In In re Est. of Corbett, Robert William Corbett died on November 26, 2016, unmarried and without children. No. 14-24-00922-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 9380 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] December 9, 2025, no pet.). Robert’s 2016 will bequeathed his residue estate to his maternal aunt, Willie Lee Bell Lambert, and her son. Lori Corbett Glidden and Donna Corbett Newding, Robert’s first cousins, alleged Robert suffered a stroke in March 2016 and that Willie and her attorney fraudulently executed the 2016 will during his health decline. Willie died, and the administrator of her estate argued that even if the 2016 will was invalid, a prior 1994 will would control, which did not name the contestants as beneficiaries. Therefore, the administrator filed a motion in limine in which he argued appellants lack standing to contest the 2016 will because they lack a pecuniary interest in Robert’s estate. Contestants argued they had an interest in Robert’s estate as his cousins and heirs because he revoked all prior wills in a handwritten instrument he signed on July 2, 2012 (the 2012 instrument). The trial court granted the motion in limine, and the contestants appealed.
The court of appeals first discussed the standards for a motion in limine to challenge standing in a will contest:
The absence of standing to contest a will may properly be raised in a motion in limine. In the probate context, a motion in limine challenging standing is essentially a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. “A motion to dismiss for want of standing is functionally the same as a plea to the jurisdiction.” We thus consider the trial court’s ruling as a matter of law on appellee’s motion in limine on standing in the same manner as a ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction.
Typically, a plea to the jurisdiction challenges whether the nonmovant has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case. But a plea to the jurisdiction can also properly challenge the existence of those very jurisdictional facts. When jurisdictional facts are challenged, the courts consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. As with summary judgment, the court takes as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulges every reasonable inference and resolves any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. If the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact finder. But if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as matter of law. We review such rulings de novo.
Id. The court clarified that only a monetary interest confers standing to contest a will: “The only interest that confers standing to contest a will is ‘a pecuniary one . . . which will be affected by the probate or defeat of the will.’ A person contesting a will bears the burden of establishing he has the necessary pecuniary interest in the estate.” Id.
The contestants argued that a 2012 document revokes the earlier 1994 will. The court hold that “A written will ‘may not be revoked, except by a subsequent will, codicil, or declaration in writing that is executed with like formalities, or by the testator destroying or canceling the same, or causing it to be destroyed or canceled in the testator’s presence.’ An invalid will cannot serve to revoke a former will.” Id. The court concluded that there was a fact issue on the contestants’ standing and reversed the trial court’s order granding the motion in limine:
The only pecuniary interest appellants allege in Robert’s estate is an interest under the rules of intestacy as Robert’s heirs. For this to be true, the defeat of the 2016 will must result in Robert leaving no valid will. Robert’s 2016 will contains a definite statement revoking all prior wills. But if appellants succeed in their challenge to the 2016 will, the revocation clause will have no effect. Just as in In re Estate of Adams, there is a question of fact as to whether the 1994 will, even if self-proved, would be admissible to probate. If it is not, Robert’s property must be distributed according to the laws of intestacy, and appellants, as surviving heirs, would be beneficiaries. Because the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, the trial court erred by granting appellee’s motion in limine on standing.
Id.