SCOLAVINO v. SCOLAVINO, 247 AD 3d 1078 – NY: Appellate Div., 2nd Dept. 2026:
“In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals
from an order of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Victor G. Grossman,
J.), dated October 15, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from,
granted those branches of the defendant’s motion which were for
declarations that a so-ordered stipulation of settlement dated July 8,
2024, required the parties to consult in good faith and reach joint
decisions regarding all major decisions concerning their children and
that such major decisions included matters beyond the children’s health,
education, and religion.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In June 2023, the plaintiff commenced this action for a divorce and
ancillary relief. The parties entered into a so-ordered stipulation of
settlement dated July 8, 2024, which included, inter alia, terms
relating to custody and parental access of the parties’ two children.
The stipulation provided, among other things, that “[t]he parties in
this matter will have joint legal custody of the two minor children,”
that “[t]he parties are going to utilize … a parent coordinator solely
for major decisions of health, education and religion,” and that the
parties would “be guided by the recommendation of the [parent
coordinator] in making major decisions,” with the party whose position
the parent coordinator supported being permitted to implement that
decision, subject to the other party’s right to seek a stay from a court
of competent jurisdiction. The stipulation further provided that the
plaintiff would have primary residential custody of the children,
subject to the defendant’s parental access schedule, and that each party
would be entitled to make the day-to-day decisions for the children
while they were in his or her care.
In September 2024, the defendant moved for declarations, among other
things, that the stipulation (1) required the parties to consult in good
faith and reach joint decisions regarding all major decisions
concerning the children, and (2) defined major decisions to include not
only matters of the children’s health, education, and religion, but also
decisions relating to dental, therapeutic, and psychiatric treatment,
extracurricular activities, summer camp and summer programs, day care
and day care facilities, and tutoring. The plaintiff opposed the motion.
In an order dated October 15, 2024, the Supreme Court, 1079*1079
inter alia, granted those branches of the defendant’s motion which were
for declarations that the stipulation required the parties to consult
in good faith and reach joint decisions regarding all major decisions
concerning the children and that such major decisions included matters
beyond the children’s health, education, and religion. The plaintiff
appeals.
“A stipulation of settlement is a contract subject to the principles of contract construction and interpretation” (Sabau v Sabau, 222 AD3d 1017, 1019 [2023]).
“A court should interpret the stipulation in accordance with its plain
and ordinary meaning, and `arrive at a construction that will give fair
meaning to all of the language employed by the parties to reach a
practical interpretation of the expressions of the parties so that their
reasonable expectations will be realized'” (id., quoting Matter of Schiano v Hirsch, 22 AD3d 502, 502 [2005]).
“`Where the stipulation is clear and unambiguous on its face, the
intent of the parties must be gleaned from the four corners of the
instrument, and not from extrinsic evidence'” (Herman v Herman, 220 AD3d 849, 850 [2023], quoting Oakes v Oakes, 38 AD3d 865, 865 [2007]).
“Joint custody reposes in both parents a shared responsibility for and
control of a child’s upbringing” and thus requires “the parties … to
communicate and cooperate on matters concerning the child” (Matter of Lee v Fitts, 147 AD3d 1058, 1059 [2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Here, the stipulation, as placed on the record in open court, is clear and unambiguous (see Herman v Herman, 220 AD3d at 850).
Read as a whole, the stipulation reflects the parties’ agreement to
share joint legal custody of the children and, consistent with the
ordinary meaning of that term, to consult in good faith and attempt to
jointly resolve all major decisions concerning the children, while
specifically carving out a subset of such decisions—those relating to
health, education, and religion— for nonjudicial dispute resolution
through the parent coordinator (see Matter of Lee v Fitts, 147 AD3d at 1059).
Issues such as dental care, summer camp, summer programs, day care,
therapy, psychiatric care, and extracurricular activities fall within
the umbrella of the categories in the stipulation for which nonjudicial
dispute resolution applies.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the
defendant’s motion which were for declarations that the stipulation
required the parties to consult in good faith and jointly resolve all
major decisions concerning the children and that such major decisions
included matters beyond the children’s health, education, and religion.”