In the recent case of Nguyen v. Biondo (In re Biondo), 2014 WL 2702891 (Bankr. S.D.Fla. 2014)(http://www.flsb.uscourts.gov) the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (“Bankruptcy Court”) held that $1,130,742.68 in damages in the underlying judgment entered by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida (“District Court”) for trademark infringement and cybersquatting were not dischargeable in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). For a debt to be found nondischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(6), the debt must be owing from the debtor to the plaintiff and arise from “willful and malicious” injury. An act is “willful” within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) if it is undertaken with the intent to cause injury, or if it is an intentional act and injury is certain or substantially certain to result. With respect to debts related to financial harms, a plaintiff must show that the defendant actually knew, at the time of the intentional act, that the injury was substantially certain to result. An act is “malicious” under section 523(a)(6) if it is wrongful and without just cause, or excessive even where there is no ill will. The Bankruptcy Court determined that findings by the District Court that the debtor intentionally infringed on the plaintiffs’ trademark and undertook cybersquatting, with full knowledge that such acts would harm the plaintiffs’ property, and without just cause or excuse, were entitled to collateral estoppel effect and satisfied the “willful and malicious” requirement of section 523(a)(6).
