On 23 September 2026, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) published its findings following a multi-firm review into money mule activity.
Background
The FCA’s findings are based on its:
- Survey of financial services firms on suspected money mule activity.
- Analysis of how fraud proceeds move through the financial system.
To build on the survey data and add an operational understanding of how money mules facilitate the movement and cashing out of fraud proceeds, the FCA established a public/private cell in 2025, a working group with 22 regulated firms.
The findings will be of interest to:
- Banks, building societies, payments institutions (PIs) and e-money institutions (EMIs).
- Money laundering reporting officers.
- Nominated officers.
- Professionals working in financial crime, compliance and fraud.
Findings
Key findings include:
- Offboarding increased between 2023 and 2025, but is now slowing: Reported offboarding, where firms closed suspected money mule accounts, rose over the 3-year period to 238,396 in 2025, but slowed in the final year. This is up from 184,935 in 2023 and 233,269 in 2024.
- Nearly half of suspected mule accounts were closed within a year: PIs and EMIs closed a higher proportion of accounts within the 6 months of the account being opened. Challenger banks reported a high proportion within the first year. Accounts that had been open for more than 3 years made up a greater share of closures at retail banks and building societies than at PIs and EMIs.
- The suspected mule profile is changing: Personal accounts represented around 92% of account closures for suspected money mule activity between 2023 and 2025. Account closures were highest among customers aged 26 to 39, while the sharpest increase was among customers aged 40 to 49. Customers aged 21 and under also represented a significant proportion of closures. Suspected mule account closures were more concentrated among younger customers at challenger banks, while retail banks reported a more even distribution across age groups. Business account closures were higher in 2025 than in 2023, but lower than in 2024. Challenger banks accounted for around half of reported business account closures in 2025.
- Fraud proceeds were usually cashed out after moving through 2 to 5 mule accounts: Criminals moved fraudulent funds through multiple accounts, usually cashing out between the second and fifth account. By this stage, funds had been broken into smaller, less conspicuous payments, making them harder to detect and trace.
- Retail banks saw the higher volumes, while non-retail firms saw higher-value transactions: Retail banks accounted for most transactions passing through mule accounts, whereas other firms experience lower volumes but higher-value transactions. This suggests different criminal behaviours, cash-out strategies and risk concentrations.
- Card payments were the most common cash-out method:Card payments were used to make lots of low-value transactions, or higher-value payments to local businesses and retailers.
- International and crypto cash-out methods were typically higher in value: Mule activity was not confined to UK payment flows. Recurring destinations included South Asia, West Africa and the Middle East. Crypto cash-outs were lower in volume but larger in value, suggest more selective use as a deliberate laundering route.
Next steps
The FCA states that:
- Firms should make sure they understand how criminals move funds between accounts. This applies within their own institution, and externally through information-sharing arrangements. This should inform the way they identify and respond to suspected money mule activity.
- Different firms are exposed to different patterns of mule activity. Their controls should be proportionate to the particular risks they face.
- Firms should regularly review their controls and respond to emerging mule patterns and cash-out behaviours. They should use data and intelligence appropriately when they assess suspected mule activity and decide how to respond.
- Firms should consider indicators beyond the initial receiving account, including linked accounts within the institution, payment characteristics, the broader transaction context, and customer.
- Where appropriate, firms should use the information-sharing provisions available under the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 to help prevent, detect or investigate economic crime.
The FCA is working with the National Economic Crime Centre to issue an alert to relevant firms providing further details.