It is not uncommon for litigants to challenge costs that were incurred by the other side in connection with a successful anti-SLAPP motion. Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b), provides that except as otherwise provided by statute, “a
Law Offices of Adrianos Facchetti, P.C.
The Law Offices of Adrianos Facchetti, P.C. is a legal practice that publishes content primarily focused on litigation issues, particularly related to California law. Their blog posts often address procedural and substantive topics such as anti-SLAPP motions, attorney fee awards, cost recovery in litigation, and the applicability of state statutes in various courts including bankruptcy. The firm provides analysis of case law and statutory interpretation to guide litigants and attorneys on matters like allowable litigation costs, fee determinations, and claims under California law. Their publications serve as practical resources for understanding complex procedural rules and legal standards in civil litigation contexts.
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Should a court consider a plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees in determining how much to award in fees for the defendant following a successful anti-SLAPP motion?
Plaintiffs often incorrectly point to their attorney’s fees and costs to set the standard for what is reasonable. Plaintiffs will urge a court to use their attorney’s claimed expenditure of time as the yardstick for an award of fees. However,…
May a trial court consider a defendant’s “walk away” offer when determining the reasonableness of fees following a successful anti-SLAPP motion?
In most cases a court is not permitted to consider settlement offers under Evidence Code section 1152, which makes “inadmissible” evidence that is offered to “prove [the offeror’s] liability for the loss.” The main purpose of this rule is to…
Does a claim for intentional physical distress exist under California law?
There is no cognizable claim for intentional infliction of physical distress under California law. See Free v. Peikar, No. 1:17-cv-00159 MSJ (PC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61985, at *17 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2017) (“Plaintiff has also asserted a claim…
Does California’s anti-SLAPP statute apply in bankruptcy court?
Confusion abounds among litigants as to whether and when the anti-SLAPP may apply in a given case. A common mistake is to assume that the statute does not apply in bankruptcy court. However, there is long-standing authority in the Ninth…
Must attorney-client confidences be revealed in order to obtain attorney’s fees after a successful anti-SLAPP motion?
After prevailing on an anti-SLAPP motion, counsel will file often file a separate motion for attorney’s fees and costs. In order to obtain a recovery, counsel has the burden to substantiate the fees and costs. While invoices are not required,…
May a court adjust the lodestar upward based on exceptional representation?
Under California Supreme Court Precedent, a trial court may adjust the lodestar figure based on factors such as the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the quality of representation. Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1132; see also Edgerton v.…
What is a contingent fee multiplier in the context of an anti-SLAPP fee motion?
In Ketchum, our State Supreme Court reiterated that fee awards should be fully compensatory. Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1133. The unadorned lodestar is computed by multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent by the prevailing hourly rate for private “attorneys…
Is the reasonably hourly rate capped to what was paid by an insurer for purposes of determining the lodestar?
Losing plaintiffs often argue after an anti-SLAPP shellacking that a defendant is limited to what an insurance company paid defense counsel. Typically, those rates are “insurance rates,” and are thus way below market rates. But this is wrong.
Courts have…
Are anti-SLAPP fees recoverable in federal court?
The short answer is, yes. The attorney’s fee provision under subdivision (c) of the anti-SLAPP statute is applicable in federal court in diversity cases. The reason it applies is because it is deemed “substantive” for purposes of the Erie doctrine,…