In Marshall v. Marshall, there were multiple trusts created by J. Howard Marshall and E. Pierce Marshall involving Koch Industries shares. No. 14-25-00322-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 1970 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] March 3, 2026, pet. filed). Preston Marshall is a beneficiary of several trusts, including the Harrier Trust and Grandchildren’s Trust #2, and was the successor trustee of the Marital Trust. Elaine Marshall served as trustee for the Marital Trust, Harrier Trust, Falcon Trust, and Grandchildren’s Trust #2, and was also the income beneficiary of the Marital Trust. In 2014, Elaine, as trustee, merged the Marital Trust into a new Wyoming trust, changing the governing law to Wyoming and adding a no-contest provision. In 2016, Elaine appointed five co-trustees to the Harrier and Falcon Trusts, with a compensation formula that was later challenged. Preston alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by Elaine, including improper appointments, failure to provide accountings, and actions detrimental to trust assets. In 2017, Preston obtained a temporary injunction in Harris County Probate Court restraining Elaine from various trust-related actions, including transferring assets, appointing co-trustees, and making payments to co-trustees. Litigation occurred in both Texas and Louisiana courts regarding the administration of the trusts, the validity of co-trustee appointments, and compensation. A Louisiana court issued 2024-2025 judgments, finding no breaches by Elaine regarding Harrier and Falcon Trusts. The Louisiana court expressly stated it was not ordering any action that would violate the Texas temporary injunction. Elaine moved to dissolve the Texas temporary injunction, arguing that the Louisiana judgments constituted changed circumstances and that portions of the injunction were moot due to the termination of certain trusts. The trial court denied the motion to dissolve, and Elaine appealed.

The court of appeals stated:

The trial court has the authority to dissolve a temporary injunction upon a showing of fundamental error or changed circumstances. Changed circumstances are conditions that alter the status quo existing after the temporary injunction was granted that make the injunction unnecessary or improper. The movant bears the burden to present new evidence establishing changed circumstances. If the movant fails to present new evidence showing fundamental error or changed circumstances, then the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dissolve.

Id.

The appellate court held that claim and issue preclusion arguments (res judicata) were pleas in bar that could not be considered in temporary injunction proceedings, as they go to the merits of the case:

We therefore apply Texas law in reviewing whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dissolve the temporary injunction. To be sure, if we were to address the merits of appellants’ res judicata arguments, we would be required to apply Louisiana Law, but we are precluded from considering the merits of the case in this interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction. By challenging a party’s right to recover, a plea in bar reaches the merits of a case. A temporary injunction proceeding may not be used to obtain an advance ruling on the merits.

Id. The court found that Preston established constitutional standing to challenge actions regarding the Marital Trust by alleging concrete injuries traceable to Elaine’s conduct and redressable by the requested relief.

The Lead Trust and Grandchildren’s Trust #2 both terminated in 2023, rendering the injunction provisions relating to them moot. The appellate court modified the temporary injunction to dissolve the portions relating to the Lead Trust and Grandchildren’s Trust #2 but affirmed the denial of the motion to dissolve as to the Marital Trust, Harrier Trust, and Falcon Trust. The purpose of the temporary injunction was to preserve the status quo pending trial on the merits, and the trial court’s discretion in denying the motion to dissolve was upheld except as to the moot portions.

Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

dfjohnson@winstead.com
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

dfjohnson@winstead.com
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law