Confluence of State and Federal Laws When it Comes to Service Animals

Today’s blog entry is an update on a prior blog entry we discussed here. In the prior blog entry, we discussed how the police could escape liability when a place of public accommodation did not do the right thing with respect to allowing a service dog in its premises and the police were called. That decision allowed the plaintiff to pursue a motion to default again the business (referred to throughout this blog entry as the defendant). On April 25, 2025, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, decided, here, it would grant the motion to default filed by the plaintiff on the grounds that the business violated both the ADA as well as the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act. As we have covered this case before, there is no reason to go into the facts at they can be found here. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories, and they are: court’s reasoning for granting a default judgment against the defendant; court’s reasoning discussing the inability to grant injunctive relief and granting declaratory relief; court’s discussion of why it awards compensatory damages; and thoughts/takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.

I

Court’s Reasoning for Granting a Default Judgment against the Defendant

1. For a plaintiff to prevail under Title III of the ADA, a private plaintiff has to show: 1) he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA; 2) he was discriminated against by defendant on the basis of that disability; 3) he was denied goods or services by the place of public accommodation; and 4) the defendant owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.
2. Plaintiff’s amended complaint contains sufficient facts supporting violations of both Title III of the ADA and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act. In particular: 1) plaintiff alleged disabilities related to his physical and mental health that substantially impaired multiple life activities; 2) plaintiff alleged that defendant denied him the ability to use its services because of his reliance upon a service and support animal related to his disabilities; 3) the term “public accommodation,” is defined broadly by both federal and Pennsylvania antidiscrimination law and includes the business operated by the defendant; 4) plaintiff alleged outright intentional exclusion by the defendant on the basis of his disabilities and their failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices because of the plaintiff’s service dog.
3. In determining whether a default judgment should be granted, courts consider three factors: 1) prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied; 2) whether the defendant appears to have a defense that can be litigated; and 3) whether defendant’s delay is due to culpable conduct.
4. Plaintiff will experience prejudice if default is denied for several reasons: 1) the court advised the defendant early on in the case that it could not be represented pro se by one of its owners; 2) even with that admonition by the court, defendant never retained counsel despite three years of active litigation involving another defendant; 3) defendant ignored the amended complaint and did not participate in the deposition of the plaintiff or in the deposition of the officer involved. Therefore, defendant acted culpably by initially acknowledging the action and then disappearing from the litigation process altogether.
5. The two defenses that the defendant has are if the animal was out-of-control and the handler did not take effective action to control it, or the animal was not housebroken. Neither of those exceptions apply, as the service animal was well behaved at the time of the incident and was also housebroken. Therefore, plaintiff’s request to use a service animal at defendant’s facility was a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law.

II

Court’s Reasoning Discussing the Inability to Grant Injunctive Relief and Granting Declaratory Relief

1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
2. A private plaintiff under Title III of the ADA, can only get relief in the form of a temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order (as well as attorney fees of course).
3. Discovery suggested that the defendant’s mall-based store closed during the litigation. So, plaintiff withdrew his request for a permanent injunction against the defendant. However, the declaratory relief action alleging that defendant’s actions, practices, and policies violated Title III of the ADA survives.
4. In a footnote, the court noted that plaintiff had standing to pursue the declaratory relief action. In particular, plaintiff demonstrated an invasion of a legally protected interest, a concrete and particularized injury, and an actual injury. Further, his injury was traceable to the conduct of the defendant and not to the conduct of the dismissed former co-defendant State College Borough police. It is also redressable by Title III of the ADA.
5. At the time of the incident, plaintiff simply sought to settle his service dog rights with the defendant through the assistance of some authority so he could watch his grandson play in the bounce house. He sought recourse from Nittany Mall security and the State College Borough Police Department to no avail.
6. A purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.
7. Since Taylor has demonstrated that default judgment is warranted and that he sustained an injury in fact, a declaration by the court that the defendant’s practices and policies violated Title III of the ADA and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act on the date of the incident, was in order.

III

Court’s Discussion of Why It Awards Compensatory Damages

1. Unlike title III of the ADA, the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act expressly permit suits for damages.
2. Compensatory damages may be recovered for humiliation, emotional distress and mental anguish. Further, a complainant’s own testimony of embarrassment and humiliation suffices to support an award for compensatory damages for violation of the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act.
3. Under the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act, damage awards serve the dual purpose of discouraging discrimination and restoring the injured party to his or her preinjury status.
4. The request by the grandson, an autistic individual at the age of five at the time, to go to the mall to play at the bouncy house was one of the first words the grandson ever said.
5. Plaintiff testified that being excluded from the business made him feel horrible and upset and that the incident hurt so bad and still does. Those emotions were discernible in the courtroom three years later.
6. Plaintiff also testified that the defendant’s employees were laughing at him and making fun of him as he spoke to the police. Therefore, a family centered positive experience for the grandson turned into a negative experience due to the denial of the plaintiff being able to use his service dog to access the facility.
7. Plaintiff also testified that the entire incident took more than an hour to conclude and caused him to recall negative events that he experienced in the past. Plaintiff testified that he spent several years in and out of the hospital following his service in Vietnam and that the incident started to bring those memories back. It doesn’t matter that the plaintiff conceded that he did not seek counseling or other mental health treatment following the incident because he testified that he was fearful talking about the incident in a therapeutic setting would bring up other events from his past.
8. The embarrassment and humiliation was evident from the body cam cameras worn by the police. Accordingly, the court awards the plaintiff $25,000.

III

Thoughts/Takeaways

1. Interesting choice made by the defendant to not cannot defend the action despite the court’s admonition that they needed to hire an attorney to do so. The court was clearly not happy with defendant’s choice.
2. Title III of the ADA does not allow for compensatory damages but the Pennsylvania equivalent does. That fact winds up costing the defendant $25,000.
3. State law always has to be considered in these situations (I am not licensed in Pennsylvania but am in Georgia, Texas, and Illinois). For example, a state law may allow for compensatory damages even though Title III of the ADA does not. On the other hand, it is possible that a state law allows for compensatory damages, but does not have any provision for attorney fees per Title III of the ADA.
4. Title III of the ADA allows for both injunctive relief and declaratory relief actions. You might not be able to get injunctive belief because it focuses on past conduct, but you could, as this case illustrates, get declaratory relief. Either would entitle you to attorney fees under the ADA.
5. The court says that a service animal is a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law unless a valid defense is present.
6. In the opinion, the court mentions “service and support animal,” but it certainly seems pretty clear from the opinion that a psychiatric service animal is involved and not a support animal.
7. Training, training, training (I do a great deal of this), is so important. I absolutely realize that frontline staff may not have a great deal of ability to make the two inquiries and then reach a conclusion as to whether a service animal is involved or not. However, making the two inquiries will likely act as a deterrent against fraudulent claims that a service animal is involved. It also might help prevent negligent claims should the animal get out of control and harm another.