The seven-year anniversary of the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Ritchie v. Rupee has come and gone, and the court’s holding from 2014 remains the law: Minority shareholders in Texas private companies do not have a cause of action to pursue claims for oppressive conduct against the company’s majority shareholders. Although a bill surfaced in the Texas Legislature a couple of years after Ritchie that would have created this cause of action, it went nowhere, which leaves Texas among a minority of states that have no claim for minority shareholder oppression. As this post points out, however, minority shareholders do have several other claims available to assert against the company’s majority owners, which provide them with real clout when disputes arise with their business partners.
Link to The Arrows that Remain in the Quiver The Arrows that Remain in the Quiver
This post does not review each of these causes of action in depth, but the array of claims that remain available to minority shareholders include the following causes of action.
Link to Breach of Fiduciary Duty Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Majority owners who hold control positions in the company, e.g., officers, directors and managers, owe fiduciary duties to the company, including the duty of loyalty. Therefore, if control persons engage in self-dealing or otherwise abuse their authority in managing the company, they will be committing breaches of their fiduciary duties and they are liable for the harm they cause the business to sustain.
Some of the important procedural advantages that benefit minority shareholders in filing derivative actions under Section 21.563 of the TBOC are summarized below:
Link to Breach of Contract Breach of Contract
Certain types of conduct may give rise to multiple claims, and conduct by the control group that constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty may also give rise to a breach of contract claim. The minority shareholder and his/her counsel should therefore closely review the corporation’s bylaws or the terms of the LLC operating agreement to determine if the officers, managers or directors abided by terms of these governance documents. When managers disregard the terms of the company’s own documents, this conduct gives rise to strong claims for breach of contract and the potential for recovery of damages and legal fees. Not all breaches are of equal import, but minority shareholders will want to consider whether the control persons complied with all of the following provisions that may be included in the company’s governance documents:
- Timely issuance of annual and quarterly financial reports and annual audits;
- Appointment and voting on new directors, officers, and/or managers as required;
Link to Appointment of a Receiver to Rehabilitate or Dissolve the Company Appointment of a Receiver to Rehabilitate or Dissolve the Company
While this relief is rarely granted, minority shareholders do have the right under the statute to request a district court to appoint a receiver when the majority owners engage in conduct that is ‘illegal, oppressive or fraudulent” (see TBOC § 11.404). This is known as a rehabilitative receivership, and the receiver is appointed to specifically address and rehabilitate the company by addressing the improper conduct. This is a high standard for a shareholder to meet, and the legal standard is discussed at length in the Ritchie case, but courts have been reluctant to impose this type of a receivership.
Receivership is viewed as a draconian remedy, and it should therefore be seen as available only in cases where the conduct of majority owners toward minority shareholders has been of an extreme or an unconscionable nature.
Link to Fraud Fraud
Another claim that should be considered by minority shareholders is a claim for common law fraud or fraud arising under the Texas Securities Act and related regulations. If the minority shareholder’s investment was induced through fraudulent statements made by majority owners, the shareholder may have a claim for fraudulent inducement that would permit him to recover his or her investment, as well as other damages and legal fees. In this regard, the investigation of potential claims should focus on specific/actionable representations made by majority owners that clearly presented false information at the time they were made rather than merely statements of future prediction or general assurances (known as “puffing”) that did not misrepresent any specific facts about the company, its financial information or status.
