The Copyright Act does not expressly address the protection of individual characters in expressive works, but courts have long recognized that certain characters, particularly those with strong visual or narrative identities, may be independently copyrightable. The Ninth Circuit crystallized this principle in DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015), where it held that the iconic Batmobile, as depicted in both comics and films featuring the Caped Crusader, qualified as an independently protectable character.
Towle established a three-part test for character copyrightability. Under the Towle test, in order to be independently copyrightable, a character must: (1) have “physical as well as conceptual qualities”; (2) be “sufficiently delineated to be recognizable as the same character whenever it appears” and display “consistent, identifiable character traits and attributes”; and (3) be “especially distinctive” and contain “some unique elements of expression.” This framework has guided courts in assessing whether a creative element is merely a prop or a protectable character.
In Towle, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Batmobile satisfied its three-part test. Among other things, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Batmobile appeared across decades of media as a high-tech, weaponized vehicle with a bat-inspired aesthetic and narrative agency, consistently assisted Batman, exhibited unique traits, and was integral to the storylines of the works in which it appeared. In subsequent cases, courts have applied the Towle test to a range of creative works, reinforcing the notion that only characters with enduring, distinctive, and expressive features merit copyright protection. But what happens when the line between character and object blurs—when the “character” is a car without personality, dialogue, or autonomy?
This was the issue in the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Carroll Shelby Lic., Inc. v. Halicki, No. 23-3731, 2025 WL 1499052 (9th Cir. May 27, 2025), in which the Ninth Circuit considered whether “Eleanor” – the name given to various Ford Mustangs that have appeared in the Gone in 60 Seconds films – qualified as a copyrightable character. In the original 1974 film, Eleanor was a customized 1971 Ford Mustang Sportsroof and assigned the feminine codename by the film’s protagonists. Multiple Mustangs donned this moniker over the three subsequent films, yet none possessed consistent attributes. For example, the 2000 remake featured a gray Shelby GT500 Mustang, also dubbed Eleanor, which sparked a long-running dispute over whether that depiction gave rise to character protection.
Procedurally, the case arose when Denice Halicki, widow of Gone in 60 Seconds creator H.B. Halicki, sued Carroll Shelby Licensing and others for allegedly infringing her claimed copyright in Eleanor by licensing others to produce Eleanor-style cars. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part. Applying the Towle framework, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Eleanor failed all three prongs of the test. First, the Ninth Circuit found that Eleanor lacked “conceptual” traits beyond its function as a vehicle; it showed no “anthropomorphic qualities” such as acting with agency or volition, displaying sentience and emotion, or otherwise acting in any humanized way. Second, Eleanor’s form changed dramatically between, and even within, the Gone in 60 Seconds films, from a yellow fastback in the original 1974 film, to a beat-up junker in the 1982 film The Junkman, to a gray Shelby in the 2000 remake, undermining any claim of consistent identity. Third, the Ninth Circuit found that Eleanor’s design was not especially distinctive, and its name was deliberately generic. In short, Eleanor was merely a ‘“stock’ sports car.”
Distinguishing Towle, the Ninth Circuit found that, unlike the Batmobile, which operated as a supporting character with a recognizable form, role, and set of abilities, Eleanor was a rotating cast of cars with no fixed identity or expressive uniqueness. As the Ninth Circuit explained, Eleanor was closer to a prop than a character, lacking sentience, symbolism, or visual continuity. The decision reinforces the relatively high bar Towle sets for character protection over objects such as automobiles, clarifying that even beloved or branded objects may not qualify for independent copyright protection unless they demonstrate conceptual (i.e., human-like) qualities, a distinctive and stable persona, and expressive features that transcend mere design.