In In re Bice, Lois Kathlyn Bice died in 2009, survived by her husband Donald Gene Bice and three daughters. No.10-25-00307-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 9005 (Tex. App.—Waco November 20, 2025, no pet.). In 2010, all parties signed a notarized heirship affidavit stating she died intestate. Mr. Bice continued to reside on a 170-acre property, understanding himself to be the sole owner. In 2024, Mr. Bice attempted to sell the property and evict two daughters living there. Two daughters then filed a purported will from 2001 for probate. One of the daughters testified she found the will in early 2024 but waited months to tell her sisters.

At the conclusion of a jury trial on will contest, the jury answered “No” to the verdict question “[d]id the Decedent sign the Purported Will?”. Following the verdict, the applicants of the will, two of the three daughters of the Decedent, moved for a judgment notwithstanding verdict or motion for a new trial. The trial court granted the proponents’ motion. The husband of the decedent, Mr. Bice, filed a petition for writ of mandamus. The court of appeals conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus and instructed the trial court to enter judgment on the jury’s verdict.

The court held:

A trial court may grant a new trial “for good cause,” subject to mandamus review for clear abuse of discretion. Trial courts have considerable discretion to grant new trials, but no court is free to simply substitute its judgment for that of the jury without a valid basis. “Disregarding a jury’s verdict is an unusually serious act that imperils a constitutional value of immense importance—the authority of a jury.” …

Upon a merits-based review of the record as a whole, there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the Decedent did not sign the purported will.

Before a will is admitted to probate, the will’s proponent must establish that it was properly executed and that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of execution… Here, the Applicants had the burden to prove that the purported 2001 will was validly executed, a fact contested by Mr. Bice.

While a self-proved will may serve as prima facie evidence that the will was properly executed, when a dispute exists “a self-proved will cannot otherwise be treated differently than a will that is not self-proved, and may be contested in the same manner as a will that is not self-proved.” “A self-proved will may be contested, revoked, or amended by a codicil in the same manner as a will that is not self-proved.”… It is within the jury’s purview to weigh the credibility of testimony, including those sworn statements contained in affidavits. When evidence conflicts, the jury’s role is to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and reconcile any inconsistencies, and as a general proposition, the jury may believe all or any part of the testimony of any witness and disregard all or any part of the testimony of any witness.

The jury heard evidence that Hightower had no record of preparing the purported will, that none of the Daughters were able to locate the purported will for fourteen years, that Hightower had no photos of where the purported will was discovered, and that all the Daughters signed an heirship affidavit asserting that the Decedent died without a will. Mr. Bice also presented evidence to the jury regarding the timing and potential monetary motive of probating the purported will. Specifically, the purported will was first filed after Mr. Bice entered a sales contract for the Property valued at over a million dollars, and the Daughters would be entitled to some portion of the Property or proceeds from the sale of the Property under the purported will…

Not only is it unnecessary to have testimony from both parties, but also juries may choose to believe one witness and disbelieve another, even if the testimony is uncontradicted. A reviewing court may assume a jury disregarded some testimony in favor of their verdict, and reviewing courts cannot impose their own opinions to the contrary when a jury acted reasonably within their discretion. In the present case, there is sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury, in their sole discretion, could have concluded that the Decedent did not sign the purported will.

Id. The court granted the petition for mandamus.

Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

dfjohnson@winstead.com
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

dfjohnson@winstead.com
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law