When Pittsburgh, PA resident Richard Baumhammers, in 2000, went on his hate-filled shooting spree and assassinated, among others, an Asian gentleman as he labored at a Chinese restaurant, the issue arose as to whether his death was work-related. Plainly the worker was killed in the course of his employment, but did his injury arise out of his employment?
According to the Larson treatise, we should treat such a casualty as one from a “neutral risk,” that is, one neither intimately connected to the employee’s work (professional risk), nor uniquely connected with the employee’s private life outside of work (personal risk). Injuries from the former are almost always compensable; injuries via the latter are not. The Larson treatise further posits that most courts hold that injuries from neutral risks, sustained while the worker is otherwise in the course of employment, should be deemed compensable – the work-connectedness is satisfied by the employee’s presence at work and lack of culpability. It is hardly a reach in such cases to say that the injury arose out of the employment.
Baumhammers’ assassination of the worker seems to have been a perfect example, however rare, of a neutral risk injury. A mentally ill gunman, seething with hatred of Asians, enters a venue where he is sure to find an Asian to murder, and carries out the act. The worker has no prior relationship with the assailant. But for the circumstances and obligations of the employee’s work, he would never have been subject to this risk of injury. He was totally free of culpability in being victim to a random hate-crime atrocity. Under the majority view, his injury arose out of his employment.
As the talented Post & Schell attorney Kyle Black explains, however, this is not the analysis undertaken under the Pennsylvania Act. In his new article, Mr. Black explains that the analysis is driven by statute, specifically a proviso of Section 301(c)(1). That proviso creates an affirmative defense, the “reasons personal” exception (also known as the personal animus exception), under which an employer contesting a claim may seek to show that the injury was for “reasons personal.” See 77 P.S. § 411(1); Torrey-Greenberg Treatise, § 4:106. Mr. Black's article is “Don’t Take it Personally”: Explaining the Correct Interpretation of Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act Section 301(c)(1)’s “Reasons Personal” Exception – and Why it’s More than Just a Matter of Semantics, PBA Workers’ Compensation Law Section Newsletter, Vol. VII, No. 128, p. 47 (December 2016). [Available from this writer: dtorrey@pa.gov.]
A number of states have a similar statute, as long discussed in the Little, Eaton & Smith workers' compensation law school text (West 6th ed., pp.260-261).
Amazingly, a fundamental ambiguity has existed in this statute since at least 1959, specifically over whether the reasons must be reasons personal to the employee or to the assailant. Often, a mutuality of personal animus exists, so in most instances the uncertainty of language is probably irrelevant. But what of neutral risk cases, where the assailant, like Baumhammers, has reasons personal (hatred of Asians), but the employee has no familiarity with the assailant and is completely free of culpability? In such cases, the difference matters.
Mr. Black has written the definitive brief on this issue, methodically considering statutory construction, effectuation of the Act’s humanitarian purpose, similar statutes, and the approach of other jurisdictions. He ultimately submits that the Section 301(c)(1) exception should be read to exclude only injury and death caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal to the employee. Under this interpretation, the Baumhammers hate-crime victim, who was in the course of his employment, who had imported no risk, and who otherwise lacked culpability, would have been deemed to have sustained a work-related death. The employer, in this regard, would have been unable to show that his death was for reasons personal to him.