On 15 December 2020, the European Commission published proposals for two regulations to regulate digital services, the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act. According to the Commission’s press release, the two proposals are a central part of the Europe’s digital decade agenda. In this contribution the authors discuss the Digital Markets Act that seeks to regulate “gatekeepers” that offer “core platform services”, the positions of the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament of November 25th and December 15th, 2021.
The draft Digital Services Act and amendments to the e-commerce Directive 2000/311 (the “Digital Services Act” or abbreviated “DSA”) focus on the regulation of different types of online intermediaries ranging from simple intermediary services to very large online platforms for which different degrees of regulation are provided. The proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Digital Markets Act (the “DMA”)3 applies to online platforms which offer core platform services with a “gatekeeper” status that fulfil a bottleneck function between companies and consumers for important digital services.
According to the Commission, platforms that operate in digital markets bring many benefits to end users. For example, entrepreneurs can more easily reach large groups of consumers across national borders. According to the Commission, a number of large platforms are increasingly acting as gateways or gatekeepers between business users and end-users and are taking up a firmly established and durable positions, often as a result of the creation of ecosystems around their core platform services, which further strengthens existing barriers to entry. At the same time, the Commission identifies the risk that a situation could arise in some markets where one or a few platforms could capture virtually all users.
The Commission considers, consumers and businesses often cannot avoid these large platforms. The Gatekeeper platforms can therefore behave independently and to their own advantage in relation to companies using the platform, raising barriers to entry for potential competitors. Unfair practices and lack of potential competition lead to inefficiencies in the digital sector such as higher prices, lower quality, less choice and less innovation, to the detriment of European consumers, the Commission said. The Commission has found that the current competition rules are not sufficient to address problems in the digital economy.
Below we provide an overview of the content of the DMA. Where reference is made in this contribution to the DSA and the DMA, this refers to the proposals for regulations designed for these purposes, which have yet to pass through the European legislative process and are therefore still subject to change.
Contents Digital Markets Act
Subject matter and scope of application
With the DMA, the Commission introduces an ex-ante regulatory framework for core platform services with a gate-keeping function. The DMA is divided into six chapters with 39 articles introducing a completely new legal regime with a new conceptual framework, new substantive standards for the designation of gatekeepers offering core platform services as well as new obligations for gatekeepers, the introduction of applicable procedures for the designation and further specification of obligations as well as for penalties to be imposed by the Commission and a division of powers specific to this Regulation in which the Commission plays a central role.
The DMA does not refer to competition law concepts such as a relevant market and whether a provider enjoys a dominant position on that relevant market. Instead, new criteria are introduced (which are partly quantitative; see below) on the basis of which core platform services are designated as gatekeepers. The DMA will impact providers of core platform services that:
a) have a significant impact on the internal market;
b) operate one or more major gateways for access to customers; and
c) have, or are expected to have, a firmly established and sustainable position with their activities.
The DMA also does not encompass relevant competition law “practices” against which ex post remedies are established to address “abuse of dominance” or “anti-competitive agreements”. Instead, the DMA is designed to enable ex ante obligations to be imposed on designated gatekeepers and certain practices that limit the “contestability” of digital markets or are “unfair” as set out in article 1(1): “This Regulation lays down harmonised rules ensuring contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the Union where gatekeepers are present”.
By not being constrained by the competition law analytical framework, the DMA circumvents difficult and time-consuming questions regarding market definition and dominance analysis in the rapidly developing digital sector.
The gatekeeper obligations created by the DMA apply in addition to existing European and national regulation, including European and national competition law, merger control, data protection law and a long list of other ex ante regulation including, for example, the P2B Regulation and the DSA. The only exception to the complementarity of the DMA is electronic communications networks and electronic communications services as defined in Directive 2018/1972 (“the Telecoms Code”). Article 1(3) DMA provides that the Proposed Regulation does not apply to electronic communications networks and services with the exception of interpersonal communications services as defined in that Directive. The term ‘markets’ here will presumably not be applied in the strict competition law sense in terms of market definition, but what is meant is unclear. Core platform services, pursuant to Article 2(2)(e) DMA, include number-independent interpersonal communications services (also known as “NI-ICS”).
An important feature of the DMA – and also an important difference with the DSA – is that the responsibility for the designation of gatekeepers and the supervision and enforcement of the DMA lies with the European Commission and not with national authorities. The reasons given for this is that the DMA addresses pan-European (indeed global) firms and conduct, that there are only a limited number of gatekeepers and that national fragmentation of regulations must be avoided.
To ensure that Member States have a role to play, the proposal foresees that the Commission consults with a Digital Markets Advisory Committee (the “Committee”) with Member State representatives before taking certain decisions (e.g. on non-compliance and fines). This Committee shall also be consulted prior to the adoption of individual decisions addressed to gatekeepers. The DMA also provides for the possibility that three or more Member States may ask the Commission to conduct a market investigation on the basis of a suspicion that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper. However, in order to harmonise the rules, Member States may not impose any further legal or administrative requirements of their own in order to ensure “contestable and fair markets “ and national authorities may not take decisions which would run counter to a Commission decision taken under the DMA.
 In our view, this demarcation, based on the use of generic concepts to indicate what Member States and national regulators are no longer allowed to do, is rather vague. At the same time, the involvement of individual Member States and national authorities in decisions under the DMA is marginal, both in terms of the determination of legal standards and in terms of implementation, supervision and enforcement. It is not surprising that the allocation of responsibilities between the Commission, the Committee and cooperation with Member States and the roles given to national regulatory and supervisory authorities is one of the important issues for discussion.
According to Article 1(2), the DMA applies to core platform services provided or offered by gatekeepers to business users established in the Union or to end-users established or located in the Union, irrespective of the place of establishment or residence of the gatekeepers and irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the service. The Regulation therefore has extraterritorial effect outside the European Union.
The DMA introduces several important new concepts in Article 2. The new key concept is “core platform services” provided by “gatekeepers”. A “gatekeeper” is a provider of “core platform services” that fulfils the three criteria set out above and has been designated as such by the Commission. A “core platform service” includes the following categories of services for which other concepts used in EU legislation are (partly) applied:
a) Online intermediary service (including marketplaces, app stores, platform services and booking platforms); 
b) online search engine; 
c) online social networking service; 
d) video platform service; 
e) number-independent interpersonal communication service; 
f) operating systems; 
g) Cloud computing service;  and
h) advertising services.
It is noteworthy that the DMA does not refer to the concepts of ‘online platforms’ and ‘very large online platforms’ introduced in the DSA. The question of whether a provider is covered by the DMA requires a stand-alone assessment based on a quantitative or qualitative test against the three criteria set out in the DMA, which is separate from the qualification based on the DSA.
Designation of gatekeepers
Chapter II of the DMA (Articles 3 and 4) contains the provisions on the designation of gatekeepers, elaborating on the three characteristics mentioned above (significant impact on the internal market, operation of one or more important gateways for access to customers and an (expected) firm and sustainable position). The conditions under which core platform service providers should be designated as gatekeepers are defined, either based on quantitative criteria or following a qualitative assessment in the context of a market study.
If a gatekeeper meets the quantitative criteria, he or she should be designated on the basis of a presumptive test, with the possibility to rebut the designation. 
a) A gatekeeper is deemed to have a significant impact on the internal market if, over the last three financial years, it has achieved an annual turnover of at least EUR 6,5 billion in the European Economic Area (EEA), or if, over the last financial year, the average market capitalisation or equivalent fair market value of the company to which it belongs is at least EUR 65 billion, and if it provides a core platform service in at least three Member States.
b) A gatekeeper shall operate one or more major customer access gateways if it provides core platform service/s with more than 45 million monthly active end-users located in the Union and more than 10 000 annual actionable business users located in the Union in the last fiscal year.
c) The condition of an (expected) durable market position is met if, during each of the last three financial years, the threshold referred to in (b) above has been met.
The gatekeeper is expected to carry out a self-assessment and report to the Commission for certain core platform services if the quantitative criteria are met. Even if the provider does not carry out the self-assessment, the Commission may designate the platform as a gatekeeper. Designation as a gatekeeper is also possible under Article 3(6) DMA on the basis of a qualitative analysis if the quantitative criteria are not met, following a ‘market test’ referred to in Article 15 DMA to determine whether the CPS provider meets the three “gatekeeper” characteristics. In addition to the characteristics for the quantitative test, the investigation will also look (prospectively) at a range of qualitative criteria, including network effects, economies of scale and scope, business or end-user lock-in and other structural characteristics of the market. It is therefore not a formal market definition analysis.
Pursuant to Article 3(8) DMA, a gatekeeper must comply with the obligations on gatekeepers under or pursuant to the DMA within six months of being designated as a gatekeeper for that core platform service and will be included in a list to be maintained by the Commission. At least every two years, the Commission shall assess whether the designated gatekeepers continue to fulfil the three characteristics for the designation of gatekeepers set out in Article 3(1) of the DMA. The Commission can also designate new gatekeepers.
The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 37 to specify the method for determining whether the quantitative thresholds laid down in the second paragraph of Article 3 are met and to regularly adapt them to market and technological developments. The scope of the proposal and the method of determining whether the quantitative thresholds are met, particularly with regard to the determination of annual turnover, is subject of debate in both the market and academic circles.
Commitments and market research
Chapter III describes the obligations that designated gatekeepers of core platform services must adhere to in order to avoid “practices” that limit “contestability” and are “unfair.”
The DMA lays down a total of eighteen ex ante obligations for gatekeepers in Articles 5 and 6. Article 5 contains a self-executing list of six obligations that are not further specified.
Article 6 contains a further set of 12 obligations which may be specified by the Commission. Designated gatekeepers must fulfil all these obligations for all their core platform services listed in the designation decision. In addition, Article 7 DMA establishes a framework for a possible dialogue between the designated gatekeeper and the Commission on measures that the gatekeeper implements or intends to implement to comply with the obligations under Article 6 DMA.
In addition to the commandments and prohibitions relating to “practices” that are unfair or restrictive of contestability, Article 12 of the DMA includes an obligation for designated gatekeepers to inform the Commission of any proposed concentration within the meaning of the EU Merger Regulation involving another core platform service provider or any other service provided in the digital sector, regardless of whether it is notifiable under merger control at the European or national level. The merger notification thresholds do not apply. Article 13 of the DMA includes an obligation for designated gatekeepers to inform the Commission, on the basis of an independent audit, of consumer profiling techniques used by them on or between core platform services. Finally, Chapter III of the DMA contains articles relating to the suspension of obligations for individual core platform services in exceptional circumstances or exemptions for reasons of public interest.
The table below setting out the obligations under Articles 5, 6, 12 and 13 is based on a working document of the European Council of Ministers dated 23 February 2021.
DIGITAL MARKETS ACT OBLIGATIONS
Use of data
- Art. 5(a) – Mandatory opt-in for personal data combination/deep consumer profiling
- Art. 6.1(a) – Mandatory separation of data sets
- Art. 13 – Obligation to inform the EU Commission of consumer profiling techniques
Data access and data portability
- Art. 6.1(h) – Obligation to ensure effective data portability in real time
- Art. 6.1(i) – Obligation to provide access to data generated by users of business users
- Art. 6.1(j) – Obligation to provide access to search data
- Art. 5(b) – Prohibition of parity clauses
- Art. 5(c) – Anti-steering provision
Leveraging access to Core Platform Services
- Art. 5(e) – Prohibition of requiring business users to use a given ID service
- Art. 5(f) – Prohibition of making access to Core Platform Services conditional on each other
- Art. 5(g) – Mandatory transparency in advertising intermediation (price)
- Art. 6.1(g) – Mandatory transparency in advertising intermediation (performance)
- Art. 6.1(b) – Mandatory freedom of app un-installing
- Art. 6.1(c) – Obligation to allow side loading of third-party apps or app stores
- Art. 6.1(e) – Prohibition of restricting user switching between different apps and services
- Art. 6.1(f) – Ban on self-preferencing through access to the operating system and other features
- Art. 6.1(d) – Ban on self-preferencing in ranking
- Art. 6.1(k) – Ban on unfair access conditions for app stores
- Art. 5(d) – Prohibition to prevent contacts with authorities
- Art. 12 – Obligation to inform the EU Commission of intended acquisitions
The system of prescriptive obligations for gatekeepers in the DMA with the possibility for the Commission to further specify the 12 obligations in Article 6 puts a lot of power in the hands of the Commission. In addition, Article 10 of the DMA provides for the power of the Commission to adopt delegated acts to update the obligations set out in Articles 5 and 6. The Commission’s discretion is further reinforced by the absence in the DMA of any definition or prediction of when practices are “unfair” or limit the “ability to challenge”. It is even questionable whether the Commission is required to involve the Digital Markets Advisory Committee provided for in Article 32 in the case of the delegated acts provided for in Articles 7 and 10, as there is no reference to that article in the relevant articles.
Chapter IV contains rules for conducting market tests for the designation of a new gatekeeper, market tests for systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper and market tests for new services to enlarge the list of core platform services or new practices that should be prohibited in view of the DMA’s objective.
Article 15(4) allows the Commission to subject emerging gatekeepers who fulfil the first two criteria of Article 3(1) DMA, but who may not yet enjoy a firmly entrenched and sustainable position in the market, to a limited number of obligations and prohibitions on the basis of Articles 5(b), 6(1)(e), 6(1)(f), 6(1)(h) and 6(1)(i).
Research, enforcement and supervision
Procedural provisions for the conduct of Commission investigations, enforcement and supervision as well as procedural safeguards for relevant gatekeepers are included in Section V of the DMA. Chapter V also provides for the involvement of Member States through the Committee. The explanatory memorandum to the DMA states that the Committee is (only) consulted prior to the adoption of individual decisions addressed to gatekeepers but not, for example, in the case of the imposition of additional applicable to all gatekeepers. Chapter V also provides for the possibility of three or more Member States launching an inquiry into the gatekeeper status of an individual company.
Article 18 states that intentions to specify obligations for gatekeepers or to take enforcement or penalty decisions shall be included in a decision initiating such proceedings. Subsequent articles specify the measures available to the Commission for the purpose of investigation, and enforcement, including powers to request information, to hear and take statements, to conduct on-site inspections and to take interim measures. In the case of non-compliance, the Commission may take an infringement decision or impose a fine or a periodic penalty payment, including in cases of the provision of incorrect, incomplete or misleading information. It would appear that these provisions are in line with the competition law instruments available to the Commission in the event of an infringement of the ban on abuse of a dominant position. The Member States and the national authorities are also obliged to provide information to the Commission, but without the possibility of a fine or periodic penalty payments.
The fines for breach of duty by gatekeepers are capped at 10% of the annual turnover for the previous year in case of intent or negligence. By way of comparison, the DSA sets the maximum fine for very large online platforms at 6% of the said annual turnover. A fine of up to 1% of the annual turnover in the preceding year may be imposed for the provision of incorrect or misleading information is provided to the Commission. The DMA also allows the Commission to impose a penalty payment of up to 5% of the average daily turnover in the preceding business year if the gatekeeper refuses to cooperate in a market investigation into systematic non-compliance or the provision of correct and complete information.
A gatekeeper has the possibility, pending the market investigation into systematic non-compliance as referred to in Article 16 DMA or a proposed non-compliance decision as referred to in Article 25, to make commitments that can be made binding by the Commission. The DMA also lays down limitation periods and procedural safeguards such as the right to be heard, access to the file and confidentiality.
Chapter VI contains further general provisions, such as the obligation to publish some individual decisions taken under the DMA and the clarification that the Court of Justice of the European Union has unlimited jurisdiction on fines and periodic penalty payments.
Furthermore, the possibility for the Commission to adopt implementing acts is provided for, as well as the possibility for the Commission to adopt certain delegated acts through a 5-year sunset clause (with tacit renewal) and the possibility for the European Parliament or the Council to revoke the delegation of powers to the Commission. These clauses only apply to the delegation of powers under Article 3(6) DMA (designation of gatekeepers following a qualitative analysis) and Article 9(1) DMA (exemption from specific obligations). However, such a clause does not apply, for example, to the determination of the method for determining whether the quantitative criteria laid down in Article 3(5) of the DMA are met, nor for updates of the obligations on gatekeepers laid down in Article 10 of the DMA, whereas these delegated acts appear to be of great importance and give rise to much debate.
The obligations for gatekeepers shall apply with effect from six months after the entry into force of the DMA. Given the scope and substantive nature of the obligations and the fact that the designation decisions alone will take several months, that timeframe seems unrealistically short.
The Council of Ministers adopted its general approach on the DMA on November 25th. The DMA, like the DSA, is vested in the Internal Market Committee (IMCO) of the European Parliament as the lead committee (and other committees). The DMA was tabled for first reading in the European Parliament on December 15th.
Council general approach
The Council of Ministers made several amendments to the proposal. The Council’s text shortens the deadlines and improves the criteria for the designation of gatekeepers. The DMA should include an annex containing a methodology that defines ‘active end users’ and ‘active business users’. Improvements were made to make the structure and the scope of obligations clearer and more futureproof. The text also contains a new obligation that enhances the right of end users to unsubscribe from core platform services. Provisions on regulatory dialogue were improved to ensure that the discretionary power of the European Commission to engage in this dialogue is used appropriately. To prevent fragmentation of the internal market, the text confirms the European Commission as the sole enforcer of the regulation. Member states can empower national competition authorities to start investigations into possible infringements and transmit their findings to the European Commission. Germany, France and the Netherlands called for the sharing of enforcement powers between Brussels and national capitals. These countries want to give space to local regulators to pursue their own cases, even if they go further than what is laid down in DMA.
European Parliament position
On December 15th, 2021 the European Parliament approved their version of the DMA. The text was adopted with 642 votes in favour, 8 votes against and 46 abstentions. The European Parliament voted for stronger and centralised enforcement by the European Commission, in cooperation with national authorities. It proposes a European High-Level Group of Digital Regulators in the form of an expert group, consisting of a representative of the Commission, a representative of relevant Union bodies, representatives of national competent authorities and representatives of other national competent authorities in specific sectors including data protection, electronic communications and consumer protection authorities. It will be able to issue advice and recommendations. National Competent Authorities (NCAs) should support the Commission in monitoring compliance and obligations. Following the position of the council, NCAs should be able to start an investigation and impose gatekeeper obligations based on national laws, and to attend the Digital Markets Advisory Committee in an expert role. The European Parliament proposes that two or more NCAs may request the Commission to open an investigation on a platform provider. Furthermore, the DMA should ensure adequate arrangements to enable whistle blowers to alert competent authorities. The European Parliament is also a proponent of a stricter gatekeeper designation process with shorter timelines.
In terms of the scope of the DMA, the European Parliament proposes that non-commercial collaborative projects should not be considered as core platforms services. Core platform services should also include online intermediation services like online search engines, operating systems (smart devices, internet of things or embedded digital services in vehicles), online social networking, video sharing platform services, number-independent interpersonal communication services, cloud computing services, virtual assistant services, web browsers, connected TV and online advertising services. With respect to the quantitative thresholds, the parliament proposes an annual turnover EUR of 8 instead of 6,5 billion in the last three financial years, 80 instead of 65 billion EUR in terms of market capitalisation in the last three financial years, and 45 million monthly active end users and 10.000 active business users using at least one core platform service.
The European Parliament also proposes new obligations and prohibitions directly applicable to big platforms acting as gatekeepers. The Commission may add new obligations to art 5 and 6 DMA through delegate acts. Gatekeepers will have to refrain from imposing unfair conditions on businesses and consumers. Additional requirements are proposed on the use of data for targeted or micro-targeted advertising and the interoperability of services, e.g. number-independent interpersonal communications services and social network services. Gatekeepers should refrain from combining personal data except if there is a “clear, explicit, renewed, informed consent” in accordance with the GDPR.
Furthermore, the European Parliament proposes that the Commission for a limited period can restrict gatekeepers from making ‘killer acquisitions’. Gatekeepers would also be obliged to inform the Commission of any intended concentration. Business users, competitors, end-users of the core platform services as well as their representatives or other person with a legitimate interest may complain to the competent national authorities. And last but not least, the European Parliament proposes fines of 4% and up to 20% of the total annual turnover of the gatekeeper.
The Commission’s recently established a Digital Markets Act task force that will be responsible for guiding the trilogue negotiations in 2022 and the designation of gatekeepers. The trilogue will begin once the Parliament has agreed on its position. European Commissioner Margrethe Vestager aims to have reached consensus by the summer of 2022, with a six-month deadline for entry into force, but that seems ambitious and would be fast by European standards.
With the DMA, the Commission is introducing a new ex ante regulatory framework for eight categories of core gatekeeper platform services, i.e. providers that have a significant impact on the internal market, operate one or more major gateways to access customers, and have or are expected to have a firmly entrenched and sustainable position through their activities.
The DMA introduces a fundamentally new legal regime by way of a directly applicable regulation with a new categorisation of platform services, new substantive standards and procedures for the designation of gatekeepers offering core platform services and a set of new obligations that will apply to these gatekeepers. Unlike in the context of the ex-ante SMP regime for the electronic communications sector, the designation of gatekeepers under the DMA is not based on familiar competition law principles. Further, implementation, supervision and the imposition of sanctions are fully centralised in the Commission.
Although the DSA and the DMA are proposed in combination, they are in fact completely different instruments, both in terms of the parties addressed and in terms of the framework of standards and procedures to be followed. It is noted that the complexity of the regulations is increasing as a result of overlapping regulatory instruments, making it increasingly difficult for companies to find their way around the ever-expanding European regulatory structure. However, following entry into force of the DSA and the DMA, regulators will also have to find their way again in a new system of substantive and procedural standards, and the same applies to the judiciary at national and European level. The DMA adds a new dimension to this.
M.J. Geus is a lawyer in The Hague (Bird & Bird) Mr. F.P. Sickinghe is principal regulatory counsel at Bird & Bird. A previous version of this article in Dutch was published in Mediaforum as part of a diptych (www.mediaforum.nl)
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive 2000/31/EC’) line on electronic commerce”) (OJ L 178, 17.07.2000, p. 1). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/NL/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32000L0031.
 Brussels, 15.12.2020 COM(2020) 825 final; 2020/0361 (COD).
Brussels, 15.12.2020 COM(2020) 842 final; 2020/0374 (COD).
 Explanatory Memorandum to the proposal, p. 2; see also Article 3(1) DMA.
Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation).
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/NL/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679.
 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediary services.
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the European Electronic Communications Code (European Telecom Code) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/NL/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018L1972&FROM=EN.
Article 2(5) Telecom Code: Interpersonal communication services relate to ‘services normally provided for remuneration which enable the direct personal and interactive exchange of information through electronic communications networks between a finite number of persons, where the persons initiating or participating in the communication identify the recipients, and which does not include services allowing personal and interactive communication as a merely incidental feature indissolubly linked to another service’.
 BEREC recommends deleting the reference to ‘markets’ in Article 1(3) DMA given the ambiguities. See BEREC Report on the interplay between the EECC and the EC’s proposal for a Digital Markets Act concerning number- independent interpersonal communication services, p. 25 (BoR (21) 85).
 Article 2(7) Telecom Code defines a NI-ICS service as “an inter- personal communications service that does not connect to publicly allocated numbering resources, namely a number or a set of numbers in national or international numbering plans, or that does not allow communication with a number or a set of numbers in national or inter- national numbering plans”.
 Explanatory notes DMA, p. 10/11.
Article 32 DMA.
 Article 33 DMA.
 Article 1(5) DMA.
 Article 1(7) DMA.
 See the definition in Article 2(2) DMA.
 Section 2(5) DMA: “service as defined in Article 2(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150” (the Regulation to promote fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediary services).
 Section 2(6) DMA: “a digital service as defined in Article 2(5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150” (the Regulation to Promote Fairness and Transparency for Business Users of Online Intermediary Services).
 Article 2(7) DMA: “a platform that enables end users to connect, share, discover and interact with each other through multiple appa- rates, in particular through chats, posts, videos and recommendations”.
Article 2(8) DMA: ‘a service as defined in Article 1(1)(aa) of Regulation 2010/13/EU’ (Audiovisual Media Services Directive).
 Article 2(9) DMA: ‘a service as defined in Article 2(7) of Directive (EU) 2018/1972’ (European Electronic Communications Code).
 Article 2(10) DMA: “system software which controls the basic functions of the hardware or software ware and enables software applications on it”.
 Article 2(11) DMA: “a digital service as defined in Article 4(19) of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council” (NIS Directive).
 Article 3(2) DMA.
 Article 3(3) DMA.
Article 8 DMA.
 Article 9 DMA.
 Article 32 DMA.
 Article 33 DMA.
 Articles 19 to 22 DMA
 Articles 25 to 27 DMA.
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community drag (Text with EEA relevance) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/NL/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32003R0001.
Article 19 sixth paragraph DMA.
Article 27 DMA.
Article 23 DMA.
 Article 28 and 29 DMA.