some of these proposals may not seem to fit neatly within the familiar EAR framework. That might make it hard to picture how they will be implemented in regulations, much less to plan for them.
But that’s just the sort of picturing we propose to take on!
We have worked our way through the list above. We have asked ourselves how those broad, potentially seismic changes might actually be put into practice. Where is there real room for rewriting the regulations? Where is there precedent in export regulatory history? (Where what’s past be prologue, to borrow a phrase)?
Here we present our initial thoughts on what may be coming. We note that none of these points constitutes legal advice. But they may be useful for considering where your organization may wish to consider the possibility of future export control regulations.[3] And they may come fast, so get ready. As the poet said, defer no time. Delays have dangerous ends.
We present our findings in three parts (in three days), dividing the list to conquer it and to do so without overburdening our readers.
7. “Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment”
The Fundamental Research provisions of the EAR consider certain technology and software in mathematics, engineering, and science that are the result of research in universities to be in the public domain, and thus not controlled for export. One criterion for this exemption from control is that the research must be of the type that is normally published. Currently, the fundamental research exclusion provides for universities to allow students, regardless of nationality, to take part in research and to have access to certain technology and software that may otherwise be controlled.
However, universities have been under increasing scrutiny in cases where fundamental research exposes sensitive technology to students, professors, researchers, and even donors from countries of concern. Tightening the fundamental research exception could mean limiting the exception so that it does not apply to foreign persons affiliated with certain universities (such as those on the Specially Designated Nationals list), or even to all nationals of certain countries of concern. Alternatively, the rules could be tightened to allow U.S. government sponsors of research to place greater limits on access to sponsored projects based on nationality, or to require universities to waive the fundamental research exception altogether in their sponsorship agreements. Since the Fundamental Research exemptions are based in the First Amendment, there may be limits on how far that reform could be taken. But we have no doubt that the administration will look at how to restrict the Fundamental Research exemptions.
8. “Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies”
Currently, certain low-controlled technology or software is not subject to the EAR when it is being shared for the purpose of designing, developing, and/or implementing industry standard. The rule is designed for international cooperation.
Historically, the Trump administration has shown a disinclination to participate in multilateral activity (the Paris Climate Accord, UN Convention on Human Rights, Trans Pacific Partnership, NAFTA, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), etc.). It would not be inconsistent with administration practice to narrow or eliminate exceptions that provide for free sharing of technology with multilateral standards-setting groups.
Eliminating the exception would be a straightforward revision of the rule, which could potentially affect U.S. government and U.S. company relations with other governments, international organizations, international inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the International Space Station operations.
9. “Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.”
Much like the fundamental research exception described above, adjusting the EAR-exception for published technology could potentially violate the First Amendment. One potential approach would be for the EAR to adopt an approach similar to the ITAR’s public domain exception. For example, public release, such as publishing, would only be permitted after approval from the U.S. Government. The proposal may also redefine what is considered “published” by introducing exceptions to the definition.
Conclusions and Early Indications
The second Trump administration has issued, rescinded, revised, and reissued a substantial number of tariffs, sanctions, and export control measures. Although it is easy to be overwhelmed by the volume of actions, some of the policy direction of the new administration is clear. And as outlined here, the Commerce Department chapter of the Project 2025 Mandate for Leadership provides strong indicators of the administration’s policy direction on export controls.
At the same time, developments outside the four corners of Project 2025 suggest that certain reforms may already be in motion. On April 10, 2025, Landon Heid—President Trump’s nominee for Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration—testified before the Senate Banking Committee and indicated that BIS may act “relatively quickly” to apply Entity List restrictions to subsidiaries of listed entities, drawing a parallel to OFAC’s 50% rule. If implemented, this shift would materially expand the scope of compliance obligations for exporters, reexporters, and technology providers by effectively capturing foreign subsidiaries and affiliates that have so far fallen outside the scope of licensing requirements.
Heid’s remarks also flagged broader enforcement priorities—particularly around China’s acquisition of artificial intelligence capabilities. He pointed to risks associated with transshipment through jurisdictions such as Hong Kong and suggested BIS may pursue tighter controls to curb diversion and illicit procurement of advanced technologies. Those developments, while not explicitly part of Project 2025, reflect an accelerating trajectory toward more expansive and aggressive export control enforcement.
Together, the Project 2025 blueprint and the emerging policy posture from BIS leadership offer a coherent preview of what the next phase of U.S. export regulation may look like. Companies would do well to monitor those signals and begin scenario planning for a regulatory environment in which the scope of control is broader, the tools are sharper, and the compliance expectations are higher.
To read our full analysis, check out Part I and Part II of this blog series.
Update (April 30, 2025): We understand that James Rockas is no longer with BIS and has moved to a position in the State Department, but Robert Burkett remains at BIS.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Available at 2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-21.pdf.
[2] Id. at p.672.
[3] Additionally, we would be glad to kick these ideas around with others (I know my associates are tired of me talking about it to them). So if you have any comments, questions, or ideas to posit, please feel free to contact the authors directly.