By: Shmuel Wyckoff

Jose Morales accomplished something thousands before him failed to do. He succeeded on a federal habeas petition. Jose Morales was a teenager from the Bronx in the late 1900s. In an unfortunate sequence of events, he was accused of a murder that he did not commit and was eventually convicted. At trial, only one witness placed Jose at the crime scene while multiple others testified that he was blocks away at the time of the murder. After Jose’s trial, another teenager confessed to a priest, two attorneys, and the mother of Jose’s codefendant that he was the one who committed the murder, not Jose.

Jose’s lawyer moved to set aside the verdict, but the trial court denied the motion. The trial court reasoned that the statements to the priest and attorneys were privileged and the statement to the mother of Jose’s codefendant was inadmissible hearsay. The state appellate court affirmed Jose’s conviction.

Jose next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court proceeded through layers of analysis and eventually granted his petition, explaining that the trial court violated Jose’s right to Due Process when it denied Jose the opportunity to present the exculpatory statements to a jury. Although it referred to Jose’s case as “the needle in the haystack,” the District Court lauded the petition for writ of habeas corpus as “the Great Writ” and a “powerful remedy of last resort.” [1]

With almost ten thousand petitions filed per year, and a paltry 3.2% success rate, federal habeas petitions occupy a unique role in the criminal justice system. [2] Federal habeas is one of my favorite areas of the law because it offers a fascinating crossroads of criminal law and constitutional law. And while it is incredibly difficult for a prisoner to have one granted, the federal habeas petition remains as the “highest safeguard of liberty.” [3] So what is a petition for writ of habeas corpus? And if the petition is meant to preserve liberty, why is it so rare for a court to grant one?

A petition for writ of habeas corpus is a procedural mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the constitutionality of a state court conviction in federal court. This procedure has existed since the Magna Carta and the Founders thought it important enough to protect access to the petition in the US Constitution. [4] The words “habeas corpus,” literally meaning “you have the body” or “show me the body,” reflect the Founders intention to ensure that any detained or incarcerated individual has the right to challenge their imprisonment.  

 Now, the federal petition for writ of habeas corpus is codified by 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This statute, and its accompanying caselaw, impose significant hurdles and constraints on prisoners seeking federal habeas relief. Federal habeas law is vast and complicated, and this article does not purport to touch even a fraction of the issues that can surface in a federal habeas proceeding. But it is important to know some of the basics of this area of law because it can be the last chance at appeal for many convicted defendants.

 Two immediate constraints to a federal habeas petition’s scope are the basis for relief and exhaustion. The only available basis for relief is a violation of the prisoner’s rights under the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States in the trial court. And a prisoner may not file a federal habeas petition unless they have exhausted all state court remedies. [5]

 These constraints work hand in hand from a policy perspective. This is because the very idea of a federal court overturning a state court’s ruling or outcome raises serious federalism concerns. Under the structure of the American government, states are their own sovereigns, and all power not given to the federal government is delegated to the states. But the federal government does have a legitimate role in enforcing individuals’ constitutional rights under the Federal Constitution against the states. Because the states are sovereign, the law requires prisoners to seek all available mechanisms for relief in state court first. It is only when the states courts have denied relief that a prisoner may turn to the federal judiciary to enforce his constitutional rights.

Further, and with the same federalism considerations, the federal judiciary respects state sovereignty when the state courts have adjudicated a claim for relief on the merits. If a state court did adjudicate on the merits a prisoner’s argument that a trial court violated their federal constitutional rights, a federal court may only grant habeas relief if the state court decision clearly contradicted or misapplied “clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” [6] That is a very high bar.

 Terrell Wesley learned this the hard way. He was arrested and brought to a bench trial on a murder charge where multiple witnesses testified that the shooter they saw matched Wesley’s description and another witness testified that Wesley was the one who shot the victim. [7] Two other witnesses also testified that they heard Wesley say that he had shot a man. At the close of evidence, the trial judge found Wesley guilty without hearing closing arguments. When Wesley’s lawyer pointed this out the trial judge apologized, heard closing arguments, and promptly found Wesley guilty again. [8]

 Wesley appealed, asserting that the trial court had violated his Sixth Amendment rights when it found him guilty before hearing closing arguments. Wesley based his argument to the state appellate court on the US Supreme Court’s opinion in Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853. There, the Supreme Court held that denial of closing arguments violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to put on a defense. The state appellate court affirmed Wesley’s conviction. The court reasoned that Herring only applies to cases in which a trial court completely denies closing arguments but in Wesley’s case the trial court heard closing arguments and stated that it had considered those arguments in reaching its verdict. [9]

 In his federal habeas petition, Wesley relied on courts, both state and federal, from other jurisdictions that held a trial court’s denial of closing arguments is reversible error, even if the trial court later hears oral arguments. The District Court denied Wesley’s habeas petition, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the state court’s decision did not clearly contradict federal law because there was a jurisdiction split on whether a case like Wesley’s is actually a Sixth Amendment violation. And because there was a circuit split on how to interpret Herring, the state court’s opinion cannot be said to clearly contradict federal law as decided by the US Supreme Court. [10]

There are also many timeliness rules that apply to federal habeas petitions. Those rules are complex and beyond the scope of this blog post, but it is important to know that federal courts strictly enforce these rules. [11]

 While it is incredibly difficult for a prisoner to prevail on a federal habeas petition, the mechanism itself is still crucial to upholding freedom and justice. As Justice Frankfurter said, “the meritorious claims are few, but our procedures must ensure that those claims are not stifled by undiscriminating generalities.” [12]


[1] Morales v. Portuondo, 154 F. Supp. 2d 706, 709; 734 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)

[2] US Supreme Court 2023 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2023year-endreport.pdf; Bureau of Justice Statistics https://bjs.ojp.gov/library/publications/habeas-corpus-federal-review-state-prisoner-petitions

[3] Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961)

[4] US Const. Art 1 section 9

[5] 28 U.S.C § 2254

[6] Id.

[7] Wesley v. Baker, No. 22-1420, 2024 WL 3688727 (7th Cir. 2024)

[8] Id.

[9] People v. Wesley, 2015 IL App (1st) 130710-U, ¶ 28

[10]Wesley v. Baker, No. 22-1420, 2024 WL 3688727 (7th Cir. 2024)

[11] See Jackson v. Wills, No. 23 C 00076, 2024 WL 3925535 (N.D. Ill. 2024)

[12] Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498 (1953) (Frankfurter, J. Dissenting)

About the Author

Shmuel Wyckoff is a dedicated law student at Chicago-Kent College of Law with a passion for exploring issues in criminal law, constitutional law, and municipal law. Shmuel’s goal is to provide readers with engaging discussions of current issues in the law while also empowering readers with practical legal information. While not immersed in classes and externship work, Shmuel enjoys watching football and baseball, cooking, reading, and hiking.