In In re Bain v. Strulovitch, (Westchester Cty. NY Sup. Ct., April 29, 2026), a New York state trial court found itself in the middle of a dispute between business associates over whether their business issues should be decided by a rabbinical court or a civil court, and if the former, which rabbinical court.
Samuel Strulovitch began an arbitration proceeding against Jonathan Bleier before a rabbinical court in Rockland County. At issue was ownership interests in a nursing home. Moshe Bain then filed an arbitration action in a different rabbinical court in Brooklyn claiming that he had a right of first refusal as to the nursing home. That rabbinical court issued an order restraining Strulovitch from taking any action to enforce the arbitration award issued by the Rockland rabbinical court until the Brooklyn rabbinical court issued a decision. Bain also filed suit in a New York civil court, and the court issued an injunction barring Strulovitch from taking any action to confirm the disputed Rockland County rabbinical court decision.
Despite that injunction, Strulovitch instituted another arbitration proceeding in a different Brooklyn rabbinical court, contending that the civil court’s injunction did not prohibit a new suit. That rabbinical court issued a summons to Bain. According to the New York trial court:
When Bain asked Strulovitch to withdraw the proceeding, he asserted that Bain was free to ignore the summons. According to Bain, this is simply impossible; one of the rabbis on the panel told Bain’s counsel that ignoring it may result in a “seruv,” a “letter of recalcitrance. He may be subject to all forms of communal sanctions and societal pressures due his flagrant violation of Jewish law.” Strulovitch’s representative reiterated the seriousness of ignoring the summons, stating to Bain that “This is serious and the lawyer cannot protect you from your hashem and your religious obligations. If you get a siruv [sic] everyone will know that you do not listen to Beis din.”
When the parties appeared in Court on the Order to Show Cause .. Strulovitch argued that the Court had no jurisdiction over the arbitration because it is a religious matter….
The matters that Strulovitch has raised with the Beis Din, however, are not religious, as clearly stated in the summons (hazmana)….
In this matter, the Court will only need to apply neutral principles of secular law to the issues raised herein. There is, thus, no First Amendment reason to deny the motion….
With respect to Bain’s contention that Strulovitch violated the stay imposed by the Court because the arbitral panel issued a seruv to Bain …, the Beis Din replied that “‘We want to make it very clear that neither Strulowitz nor his agents requested the seruv after the TRO was issued. The BD issued it of its own volition as a response to the chutzpah of enjoining a litigant from pursuing his Halachic rights to a Din Torah.’”
Given this letter, … the Court denies the request to sanction Strulovitch. There is no evidence that Strulovitch or any of his representatives, secular or religious, have violated the Court’s rulings. …
To rectify the potential damage to Bain’s reputation in the religious community resulting from the issuance of the seruv by the Beis Din, Strulovitch must take all steps necessary to have the Beis Din withdraw it, including withdrawing the entire proceeding.