Authored by: Shmuel Wyckoff
A young man named Quovadas Mahomes, and a young woman named Bethany McKee, in two separate counties, were convicted of murder. Mahomes shot four rival gang members, killing one; McKee did not kill anyone. She was convicted on a theory of accountability. Bethany had participated in a plan to kill two men for their money to buy alcohol and drugs. Mahomes was originally sentenced to 44 years in prison, but he ultimately received 37 years after an appellate court granted him a new sentencing hearing. Bethany McKee received natural life, and her sentence was affirmed on appeal. Although Bethany had been raped when she was 14, had a history of alcohol and drug abuse, and had multiple mental health diagnoses, the statutory scheme mandated that she be sentenced to natural life in prison. Why was Mahomes able to successfully challenge his sentence while Bethany McKee could not? Because Mahomes was 17 years old at the time of his crime and Bethany was 18.[1]
Young-adult offenders (18-21 years old) like Bethany McKee often find themselves in a unique predicament at sentencing. On one hand, Illinois courts have long recognized youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing.[2] On the other hand, some crimes carry long statutory minimum sentences and young-adult offenders do not automatically receive the same constitutional protections as juveniles. This has resulted in courts treating offenders who committed crimes soon after their eighteenth birthday as full-fledged adults at sentencing.[3] This article describes the rights afforded juveniles at sentencing and how young-adult offenders can avail themselves of those protections.
The Eighth Amendment to the US Constitution and the Proportionate Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution generally protect juvenile offenders from lengthy prison sentences. The United States Supreme Court, in Miller v. Alabama, famously interpreted the Eighth Amendment to prohibit mandatory life-without-parole prison sentences for juveniles.[4] And although the Supreme Court, in Jones v. Mississippi, declined to extend Miller’s protections to discretionary life sentences,[5] the Illinois Supreme Court has extended Miller further than the US Supreme Court.
The Illinois Supreme Court held, based on Miller, that a mandatory de facto life sentence imposed on a juvenile violates the Eighth Amendment, and that any sentence over 40 years is a de facto life sentence.[6] So if a juvenile is convicted of first-degree murder with a firearm, which would ordinarily trigger a 45-year minimum sentence (if the juvenile was found to personally discharge a firearm causing great bodily harm), [7] that juvenile is entitled to a special sentencing hearing. At such a hearing, the trial court is obligated to consider a litany of factors related to youth and immaturity.[8] These factors include level of maturity, peer pressure, home environment, potential for rehabilitation, and others. A trial court can only sentence a juvenile to more than 40 years in prison after developing a record of all factors enumerated in the statute on juvenile sentencing.[9] Failure to consider these factors when sentencing a juvenile is reversible error. Additionally, a trial court may decline to impose sentencing enhancements on a juvenile offender.[10]
As clear as the law is about sentencing for juvenile offenders, the law regarding sentencing for young-adult offenders is murky and still evolving. The Illinois Supreme Court opened the door for young-adult offenders to challenge 40-year-plus sentences under the Proportionate Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution. But the Court did not provide much guidance on any legal standard that an offender must meet to be treated as a juvenile at sentencing. And the Appellate Courts have been similarly unhelpful. Further, much of the jurisprudence on this issue may effectively be rendered moot for many young offenders due to a recent parole statute passed in Illinois.
The landmark Illinois case that allows young-adult offenders to challenge lengthy sentences under the Proportionate Penalties Clause is People v. Harris.[11] In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Proportionate Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution, which directs courts to fashion criminal sentences “according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship,”[12] could render a lengthy prison sentence for a young adult unconstitutional as applied to that specific defendant. In Harris, a defendant was convicted of murder and attempted murder, among other crimes, all committed only a few months after his 18th birthday.[13] The defendant challenged his 76-year sentence under the Proportionate Penalties Clause, and the Appellate Court agreed that the statute mandating a prison sentence for longer than 40 years in the defendant’s situation was unconstitutional as applied to him.[14] The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court, holding that although such an as-applied constitutional challenge could be viable in some situations, the defendant in that case had failed to raise the issue in the trial court. This failure resulted in the lack of a factual record to show that the rationale in Miller applied directly to his circumstances.[15] Because the defendant did not demonstrate in the trial court that he should be treated as a juvenile at sentencing, his as-applied challenge was premature and could be relitigated in a post-conviction petition.[16]
After Harris, the Illinois courts have begun developing a body of precedent regarding sufficiency of the factual record on whether a given defendant’s specific circumstances qualified him to be treated like a juvenile at sentencing. It is clear that a defendant must raise an as-applied constitutional challenge in the trial court, and not on appellate review for the first time.[17] This allows for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the evolving science on young-adult brain development renders a lengthy prison sentence unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. There have been many cases in Illinois in which lengthy prison sentences have been affirmed due to defense counsel’s failure to raise an as-applied constitutional challenge in the trial court and lack of evidentiary hearing. But how much evidence a defendant needs to present at this hearing is unclear.
One court held that a young defendant’s as-applied constitutional challenge to her natural life sentence failed, even though, at her sentencing hearing, she presented evidence of her history of self-harm, that she had been raped and forced into prostitution, and that she suffered from depression, bipolar disorder, ADHD, and PTSD.[18] That Court reasoned that the defendant’s challenge failed because she had not presented any evidence specifically linking the evolving science on young-adult brain development to her specific situation.
Another case similarly rejected a defendant’s as-applied challenge to a natural life sentence. That Court reasoned that even though there was some evidence in the trial court about the defendant’s development and mental health status, that information was contained in a pre-sentence report and there was no sworn testimony provided.[19] In contrast, another court held, in the context of a post-conviction petition, that reliance on scholarly articles about young-adult brain development, information contained in a pre-sentence report, and other evidence of an offender’s immaturity was enough to file a post-conviction petition challenging a 66-year sentence.[20] This decision was eventually overturned on other grounds, but its discussion of the evidence required to successfully challenge a lengthy prison sentence demonstrates the lack of clear guidance on this issue. In sum, the best practice for a young adult challenging a lengthy prison sentence would be to present sworn testimony of the offender’s immaturity and expert testimony about the offender’s development.
Another issue for practitioners to be aware of is the effect of day-for-day good conduct credit and parole on proportionate penalties jurisprudence. Day-for-day good conduct credit allows offenders to serve only 50% of a sentence for certain crimes, and the Illinois Supreme Court held that this can remedy a de facto life sentence.[21] This means that both juveniles and young adults would not be able to use the Eighth Amendment or Proportionate Penalties Clause as a basis to challenge a prison sentence under which they could obtain release before 40 years using day-for-day good conduct credit. Whether parole similarly remedies a de facto life sentence and precludes a young offender from raising an as-applied constitutional challenge to a lengthy sentence is currently pending before the Illinois Supreme Court.[22] Illinois recently enacted a statute that allows offenders who were under the age of 21 at the time of their offense to apply for parole far before 40 years.[23] If the Supreme Court does hold that this new parole statute has the same effect as day-for-day good conduct credit, it would significantly undercut many young offenders’ ability to challenge their sentences.
Juveniles are protected from mandatory de facto life sentences in Illinois. Young-adults like Bethany McKee do not automatically receive the same protection, but they can also avoid de facto life sentences with effective representation at sentencing.
[1] People v. Mahomes, 2024 IL App (1st) 230324-U; People v. Mckee 2017 IL App (3d) 140881.
[2] People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40.
[3] See People v. Thomas, 2017 IL App (1st) 142557, ¶ 18.
[4] Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012)
[5] Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 104 (2021)
[6] People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 10; People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 ¶ 40.
[7] 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20 (Sentencing range for first-degree murder is 20-60 years); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (25 year firearm enhancement).
[8] 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105
[9] Id.;
[10] Id.
[11] People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 37.
[12] Ill. Const. art. I, § 11
[13] Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 1.
[14] Id. at ¶ 18.
[15] Id. at ¶ 46.
[16] People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 46-48.
[17] People v. House, 2021 IL 125124 ¶ 29.
[18] McKee, 2017 IL App (3d) 140881 ¶ 29.
[19] People v. Landerman, 2018 IL App (3d) 150684, ¶ 56.
[20] People v. Horshaw, 2021 IL App (1st) 182047, ¶ 150, appeal denied, judgment vacated, 221 N.E.3d 393 (Ill. 2023)
[21] People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 54.
[22] People v. Spencer No. 130015
[23] 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115
About the Author
Shmuel Wyckoff is a dedicated law student at Chicago-Kent College of Law with a passion for exploring issues in criminal law, constitutional law, and municipal law. Shmuel’s goal is to provide readers with engaging discussions of current issues in the law while also empowering readers with practical legal information. While not immersed in classes and externship work, Shmuel enjoys watching football and baseball, cooking, reading, and hiking.