In an opinion filed on August 31, and later ordered published on September 22, 2026, the Fourth District Court of Appeal (Div. 3) reversed the judgment of the Orange County Superior Court denying writ relief and ordered issuance of a writ of mandate invalidating the City of Laguna Beach’s (“City”) amendment of its General Plan’s Historic Resources Element and associated Negative Declaration for failure to comply with CEQA. Laguna Beach Historic Preservation Coalition, et al. v. City of Laguna Beach, et al. (2026) ___ Cal.App.5th ___.
The City’s voided action consisted of amending the relevant general plan element to eliminate all references to a 1981 Inventory of historic properties prepared at its direction listing over 700 pre-1940 homes and structures. In 1982, to facilitate obtaining grant money, the City passed a resolution formally recognizing the Inventory as listing “the best representative examples of historically significant architecture” in the City. In the decades thereafter, however, the Inventory was not updated and allegedly became outdated and both underinclusive (as not including all properties listed on a subsequently established voluntary local registry) and overinclusive (as including properties that had been demolished or materially altered). Rather than updating the Inventory, the City chose to amend its Municipal Code and Historic Resources Element to eliminate all references to it and clarify that owner consent is a criterion for the more recent Register’s eligibility. The Negative Declaration that City prepared as CEQA compliance for these discretionary legislative actions concluded they would not have a significant adverse effect on historic properties; noted the Inventory would be eliminated because it was more than 36-37 years old; and explained that inventories that are not updated every five years don’t meet Public Resources Code § 5024(g)’s criteria for presumptive historic resources.
As brief legal background, historical resources, such as certain historic structures, sites, and objects, are considered part of the existing physical environment protected by CEQA. As noted by the Court: “If a project may cause a “substantial adverse change” in a historical resource’s significance, the project may have a significant effect on the environment and warrant the preparation of an EIR or a mitigated negative declaration [“MND”].” (Citations and footnotes omitted.) A “substantial adverse change” includes physical demolition or other adverse effects that materially impair the historic resource’s significance.
For CEQA purposes, historical resources come in three types: mandatory, presumptive, or discretionary. The category of historical resources at issue in this case was “presumptive historical resources,” which are properties “presumed to be” historically significant because they are either (1) included in a local register of historical resources (as defined in Pub. Resources Code, § 5020.1(k)), or (2) deemed significant under Public Resources Code § 5024.1’s statutory criteria. The parties conceded, as the trial court concluded, that § 5024.1’s statutory criteria weren’t met; accordingly, the case turned in relevant part on whether the properties affected by City’s amendment of its Historic Resources Element were contained in a “local register of historical resources,” which § 5020.1(k) defines as “a list of properties officially designated or recognized as historically significant by a local government pursuant to a local ordinance or resolution.” (Notably, City’s Negative Declaration failed to discuss this statute and its criteria.)
Like the trial court, the Court of Appeal had little trouble concluding in light of the 1982 resolution that the City’s 1981 Inventory was a local registry of historical resources such that the structures listed therein were presumptive historical resources for CEQA purposes. Where the two courts parted ways, however, was on the issue of whether City had succeeded in rebutting the presumption so as to clear the way for eliminating all Historic Resources Element references to the 1981 Inventory, which, ipso facto, eliminated all legal protections for all structures listed therein based on their historic status.
Noting that the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to City’s determination of the issue (Pub. Resources Code, § 21084.1) is not an onerous one, the Court of Appeal nonetheless held City had failed to rebut the presumption as required for each property listed in the inventory. Applying the substantial evidence standard of review that is applicable to an agency’s finding that a property is not a historical resource (citing, inter alia, Friends of the Willow Glen Trestle v. City of San Jose (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 457, 467-468, 473, my August 15, 2016 post on which can be found here), the Court held that no substantial evidence supported City’s determination that all of the listed properties were in fact not historically significant.
The crux of the issue was that City’s blanket rejection of the entire 1981 Inventory as an outdated document was a legally flawed approach given that the protections provided by law extended to each of the 700-plus individual properties listed therein. Per the Court of Appeal, “rebutting the presumption requires more than showing the Inventory as a whole is outdated, overbroad, or underinclusive; instead, the City was required to find that each and every property on the Inventory is not in fact historically significant.” In other words, the City could not simply “revoke the entire Inventory … without individually analyzing the historical status of any property listed on it.” Per the Court, “the City’s admitted failure to conduct an individualized analysis of Inventory properties is dispositive” because CEQA protections extend to the individual listed properties on the “local register,” i.e., the Inventory (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21084.1; 5020.1(k)), and to rebut the presumption of historical significance “the City needed to find that a preponderance of the evidence demonstrated all of those properties are not in fact historically significant.” The City improperly refused to consider that question and, focusing instead on perceived inaccuracies in the Inventory as a whole, improperly took action amounting to “a blanket delisting of hundreds of presumptively historical resources.”
The Court further called out City’s rationale for the blanket delisting as “questionable.” It reasoned that even if the Inventory is outdated and overinclusive because it includes properties that have been demolished or materially altered since 1981, that wouldn’t detract from the historical significance of hundreds of other listed structures that have retained their structural integrity. Further, even if the Inventory is underinclusive to the extent “it does not catch all Laguna Beach properties that might be historic” that would not detract from the historical significance of those properties that are listed.
Once the issue of the status of the properties listed in the Inventory as presumptive historical resources was thus settled, the Court applied the “fair argument” test to conclude that, in light of City’s action’s potentially significant impacts on these resources, the Negative Declaration could not be upheld. (Citing Friends of Willow Glen, supra. at 472, and Citizens for the Restoration of L Street v. City of Fresno (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 340, 364, my September 8, 2014 post on which can be found here.) The Court held that “the record supports a fair argument that the [Historical Resources Element] amendment may have a “significant effect on the environment” because by removing the Inventory properties’ presumed historic status, it enables the City to treat them as not historic for CEQA review purposes, leaving them more vulnerable to demolition or modification. Accordingly, the Court reversed and directed issuance of a peremptory writ ordering City to set aside its approvals of the Historic Resources Element amendment pending preparation of an EIR or MND.
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