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Basel Committee finds Australia, Japan, Korea, Switzerland compliant, and Canada, United Kingdom largely compliant with its leverage ratio framework

By Simon Lovegrove (UK) on October 13, 2026
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On 13 October 2026, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) published assessment reports on the implementation of its leverage ratio framework in Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The assessments form part of the Basel Committee’s Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme, which evaluates the consistency and completeness of Basel standards’ implementation across member jurisdictions.

Grading

Australia, Japan, Korea and Switzerland were assessed as compliant with the Basel Committee’s global standards, the highest overall grade. Canada and the United Kingdom were assessed as largely compliant, which is one notch below the highest overall grade.

United Kingdom

The Basel Committee assessed two of the four components of the Basel leverage ratio standard (definitions and application, and calculation; and disclosure requirements) to be compliant. One component (exposure measurement) was assessed as partially non-compliant, and one component (buffer requirements and transitional arrangements for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs)) was assessed as largely compliant.

The exposure measurement grade was driven by one material finding: the Basel standards permit the temporary exemption of central bank reserves from the leverage ratio exposure measure, whereas the United Kingdom’s exemption extends to certain other non-reserve claims on central banks. Other deviations relating to the exposure measure were assessed as not material.

The buffer requirements grade reflects two potentially material findings: (i) the UK leverage buffer design can be less conservative than the Basel G-SIB leverage buffer in certain situations; and (ii) the absence of automatic capital distribution restrictions when the leverage ratio buffer is not met, with the UK framework relying instead on supervisory intervention.

Photo of Simon Lovegrove (UK) Simon Lovegrove (UK)
Read more about Simon Lovegrove (UK)Email
  • Posted in:
    Banking, Finance and Securities
  • Blog:
    Global Regulation Tomorrow
  • Organization:
    Norton Rose Fulbright
  • Article: View Original Source

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