Bexis has been working with Lawyers for Civil Justice on a number of projects, including the currently pending initiative to enact a federal rules amendment that requires meaningful disclosure of third-party litigation funding (“TPLF”) on essentially the same rationale that insurance policies are routinely disclosed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(1)(A)(iv). As part of this project, LCJ has its own initiative – “Ask About TPLF” – to encourage defendants, including defendants in prescription medical product liability litigation, to seek discovery of TPLF.
If you or your clients are participating in this LCJ initiative, or otherwise involved in seeking TPLF discovery, then you know that the other side almost always seeks to impede TPLF discovery with questionable claims of attorney/client privilege or work product protection. Well, here’s something new that can help overcome such objections.
On April 7, 2026, Todd Presnell, a partner at Bradley Arant, submitted a comment to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (the judicial committee considering the TPLF rules change), which “conclude[d] that mandating disclosures will not adversely affect a party’s attorney-client privilege shield for communications or that party’s or her lawyer’s work-product.” Presnell comment at 1.
Why should we care?
Because Presnell has probably forgotten more about attorney/client privilege/work product protection than any of us here on the Blog know. As stated in the comment:
I have devoted a substantial amount of my practice to the study and analysis of . . . the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. . . . I have published over 40 articles in various journals on privilege-related issues. . . . Separately, I am the sole creator and author of the legal blog Presnell on Privileges . . . and the lead author of the legal treatise Privileges and Protections: Tennessee and Sixth Circuit Law. . . . I have given over 100 legal-education presentations or client-focused privilege training sessions, been retained to author and file several amicus briefs on privilege issues, . . . and been retained by law firms to serve as a legal expert witness in the area of evidentiary privileges.
Id. at 1-2. This guy knows of what he speaks.
And what did he have to say?
In general, and with plenty of citations to back it up, that neither the attorney/client privilege nor the work product protection is an impediment to a rule requiring the general disclosure of TPLF contracts. Id. at 2. Other documents, maybe, but not the TPLF contracts themselves. Why?
A TPLF Agreement between a party, or that party’s counsel, and a non-party funding entity is not a communication, not a communication between a client and her lawyer, and does not pertain to the request for or provision of legal advice. . . . A TPLF Agreement arises in the ordinary course of a non-party funding entity’s business.
Id. 2. In short, privilege-based objections to the proposed TPLF disclosure rule are overblown and should be limited to “putatively protected portions” of the actual contracts. Id.
Here is an outline of the rest of the privilege argument:
- Because privileges preclude discovery of otherwise relevant information, they are interpreted narrowly. Id. at 3.
- The attorney/client privilege is limited to confidential communications between clients and attorneys for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Id. at 3-4.
- Even where applicable, the privilege can be waived. Id. at 4.
- A TPLF agreement is a contractual agreement, not a communication. Id.
- A TPLF contract cannot be confidential because it necessarily involves a third-party funder. Id.
- A TPLF contract does not involve provision of legal advice. Id.
- If a TPLF contract includes an otherwise privileged communication, that is a waiver of confidentiality. Id.
The work product doctrine is different. It protects information an attorney uses in anticipation of litigation that either the attorney or the client prepares. It does not extend to material prepared in the attorney’s ordinary course of business. Id. at 5-6. The work product protection does not extend to a TPLF contract because that kind of agreement “arises [from] the funder’s decision to invest capital as part of its ordinary business and [the] attorney’s need for business financing.” Id. at *7. This section is notable for its comprehensive discussion of relevant precedent, as to both TPLF contracts and “other litigation-related agreements” such as contingent fee documents, invoices, and billing statements. Id. at *7-8. It concludes that “[a] TPLF Agreement does not warrant work-product protection because, while related to litigation, it is a [contract] created in the ordinary course of the non-party funder’s business for the purpose of memorializing a financing arrangement.” Id. at *8.
So if you’re involved in motion practice concerning production of TPLF agreements, take a look at Presnell’s public comment. Unless and until the rules committee acts, it can save time and money while increasing your understanding of why the other side’s privilege arguments can’t hold water.