
For over a century, American courts have wrestled with a fundamental question: Can someone else decide to end your marriage when you’re no longer capable of making that decision yourself?
The question has split American courts into two distinct philosophies. The Traditional Majority views marriage as so intensely personal that only spouses themselves can choose dissolution. Wyoming’s decision in Flory v. Flory, 527 P.3d 250, 252 (Wyo. 2023), exemplifies this approach: divorce is “too personal and volitional to be pursued at the pleasure or discretion of a guardian.” The Progressive Minority argues this approach leaves vulnerable adults defenseless. Illinois’s decision in Karbin v. Karbin ex rel. Hibler, 364 Ill. Dec. 665, 977 N.E.2d 154, 162 (2012), captures modern thinking: guardians should make “all types of uniquely personal decisions that are in the ward’s best interests, including the decision to seek a dissolution of marriage.” These courts emphasize that denying guardian divorce authority can trap incapacitated individuals in exploitative marriages.
Into this national divide stepped the Texas Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Benavides, 2025 WL 1197404 (Tex. Apr. 25, 2025), charting an entirely new path forward.
As Carlos’s condition worsened, competing narratives emerged. Leticia claimed Carlos gave her “full authority” over his accounts, repeatedly saying “todo lo mío es tuyo”—“all that I have is yours.” Id. at *2. Carlos’s daughter, Linda, painted a darker picture: systematic exploitation of an incapacitated man.
The family dysfunction erupted in 2011. Linda filed for guardianship while Carlos signed a new will leaving everything to Leticia. The court found Carlos totally incapacitated and appointed Linda as guardian. In 2018, Linda moved Carlos from his home with Leticia and filed for divorce on his behalf, claiming they had lived apart for over three years. The trial court granted the divorce in September 2020, but Carlos died two weeks later, launching the appeal that would reach the Texas Supreme Court. Id. at *1-4.
Rather than deciding whether a guardian may initiate a divorce on behalf of a ward, the Court explicitly declined to “definitively decide” the issue. Id. at *14. It characterized the matter as “the very type of policy choice on which we consistently defer to the Legislature.” Id. at *12. The message was clear: Courts interpret law; legislatures make policy.
Yet while dodging the core question, the Court created something entirely new: a procedural framework that would govern guardian divorces if such authority exists. The framework requires two crucial safeguards. First, express guardianship court authorization—guardians cannot rely on general litigation authority but must obtain specific authorization for divorce proceedings. Second, dual best-interest findings—both the guardianship court and family court must independently find that the divorce serves the ward’s best interests and promotes their well-being.
Most significantly, the Court explicitly invited legislative action, noting that “the Legislature may wish to consider amending the Estates Code or the Family Code to plainly express its policy choice.” Id. at *13.
But the decision exposed philosophical divisions among the justices. Chief Justice Blacklock’s concurring opinion revealed the moral complexity underlying the issue: “Marriage pre-dates and transcends our law,” he wrote. “Marriage is a unique, natural relationship reflected in the law and recognized by the law, but it was not created by the law.” Id. at *15 (Blacklock, C.J., concurring). He continued, “Whether I want to be married and whether somebody thinks I should be married are two completely different questions,” and “only the former has any bearing on whether I am or will remain married.” Id. at *18. This reflects the traditionalist view that some decisions are simply too personal for third-party determination.
Where Texas Goes From Here
Now, the Legislature must decide whether to follow that map, redraw it, or leave it unmarked. It can affirm this new route with statutory safeguards, close the door entirely, or continue allowing families to operate amid legal uncertainty.
The Court’s decision may be seen as measured restraint or missed opportunity. Yet in declining to declare a definitive rule, the justices extended an invitation: for lawmakers to finish what the judiciary could only begin. In doing so, they handed families something rare in such cases—structure, if not resolution.