In In re Est. of Wright, Teddy Jack Wright died in Throckmorton County, Texas, in July 2022. No. 11-24-00243-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 2532 (Tex. App.—Eastland March 19, 2026, pet. filed). Andy Wright and Glynda Fincannon filed an application to probate Teddy’s 2019 will in the 39th District Court of Throckmorton County. Robin Renee McCarthy, Teddy’s child and half-sibling to Andy and Glynda, filed a competing application to probate a 2007 will in the Throckmorton County Court. The probate proceedings became contested, as the parties adopted adversary positions regarding which will should be admitted to probate. Andy and Glynda moved to transfer the contested probate proceedings from the county court to the district court under Texas Estates Code § 32.003(a)(2), which imposes a mandatory duty on the county court to transfer contested matters to the district court upon motion by any party. The county court signed a transfer order containing contradictory language, both denying and granting the transfer, but the decretal language clearly ordered the transfer of the contested matters to the district court. The county clerk executed the transfer, and all parties proceeded in the district court without objection to the transfer until the appeal.

The district court found the 2019 will was properly executed, self-proved, and not suspicious. Robin presented no evidence that the 2019 will had been revoked. The presumption of continuity attached to the 2019 will, as it was produced without mutilation or evidence of revocation and was properly executed. The district court admitted the 2019 will to probate and denied Robin’s opposition.

On appeal, Robin argued that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to a defective transfer order and that the evidence was insufficient to prove the 2019 will had not been revoked. The appellate court held that the transfer order was effective, the district court had jurisdiction, and the presumption of continuity was not rebutted because Robin produced no evidence of revocation. Regarding jurisdiction, the court of appeals held:

“In a county in which there is no statutory probate court or county court at law exercising original probate jurisdiction, the county court has original jurisdiction of probate proceedings.” Throckmorton County has neither a statutory probate court nor a county court at law. Thus, in a county such as Throckmorton, “when a matter in a probate proceeding is contested, the judge of the county court . . . shall, on the motion of any party to the proceeding, according to the motion . . . transfer the contested matter to the district court, which may then hear the contested matter as if originally filed in the district court.” Robin is correct that original jurisdiction of the probate proceedings lies with the county court, not the district court. And as Robin has conceded, the county court had the authority to order the proceedings transferred to the district court, pursuant to Section 32.003(a). In fact, the county court was required to do so, as Andy and Glynda have urged, because it is undisputed that matters in the probate proceedings were contested. Nevertheless, Robin contends that the county court’s order was defective and failed to effectively transfer the matter to the district court.

Id. The court then held that the county court’s order was sufficient to transfer the case. Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to admit the 2019 will, the court of appeals held:

The only evidence presented to the district court that the 2019 will was never revoked consists of Andy’s (1) statements in his Proof of Death and Other Facts, and (2) testimony at the final hearing that the 2019 will had never been revoked, to “the best of [his] knowledge.” Robin argues that none of these statements were accompanied by a factual predicate and constitute bare legal conclusions which do not constitute evidence. Because Section 256.152(a)(1) of the Estates Code requires that an applicant who desires to probate a will must prove that the testator did not revoke it, Robin reasons that Andy and Glynda failed to offer any evidence to establish that the 2019 will had not, in fact, been revoked. The proponent of a will must prove that the testator did not revoke it. However, it is well established that when a will is produced without mutilation or other evidence of an intent to revoke, and the will is otherwise valid and has been duly shown to have been executed with the requisite formalities, a rebuttable presumption of continuity arises, and the will proponent need not then produce direct evidence of no revocation. In such circumstances, there is no requirement that the proponent produce other evidence. If the contestants of the will produce evidence of revocation, the presumption is rebutted and the burden shifts back to the proponents to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the will has not been revoked. The evidence of revocation must be substantial before the presumption of continuity is rebutted.

Here, with respect to the 2019 will, the district court found that: (1) Teddy was over eighteen when he signed the will; (2) Teddy signed the will in person; (3) the will was attested by two witnesses who were over fourteen and who subscribed their names to the will in their own handwriting in Teddy’s presence; (4) Teddy had full testamentary capacity as required by law; (5) the will was not executed by Teddy as a result of undue influence; (6) Teddy executed the will and his signature on it was not forged; and (7) the will was self-proving. Robin does not challenge these findings of fact, and the record supports the district court’s findings. Together, these unchallenged findings establish that the 2019 will was duly executed with the requisite formalities and not attended by suspicious circumstances. Accordingly, the presumption of continuity attached to the will and the burden of rebuttal was borne by Robin.On appeal, Robin points to no evidence of revocation and instead focuses her arguments on the alleged conclusory nature of Andy’s and Glynda’s testimony. In the absence of any evidence of revocation offered by Robin, the will is presumed to not have been revoked.

Id. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s order admitting the 2019 will to probate.

Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

dfjohnson@winstead.com
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

dfjohnson@winstead.com
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law Review, St. Mary’s Law Journal, South Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law