On June 30, 2026, the United States Supreme Court decided the consolidated cases West Virginia v. B.P.J. (No. 24-43) and Little v. Hecox (No. 24-38), upholding state laws in West Virginia and Idaho that prohibit transgender female athletes from participating in women’s and girls’ sports. In so doing, the High Court reversed decisions from both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (West Virginia) and the Ninth Circuit (Idaho). The ruling addressed two distinct legal questions—one under Title IX and the other under the Equal Protection Clause—with different vote counts on each.
The consolidated cases involve challenges to two state laws: West Virginia’s Save Women’s Sports Act (W. Va. Code §18-2-25d) and Idaho’s Fairness in Women’s Sports Act (Idaho Code §33-6203), both of which define eligibility for participation in women’s sports based on biological sex assigned at birth. More than two dozen states have enacted similar legislation since 2020. The Supreme Court’s ruling effectively validates those state frameworks and allows states to restrict participation in sex-separated athletic programs on the basis of biological sex.
Title IX (unanimous, 9-0). The Court held that the term “sex” in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), the 1974 Javits Amendment, and the 1975 Title IX implementing regulations refers to biological sex (not gender identity) based on the ordinary meaning of the term at the time of the statute’s enactment. The Court further held that neither Title IX nor its implementing regulations require schools to make an exception for biological males who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones.
The Court rejected the argument that Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020), which held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits employment discrimination against transgender individuals, compels the same result under Title IX. The Court held the two statutes and contexts are “vastly different”: unlike Title VII, Title IX expressly authorizes separate sex-based sports teams, and Bostock itself reserved questions about sex-separated spaces and sports. Notably, Justice Gorsuch, the author of Bostock, filed a separate concurrence specifically to explain why Bostock supports rather than undermines the Court’s conclusion. He identified two key distinctions: First, Title IX, as a Spending Clause statute, must “clearly and unambiguously” alert funding recipients to any prohibited conduct, and nothing in Title IX clearly prohibits schools from sponsoring teams restricted to biological females. Second, while Bostock held that firing a transgender employee is discrimination “because of” biological sex under Title VII, that analysis does not carry over to Title IX because Title IX, unlike Title VII, expressly anticipates and permits single-sex sports teams. The question under Title IX is not whether a sex-based distinction was made, but whether that distinction constitutes prohibited “discrimination,” and Title IX’s text and structure make clear it does not.
Equal Protection (6-3). With respect to the athletes’ constitutional argument, the majority applied intermediate scrutiny (the constitutional standard for sex-based classifications) under which the classification must be “substantially related” to achieving an “important” governmental objective. The majority reasoned that safety and competitive fairness are important government interests, and that limiting women’s sports to biological females is substantially related to those interests.
Critically, the Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ as-applied argument that states must carve out individualized exemptions for transgender athletes who have taken puberty blockers or hormones, holding that intermediate scrutiny does not require case-by-case exceptions and that such athlete-by-athlete judicial determinations would be “an almost impossible task.” Legislatures and schools, not courts, are the appropriate institutions to make those assessments.
The Court further reasoned that, following its 2025 decision in United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495 (2025), the challenged laws classify on the basis of biological sex rather than gender identity or transgender status. The majority added that even if the laws were analyzed as making a transgender classification, they would still satisfy either rational basis review or intermediate scrutiny (meaning the constitutional holding is durable regardless of which level of scrutiny ultimately applies to transgender classifications), a question the Court left expressly open.
The Court also declined to resolve the scientific debate over whether hormone treatment eliminates male athletic advantages, citing ongoing disagreement among medical and athletic authorities, and held that legislatures, not courts, retain “wide discretion” to act under conditions of medical and scientific uncertainty.
What This Means to You
A significant question left open by this decision: The Court addressed only whether states and schools may prohibit biological males from women’s sports, but it did not decide whether states or schools may permit biological males who identify as female to participate on women’s teams. That issue, whether a state law or school policy affirmatively allowing transgender participation is constitutionally and statutorily permissible, remains unresolved and is currently being litigated in lower courts. Accordingly, while this decision confirms that a restrictive policy is constitutional and Title IX-compliant, it does not validate or invalidate permissive policies. States and educational institutions that currently allow transgender athlete participation are not directly required by this ruling to change their approach, though they may face separate challenges under state law, OCR enforcement pressure, or future litigation.
In sum, the implications of this ruling vary depending on the state in which an institution operates:
- States with enacted restrictions (which include more than two dozen states): The relevant state statute is now constitutionally confirmed. Institutions in these states should verify that their athletic participation policies and administrative practices align with the applicable state statute. Institutions in states that include a private cause of action in their statute (such as Florida) face additional litigation exposure if policies are inconsistent with state law.
- States where the legislature passed restrictions, but the governor vetoed them: No state-law mandate applies, but governing athletic associations may have updated their own eligibility rules (e.g., the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association (WIAA) updated its K-12 policy in February 2025 to prohibit biological males from girls’ sports). Institutions should confirm applicable association rules and their own policy alignment.
- States with pending legislation or no enacted law: Biological-sex-based restrictions are constitutionally permissible and federally supported under Title IX as interpreted by this decision. The status of gender-identity-inclusive athletic policies is less certain and may pose some enforcement risk, including potential OCR investigations.
This ruling is a landmark development in the legal landscape governing K-12 and higher education athletic programs, but it does not resolve every question. Institutions across the country should treat this decision as a prompt to audit current policies, assess state-specific risk, and align athletic eligibility practices with both federal laws as now interpreted and any applicable state statute or governing association rules. If you have questions about how these developments could impact your state, school, or district, please reach out to the authors or your Husch Blackwell attorney.