According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Defendant to recover for injuries that the Plaintiff sustained when he slipped and fell on a wet and muddy ramp while unloading a forklift from a tractor trailer.
The defense filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that it had not duty to the Plaintiff because the Plaintiff knew of the dangerous conditions on the ramp and chose to voluntarily walk on the ramp and was injured as a result. Essentially, the Defendants were arguing that a “no-duty” rule arises in favor of a Defendant when a danger is known and obvious to a Plaintiff and the Plaintiff chooses to voluntarily encounter that danger.
The Plaintiffs argued that the second clause of §343A, along with comment F of that Section under the Restatement (Second) of Torts created an exception to the “no-duty” rule. The Plaintiff more specifically argued that, even if a danger is known and obvious to a Plaintiff, a Defendant may still be liable if the Defendant should expect that a business invitee will not protect themselves against the danger due to being distracted at the time of the incident.
After reviewing the law as applied to the facts presented, the court held that, although it was clear that the Plaintiff knew about the dangerous condition of the ramp based upon the Plaintiff’s testimony that the ramp was indeed muddy and wet, the court otherwise found that issues of fact remained as to whether the Defendant should have anticipated a harm to the Plaintiff despite the Plaintiff’s knowledge of the ramp conditions.
There was evidence in the case that, prior to the Plaintiff’s fall, an employee of the Defendant had slipped on the ramp. Accordingly, the court noted that a jury could reasonably determine not only that the Defendant knew that the ramp was slippery, but that its slippery condition could lead to workers falling on the ramp. The court stated that it would be up to a jury to determine whether, despite the Plaintiff’s knowledge of the dangerous condition on the ramp, the Defendant should have anticipated a harm despite such knowledge on the part of the Plaintiff or the fact that the danger was obvious.
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I send thanks to Attorney Garrett L. Trettel and Attorney Brendan B. Lupetin of the Pittsburgh, PA law firm of Lupetin & Unatin for bringing this case to my attention.