In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Sotomayor, the Supreme Court in Parrish v. United States held that a litigant who files a notice of appeal after the original appeal deadline—but before a district court formally reopens the appeal period—is not required to file a second notice once the appeal period is reopened.
As previewed in Dykema’s May 2025 issue, the case stemmed from Donte Parrish’s failure to file a second notice of appeal. Parrish, a former federal inmate, filed a pro se civil rights complaint that was dismissed on March 23, 2020. However, he did not receive notice of the dismissal order until June 25, 2020. He filed a notice of appeal on July 8, 2020.
Under normal circumstances, a federal civil litigant must file a notice of appeal within 30 days of judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) provides limited exceptions—one of which allows a district court to reopen the time to appeal for 14 days if the litigant did not receive notice of the judgment within 21 days and reopening would not prejudice any party. To benefit from this exception, the party must move to reopen within 180 days of the judgment or within 14 days of receiving the notice—whichever is earlier.
The Fourth Circuit treated Parrish’s July 8 filing as a motion to reopen. On remand, the district court reopened the appeal window for 14 days. Rather than filing a new notice of appeal, Parrish submitted a supplemental brief. The Fourth Circuit then dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that a second notice was required following the reopening.
The Supreme Court reversed. The question before the Court was simple—must a litigant who files a notice of appeal before a district court reopens the appeal period file a second notice after reopening. Answering that question with a “no,” the Court held that Parrish’s notice—although filed after the original deadline—was effectively premature with respect to the reopened period. Applying the well-established relation-forward doctrine, the Court reasoned that “an adequate but premature notice of appeal ‘relates forward to the entry of the document that renders an appeal possible.’” This approach, the Court emphasized, aligns with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the fundamental purpose of a notice of appeal—to notify the Court and opposing parties of the litigant’s intent to appeal.
Crucially, the Court found no prejudice to the government, noting that both parties clearly understood Parrish’s intent to appeal. Requiring a second notice, the Court said, would constitute “empty paper shuffling.”
Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment but found reliance on the relation-forward doctrine unnecessary. She argued that when a notice of appeal is filed concurrently with a motion to reopen, it should be treated as timely upon the Court’s grant of that motion.
Justice Gorsuch authored the lone dissent, urging judicial restraint. He pointed out that the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules is actively reviewing Rule 4(a)(6), and urged that any changes to appellate procedure should be left to the rulemaking process.
Takeaways
- Clear and non-prejudicial expressions of intent to appeal may suffice, even if procedural requirements are not technically met.
- Second notices of appeal are not required when a timely (albeit premature) notice is filed before the appeal window is reopened.
For more information, please contact Chantel Febus, James Azadian, Kyle Asher, or Monika Harris. A special thanks to Summer Associate Richard “Tres” Lyons for assisting with this post.