On April 17, 2024, the Supreme Court unanimously held in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, MO, that a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not require a plaintiff to prove “significant” or “serious” harm. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, which reversed the Eighth Circuit’s decision and remanded.
As previously summarized in Dykema’s January 2024 edition, Muldrow alleged that the St. Louis Police Department demoted her to a different, less prestigious position because she was a woman. Before her transfer, Muldrow worked as a plainclothes officer in the specialized Intelligence Division where she investigated public corruption and human trafficking, oversaw the Gang Unit, and served as head of the Gun Crimes Unit. She was also deputized as a Task Force Officer with the FBI (which granted her FBI credentials, personal use of an unmarked car, and the ability to pursue investigations outside of St. Louis). A new division commander transferred Muldrow to a different division where she served as a uniformed officer and supervised the day-to-day activities of neighborhood patrols. The role involved more administrative work, and she lost her FBI status, as well as the car. Her schedule also changed from a traditional Monday-to-Friday work week to a “rotating schedule” that often involved working weekends. Despite the transfer, Muldrow’s pay and rank did not change. The district court concluded that these were not “significant” changes to working conditions that caused a “material employment disadvantage” as required for a Title VII claim, and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. The Eight Circuit affirmed.
The Court reversed, holding that a Title VII plaintiff must show “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment,” and rejecting a “significant” or “serious” harm requirement. The Court noted that nothing in the text of Title VII requires “significant” or “serious” harm. In this context, “term” and “condition” are not read “in the narrow contractual sense” and cover more than “economic or tangible” harm. So despite no loss of salary or rank, Muldrow’s transfer to a role with lesser supervisory responsibilities, a less regular schedule, and loss of her take-home car made her worse off respecting terms and conditions (or the “what, where, and when”) of her work. The Court added that whether Muldrow’s claims had adequate evidentiary support (as the district court and Eighth Circuit suggested) would be for the courts below to decid
Although all Justices agreed Title VII does not require “significant” or “serious” harm, there was less agreement about the “some harm” standard.
Justice Kavanaugh wrote that a forced transfer, or other change to job responsibilities, based on sex (or race, or other protected class) is itself discrimination that violates Title VII and no more proof of harm is needed. Still, he accepted the Court’s “some harm” standard and presumed that his preferred test would reach the same result “in 99 out of 100 discriminatory transfer cases, if not in all 100.”
Justice Thomas agreed there was no “significant” harm requirement for a Title VII claim, but questioned whether the “some harm” standard was substantively different from the Eighth Circuit’s analysis and whether Muldrow properly presented the facts the Court cited to reach its conclusion. In his view, a Title VII plaintiff needs to prove more than a “nontrifling change,” from a transfer, which aligns with the Court’s “some harm” requirement. At any rate, he wrote, some harms identified by the Court (such as loss of a take-home car, an irregular schedule, and FBI status) either may not have been preserved by Muldrow or were not attributable to the City’s actions. He thus questioned whether the Eighth Circuit’s decision would turn out differently under the “some harm” standard.
Justice Alito also questioned whether the Court’s “some harm” standard is substantively different from what the Eighth Circuit applied. He agreed that assuming that Muldrow properly preserved and presented the facts cited in the Court’s opinion, she would have shown a violation of Title VII if the transfer was based on her sex. Yet he also called the Court’s opinion “unhelpful” and doubted it would clarify what harm a Title VII plaintiff must show, suggesting that the Court’s definition still requires “at least some degree of significant or substantial[]” harm.
Takeaway
- The Court wrote that its decision “lowers the bar Title VII plaintiffs must meet,” and that it expects “many cases will come out differently.” Employers may consider reviewing policies and practices, especially with respect to employee transfers, to account for the new standard in Muldrow.
For more information, please contact Chantel Febus, James Azadian, Cory Webster, Christopher Sakauye, Monika Harris, Puja Valera, A. Joseph Duffy, IV., or Heming Xu.