This post is from the non-Reed Smith side of the blog.
If you’re going to forum shop, you still need a legitimate forum. That was the problem for plaintiffs in Rodriguez v. Thoratec Corp., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88964 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2026). Texas and Arkansas residents brought suit in California over an implanted medical device—even though the device was implanted in Texas, all treatment occurred in Texas, and the decedent died in Texas. The only apparent hook? One defendant’s alleged citizenship in California. That wasn’t enough. The court granted defendants’ motion to transfer to the Northern District of Texas.
The case involves a left ventricular assist device (LVAD) implanted in Texas. Following the recipient’s death, his family sued, alleging device-related complications. But there was no dispute about where the relevant events occurred: implantation, treatment, and death all took place in Texas.
Before turning to convenience—the question of whether the case should be transferred–the court first confirmed that the case could have been brought in Texas. It could. The manufacturer was subject to specific personal jurisdiction there because it sold the device in Texas, and plaintiffs’ claims “arise out of and relate to” those contacts. Any potential jurisdictional gaps as to other defendants disappeared when they consented to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of Texas “for the limited purposes of the case.” Id. at *6-10. Diversity jurisdiction supplied subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at *10-12. And since it was undisputed that a “substantial part of the events … giving rise to the claim occurred” in Texas, venue is proper there. Id. at *13.
That cleared the way for the familiar eight-factor transfer analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). And nearly every factor pointed in the same direction–east.
Plaintiffs’ choice of forum? While ordinarily a heavy weight on the scale, here it was entitled to little deference because plaintiffs were not California residents. Id. at *13-14. Moreover, California had no meaningful connection to the operative facts. None. So, plaintiffs’ choice did not weigh against transfer.
Convenience of the parties? Also Texas. Plaintiffs lived in Texas and its neighbor Arkansas. Defendants undercut plaintiffs’ only counter—concerns about securing company witnesses live at trial—by agreeing to produce appropriate witnesses in Texas. Id. at *14-15. Another factor for transfer.
Convenience of the witnesses? This one is often “the most important factor” considered by courts, nd the primary concern is third-party witnesses. Here, that was decisive. The key third-party witnesses—the implanting surgeon and treating physicians—were in Texas. To the exten it mattered, defendants’ concession addressed their own employees. Id. at *15-16. Transfer again.
Ease of access to evidence? Plaintiffs tried the old “documents are in California” argument. The court wasn’t buying it. In the age of electronic storage, the physical location of the PMA file means little. Id. at *16-17. Neutral.
Familiarity with the law? Texas law likely governs a Texas-based injury, and a Texas federal court is better positioned to apply it. Id. at *17. Transfer.
Local interest? Strong in Texas, where the device was used and the alleged injury occurred. California’s interest in regulating manufacturers within their borders exists but is “decidedly weaker” when the injury happens elsewhere. Id. at *18. Transfer.
Court congestion? This is just about reading the federal court statistics. The Northern District of Texas was less congested. Id. at *18-19. Transfer.
At the end of the day, this was not a close call. When the plaintiffs, the medical care, the alleged injury, and the key witnesses are all in Texas, filing in California looks less like a reasoned choice and more like a detour. Section 1404(a) exists to correct exactly that. Courts do not need to indulge choices with no meaningful connection to the dispute.