Lesson. A defendant debtor can reduce the amount owed to a plaintiff creditor by the amount the creditor owes to the debtor, but the parties must be identical.

Case cite. Hendrix v. Campbell, 235 N.E.3d 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024)

Legal issue. Whether defendant could set off an adverse judgment held by husband and wife through a separate judgment the defendant held against wife, only.

Vital facts. This case involved the entry of a $115K judgment in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Campbell against Ms. Hendrix (the “Campbell Judgment”). In a separate case, Hendrix obtained a $61K judgment against Mrs. Campbell, only, who later passed away (the “Hendrix Judgment”). Both disputes were related to one house.

Procedural history. During proceedings supplemental, Hendrix moved to set off the Campbell Judgment by the Hendrix Judgment, which is to say that Hendrix sought to reduce the Campbell Judgment to $54K ($115K-$61K). The trial court denied the motion. Hendrix appealed.

Key rules. The Court’s opinion cited the following legal definitions of setoff:

  • Black’s Law Dictionary defines setoff as: “[a] defendant’s counterdemand against the plaintiff, arising out of a transaction independent of the plaintiff’s claim” and “[a] debtor’s right to reduce the amount of a debt by any sum the creditor owes the debtor.”
  • A secondary legal source puts the concept more succinctly: “[t]he right of setoff allows entities that owe each other money to apply their mutual debts against each other.” 80 C.J.S. Set-off and Counterclaim § 59.

Indiana courts have equitable discretion to set off one judgment against another.

Importantly, the general rule is that “mutuality must exist between the judgments. In other words, the judgments must, at a minimum, be reciprocal between the same parties.”

An exception to the general rule of mutuality may be applied in Indiana “in order to prevent irremediable injustice.”

Holding. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of setoff.

Policy/rationale. The Court found that, because mutuality did not exist between the judgment debtors, the Campbell Judgment could not be set off by the Hendrix Judgment. To illustrate, Hendrix owed Mr. Campbell money under the Campbell Judgment. On the other hand, Mrs. Campbell (actually, her estate), only, owed Hendrix money under the Hendrix Judgment. Further, despite seemingly common issues surrounding the subject house and likely Mr. Campbell’s interest in the estate, the Court determined that Hendrix did not establish the “irremediable injustice” exception to mutuality. The opinion does not address what Hendrix’s theory was, but instead simply concluded: “equity does not support reducing [Mr. Campbell’s] judgment by a debt that he does not owe.”

By the way, setoff is not dependent upon the entry of judgments. As suggested by the above definitions, competing claims/debts can give rise to setoff, as long as the parties are identical. For example, a borrower or guarantor may allege that certain damages caused by a lender should be set off against the unpaid loan amount.

Related posts.

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Part of my practice involves representing parties in disputes about loans and the collection of same. If you need assistance with a similar matter, please call me at 317-639-6151 or email me at john.waller@dinsmore.com. Also, don’t forget that you can follow me on Twitter @JohnDWaller or on LinkedIn, or you can subscribe to posts via RSS or email as noted on my home page.

Photo of John D. Waller John D. Waller

John protects the interests of parties when businesses default on loans of all kinds, including; commercial real estate, loans secured by multi-family projects, senior nursing/assisted living facilities, agricultural operations and small businesses. This includes serving as an advocate during the work out of…

John protects the interests of parties when businesses default on loans of all kinds, including; commercial real estate, loans secured by multi-family projects, senior nursing/assisted living facilities, agricultural operations and small businesses. This includes serving as an advocate during the work out of underperforming loans; filing and defending lawsuits to enforce promissory notes, guaranties, and other written contracts; foreclosing mortgages and enforcing personal property security interests; applying for court-ordered receiverships; protecting lien rights in bankruptcy court; purchasing or selling distressed loans; and representing court-appointed receivers.

His practice also includes representing mortgage loan servicers and the corresponding trusts/investors in consumer finance litigation, including contested residential foreclosures, title insurance claims, regulatory violation cases, tax sale disputes, and compliance matters. John also asserts the rights of parties in complex, real estate-related and title litigation and represents companies and individuals in contract disputes.

An AV Martindale-Hubbell Peer Review Rated lawyer and partner in the Indianapolis office of the national law firm of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, John graduated from DePauw University in 1990 and immediately entered the Indiana University School of Law. In 1993, he received his license to practice in Indiana’s state and federal courts. John later completed an intensive week-long professional training program in trial skills presented by the National Institute for Trial Advocacy. John has represented companies and individuals in a wide variety of disputes. He has tried a number of bench and jury trials, and has handled several appeals. He and his wife have three sons.