A “foreign official.”
Without one, there can be no FCPA anti-bribery violation (civil or criminal). Who were the alleged “foreign officials” of 2025?
This post highlights the alleged “foreign officials” from 2025 corporate FCPA enforcement actions.
As is apparent from the descriptions below, in certain instances the enforcement agencies describe the “foreign official” with reasonable specificity. In other instances there is less specificity as to the alleged “foreign officials.”
Liberty Mutual
“officials at six state-owned banks in India”
Millicom/Comcel
“numerous Guatemalan members of Congress”
Smartmatic
Juan Andres Donato Bautista (Chairman of COMELEC – The Commission on Elections of the Republic of the Philippines – an agency mandated to enforce and administer election laws in the Philippines).
Of the three corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 2025, one (33%) involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled entities (“SOEs).
By way of comparison:
- In 2024, 55% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here).
- In 2023, 64% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here).
- 2022, 70% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here).
- In 2021, 75% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here).
- In 2020, 83% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here);
- In 2019, 57% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here);
- in 2018, 53% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here);
- in 2017, 54% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here);
- in 2016, 78% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here);
- in 2015, 55% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here);
- in 2014 60% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here);
- in 2013, 77% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here);
- in 2012, 42% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here at pages 348-353);
- in 2011, 81% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here at pages 29-41);
- in 2010, 60% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here at pages 108-119); and
- in 2009, 66% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here at pages 410-44).
In 2014, in an issue of first impression for an appellate court, the 11th Circuit set forth a control and function test for whether an alleged SOE can be a “instrumentality” under the FCPA such that its employees are “foreign officials” under the FCPA. As highlighted here and more extensively in this Supreme Court amicus brief supporting a cert petition, there were many flaws in the 11th Circuit’s reasoning. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case. As to whether Congress intended employees of SOEs to be “foreign officials” under the FCPA, see here for my “foreign official” declaration.
