Under the terms of legislation signed into law by New York Governor Kathy Hochul on February 6, 2026, the New York Medical Aid in Dying Act was to become effective August 5, 2026. As discussed in this previous blog post, litigation was commenced in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York to enjoin the enforcement of the law as discriminatory toward disabled individuals and to prevent the Act from going into effect.
On July 31, 2026, Judge Orelia E. Merchant entered an Order dismissing the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
In a Memorandum Opinion, Judge Merchant explained that the basis of her ruling was a lack of standing on the part of both the individual plaintiffs who presented themselves as having “life-threatening disabilities,” and the eight organizational plaintiffs which represent and advocate for individuals with life-threatening disabilities. Judge Merchant further noted that to establish standing to invoke federal judicial power under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an injury that had been or would likely be sustained caused by the defendant could be redressed by a favorable decision of the court.
One of the individual plaintiffs had a spinal cord injury with paralysis from the neck down while the other was suffering from degenerative conditions including multiple sclerosis and congenital cerebellar ataxia.
The court concluded:
Individual Plaintiffs chiefly fail to allege an injury in fact because their alleged conditions do not establish a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury. Only a patient with a “terminal illness or condition” may request and self-administer life-ending medication under the Act, and the Act defines a “terminal illness or condition” as “an incurable and irreversible illness or condition that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six months whether or not treatment is provided.”
The court rejected the contention that the individual plaintiffs’ conditions qualified because death would occur within six months if they did not receive medical support. It characterized this interpretation of eligibility under the statute as leading to “absurd results” since it would make patients eligible who could otherwise live long lives with medical treatment. Moreover, this contention was directly contradicted by the statutory language that “[n]o person shall qualify for medical aid in dying . . . solely because of age or disability.”
The court similarly found a lack of standing on the part of the organizational plaintiffs, both under the test for organizational standing and associational standing. Neither the alleged frustration of the organizations’ purpose to advocate for disabled person nor its expenditure of time, energy, and resources in pursuit of their advocacy objectives was sufficient. Likewise, to the extent that the organizational plaintiffs relied on their association with either disabled individuals generally or to the two individual plaintiffs in the case, the contention failed. The individual plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege an injury in fact, and none of the organizational plaintiffs demonstrated they had members who were eligible for the medical aid in dying services.
With the determination that no plaintiff before the court had standing to advance the claim, the court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation. Fundamentally, there was no “case or controversy” for constitutional purposes. The matter was accordingly dismissed without prejudice because the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
This procedural posture was consistent with controlling Second Circuit Court of Appeals case law that when the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it also lacks the power to dismiss a case with prejudice. A similar view is taken by multiple circuit courts. In contrast to a dismissal with prejudice, a dismissal without prejudice is not a ruling on the merits of the claim, as only a court with proper jurisdiction may adjudicate on the merits.
The New York Department of Health announced that as of August 5, 2026 the Medical Aid in Dying Act is in effect, and that it has established a website with related resources and guidance.