Pending decision notice: The Supreme Court heard oral argument in United States v. Hemani on March 2, 2026. A decision is expected by late June or early July 2026. This blog reflects the law and the state of the argument as of May 2026. We will update it when the decision issues. If you have a pending federal firearms charge under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3), call us before the decision comes down.

The case started in Texas. The FBI searched a home in the Eastern District and found a Glock 19, approximately 60 grams of marijuana, and 4.7 grams of cocaine. The man who lived there (Ali Danial Hemani) told agents he smoked marijuana a few times a week. He was charged with a federal felony: possessing a firearm while being an unlawful user of a controlled substance, under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3).

His lawyers moved to dismiss. A federal magistrate agreed. The district court agreed. The Fifth Circuit agreed. The Trump administration asked the Supreme Court to reverse. The Supreme Court granted review in October 2025, heard argument on March 2, 2026, and will issue its decision by the end of the term.

At oral argument, a majority of the Court appeared skeptical that §922(g)(3) (as applied to a regular marijuana user who was not intoxicated when he possessed the firearm) survives the constitutional framework the Court established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. The decision will reshape federal firearms law for millions of Americans.

 

What 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3) Actually Does

Section 922(g)(3) makes it a federal felony for any person “who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” to possess a firearm or ammunition. The offense carries up to 15 years in federal prison.

The statute does not require that the person be intoxicated when they possessed the firearm. It does not require that they used a drug while holding the gun. It does not require any connection between the drug use and the possession. It requires only that the person is “an unlawful user” of a controlled substance (a status, not a moment).

What that means in practice:

  • Marijuana users in Texas. Texas has not legalized recreational marijuana. Every Texas marijuana user is an unlawful user of a controlled substance under federal law. If they own a firearm, they are, technically, a federal felon under §922(g)(3). The statute does not require a large amount, a pattern of daily use, or any particular frequency. Courts have generally applied it to regular or habitual users.
  • Marijuana users in legal states. Nearly half of all U.S. states permit recreational marijuana use. Every one of those users is still an “unlawful user” under federal law because marijuana remains Schedule I under the Controlled Substances Act. State legalization changes nothing for federal purposes.
  • Prescription drug users. Justice Barrett made this point directly at oral argument: someone who takes their spouse’s Ambien without a prescription is an unlawful user of a controlled substance under the statute. Someone who took a prescribed Adderall that wasn’t their own prescription is an unlawful user. Tylenol with codeine taken from someone else’s prescription. Testosterone taken without a prescription. All of them lose their Second Amendment rights under the government’s reading of §922(g)(3).

Barrett at oral argument: “Ambien, Robitussin, Tylenol with codeine, testosterone, Adderall — I’m not a pharmacologist, but none of those drugs strike me as drugs for which it is obvious that a risk of violence would ensue. I just don’t see anything in the scheme that actually reflects Congress’s judgment that this drug makes someone more dangerous.”

 

The Bruen Framework and Why It Matters Here

In New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), the Supreme Court fundamentally changed how courts evaluate gun regulations. The old approach asked whether a law was a reasonable fit with a compelling government interest. Bruen replaced that with a different test: the government must show that a gun regulation is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” If there is no sufficiently analogous historical law, the regulation fails.

In United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), the Court clarified that modern laws do not need to be exact twins of historical regulations but they must be “relevantly similar” in principle. The Court upheld §922(g)(8), which disarms people subject to domestic violence restraining orders, because it fit within a historical tradition of temporarily disarming people who posed a clear threat of physical violence to others.

The Government’s Historical Analog: Habitual Drunkards

The government’s Bruen argument rests on a single historical analog: laws governing “habituals drunkards.” At the Founding, the government argues, American legislatures could confine habitual drunkards to workhouses or jails which had the incidental effect of disarming them. This tradition, the government argues, shows that the Founders understood that habitual users of intoxicating substances could be temporarily disarmed.

Why the Justices Were Skeptical

The habitual drunkard analog ran into several problems at oral argument that multiple justices raised:

  • The analog is not about disarmament. Historical habitual drunkard laws were about confinement and vagrancy (incarceration in workhouses). They did not involve laws specifically prohibiting gun ownership. Disarmament was a consequence of imprisonment, not a freestanding prohibition.
  • The dangerousness theory does not extend to all covered substances. The government argued that habitual drug users are dangerous because they may become intoxicated and misuse firearms. But §922(g)(3) applies to someone who takes an unprescribed Adderall and owns a gun which is conduct that produces no intoxication, no impaired judgment, and no obvious safety risk. The sweeping statutory coverage does not match the narrow historical analog the government invoked.
  • The illegality–dangerousness gap. The government repeatedly argued “unlike alcohol, illegal drugs are illegal.” Justice Jackson responded directly: under Bruen, courts are not supposed to credit modern legislative judgments about who is dangerous. They are supposed to ask whether a contemporary law is supported by historical tradition. Congress’s current classification of a substance does not create historical tradition.
  • Hemani was not intoxicated. The government did not allege that Hemani was under the influence of marijuana when he possessed the Glock. He was sober. The Founders’ concern about armed intoxication does not map onto a sober person who also sometimes uses marijuana.

Justices Alito and Roberts were the clearest sympathizers with the government’s position, expressing concern about the practical implications of striking the statute. But the weight of questioning from Barrett, Jackson, Kavanaugh, and others reflected deep skepticism about whether the habitual drunkard analog was close enough to sustain a sweeping prohibition on gun ownership by anyone who has ever used a controlled substance.

 

Possible Outcomes and What Each Means

The Court Strikes §922(g)(3) As Applied to Hemani

The narrowest ruling would hold that §922(g)(3) cannot be constitutionally applied to a sober person who uses marijuana regularly but is not intoxicated when possessing a firearm. This is the Fifth Circuit’s position and the most likely outcome given the oral argument. The statute would survive but would be narrowed: it could still apply to someone who is actually intoxicated while possessing a firearm, but not to the status of being a regular user alone.

Effect on pending cases: charges under §922(g)(3) based solely on the defendant’s status as a regular drug user, without evidence of intoxication during possession, would need to be dismissed or resolved through plea to a different count.

The Court Strikes §922(g)(3) More Broadly

A broader ruling could hold that the historical record does not support any prohibition on firearm possession by drug users who are not actually intoxicated, striking the statute more completely. This would be a larger Second Amendment ruling with immediate implications for the hundreds of pending lower court challenges.

The Court Upholds §922(g)(3)

If the Court accepts the habitual drunkard analog and upholds the statute, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling is reversed and Hemani’s case proceeds. Pending charges nationwide continue. The Bruen challenge to §922(g)(3) is resolved against defendants for the foreseeable future.

This outcome is possible but appeared less likely based on the oral argument. Alito and Roberts were the clearest votes for the government. The remaining seven justices showed varying degrees of skepticism.

 

What This Means Right Now, Before the Decision

Pending Federal Indictments

If you or a family member has a pending federal indictment that includes a §922(g)(3) count, the Hemani decision is directly relevant. A ruling for Hemani (even a narrow as-applied ruling) may be grounds to dismiss the §922(g)(3) count, which changes the charge exposure, the sentencing guidelines calculation, and the plea negotiation dynamic. Defense counsel should be monitoring this case and should have the Bruen/Hemani argument preserved and ready to file the moment the decision issues. James Lee Bright of Deandra Grant Law handles federal criminal defense in all four Texas federal districts, the D.C. Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, and the Supreme Court.

Plea Negotiations

A pending Hemani decision creates leverage in plea negotiations. A prosecutor who knows that the §922(g)(3) count may be dismissed on constitutional grounds after the ruling has an incentive to resolve the case on terms that do not depend on that count surviving. Defense counsel should be explicit: we are monitoring Hemani, we will move to dismiss this count when the decision issues, and we are prepared to try this case if necessary. That leverage exists right now, before the decision comes down.

The “Unlawful User” Question Is Already Litigated in the Fifth Circuit

The Fifth Circuit, which covers Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, already ruled in Hemani’s favor at the circuit level. In the interim between the Fifth Circuit’s ruling and the Supreme Court’s decision, the circuit’s precedent (specifically United States v. Connelly) has been the controlling law in Texas federal courts. Texas federal defendants have been challenging §922(g)(3) counts based on this precedent. A favorable Supreme Court ruling confirms and extends that precedent.

Post-Conviction Options If Hemani Wins

For defendants who have already been convicted under §922(g)(3) and are currently serving sentences or on supervised release, a favorable ruling creates potential post-conviction relief options under 28 U.S.C. §2255 (motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence in federal cases). The legal landscape for retroactive application of new constitutional rules is complex, but the defense argument is available and worth evaluating case by case. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Hemani will not automatically vacate prior convictions but it creates the basis for motions that were not previously available.

 

The Texas-Specific Picture

The Hemani case began in the Eastern District of Texas, before U.S. District Judge Amos Mazzant in Sherman. It was appealed through the Fifth Circuit, which sits in New Orleans but covers all of Texas. The decision will apply immediately and directly in every federal court in Texas.

Texas is the state with the largest number of active federal criminal cases in the country. The Northern District of Texas (Dallas and Fort Worth), the Southern District of Texas (Houston and Corpus Christi), the Eastern District (Sherman and Tyler), and the Western District (San Antonio and El Paso) all prosecute firearms offenses regularly. §922(g)(3) charges frequently appear alongside drug distribution charges, where a defendant is found to possess both drugs and a firearm.

For Texas defendants, the interaction between state drug charges and federal gun charges is particularly acute. A Texas defendant charged with state marijuana possession who also had a firearm at the scene may face both a state drug charge and a federal §922(g)(3) charge. The Hemani ruling will directly affect the viability of the federal count.

 

The Broader Post-Bruen Landscape

Hemani is not the only §922(g) case in the post-Bruen pipeline. The Supreme Court has dozens of petitions pending involving challenges to §922(g)(1) (the felon-in-possession statute) particularly as applied to nonviolent felony convictions. The Court denied certiorari in a large batch of those cases in early 2026, but several remain pending. The Hemani ruling will be read carefully for signals about how far Bruen’s history-and-tradition test extends to the felon-in-possession context.  Rahimi upheld the domestic violence restraining order prohibition. Hemani may narrow or strike the drug-user prohibition. Where the Court goes from there (on §922(g)(1) and the other prohibited-person categories) will be shaped significantly by what the Hemani majority says about how to apply the historical-analog methodology.

 

Sources

 

If you are facing a federal firearms charge under §922(g)(3) in Texas, or if you have already been convicted and want to understand your post-conviction options when the Hemani decision issues, call (214) 225-7117 for a free, confidential consultation. James Lee Bright handles federal criminal defense in all four Texas federal districts, the Fifth Circuit, and the Supreme Court.

The post The Texas Case That Could Change Federal Gun Charges for Anyone Who’s Ever Used Marijuana appeared first on Deandra Grant Law – Texas Criminal Defense & DWI Defense.