In its recent decision in RJR Para Corp. v. Pond (pdf), the Appeals Court makes an important distinction between “personal injury” as that term is commonly understood, and an injuries that are personal in nature but concern rights in real property. For purposes of having standing to assert a claim under an assignment of rights from the injured person, this distinction is crucial. It is especially crucial for those who wish to walk in the footsteps of one Edward Gately, whose line of work the Appeals Court previously described, in Allen v. Batchelder (pdf), as “bounty hunting in troubled titles.”
Land Court: Bounty Hunter Doesn’t Have Standing
RJR Para Corp. (RJR) brought suit to quiet title to land in Medway and Milford, Massachusetts via a claim of adverse possession. RJR made modest efforts to find the landowner, Metcalf 
Pond, or his heirs. These efforts (perhaps by design) failed, and RJR received court permission to serve its complaint by published notice. When no one responded to that notice, the Land Court allowed RJR’s motion for default and entered judgment declaring RJR the owner of the land by adverse possession.
RJR would have walked off with the land without having to prove its adverse possession claim. But then entered Gately. He located two of Pond’s heirs, one of whom, Janet Dinan, decided to pursue the matter on her own. The other heir conveyed her interest in the land to Gately for $1,000, and assigned him all her rights as heir. Dinan and Gately then moved to intervene in the case and vacate the judgment. The Land Court allowed Dinan to intervene and then vacated the judgment, finding that RJR’s efforts to locate Pond’s heirs were inadequate. But the court denied, for lack of standing, Gately’s motion to intervene, reasoning that the right to set aside a judgment for inadequate notice is a constitutional due process claim that is “personal in nature, and ‘[a] claim for personal injury cannot be assigned.’” Gately appealed, and when Dinan later settled with RJR, Gately’s appeal became the sole obstacle between RJR and the coveted land.
Appeals Court: Bounty Hunter Does Have Standing
The Appeals Court reversed the Land Court’s decision on standing. “[T]hough the claimed violation of due process is personal in nature in that it implicates personal rights,” the court wrote, “it is not a claim for personal injury,” and only personal injury claims cannot be assigned. The court went on to note that the rule against assigning personal injury claims is premised on concerns about (1) the presentation of evidence of damage, and (2) enabling “the rich and powerful to oppress the poor.” The Court concluded that neither concern is implicated by due process claims based on injuries to real property interests.
Some Thoughts on Bounty Hunters in Troubled Titles
It’s easy to disparage the efforts of “bounty hunters in troubled titles” as serving only selfish interests, but they can play a salutary role in vindicating the rights of others. RJR Para Corp.illustrates this point, since the rights that Pond’s heirs had in the land were not protected by RJR’s inadequate efforts to serve its adverse possession complaint. One of the heirs lived in Maine, and the chances of her coming across a notice published in Massachusetts were slim. Unlike a personal injury, a threat to one’s property rights may be unknown to the potentially injured party. In this instance, Gately located two of Pond’s heirs, who were alerted to a threat to their property rights that they didn’t know existed, and, as a result, were able to realize some value from those rights. By confirming that parties like Pond’s heirs can validly assign their rights, the Appeals Court has ensured that “bounty hunting in troubled titles” will remain a viable business model.