Not too long ago we wrote about McKenzie v. Progressive Treatment Solutions, LLC, 2026 WL 636741 (N.D. Ill. March 6, 2026). One of the things about McKenzie that caught our eye was the statement that, under Illinois law, “misrepresentations or mistakes of law cannot form the basis of a claim for fraud.” Id. at *6 (quoting McIntosh v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., 135 N.E.3d 73, 84 (Ill. 2019)). As our prior post explained, the non-fraudulent legal statement at issue in McKenzie was a purported misrepresentation of “the product’s regulatory classification. That alleged conduct is not an actionable representation of fact.”
We see those kinds of claims fairly frequently in prescription medical product liability litigation – allegations about some FDA requirement or another that was supposedly misstated or misapplied either by a regulated manufacturer or someone else in the chain of distribution (allegedly calling a §510(k) device ”approved” rather than ”cleared” comes to mind). So, the Illinois law proposition that allegations of legal mistakes are insufficient to support a fraud – or consumer fraud – claim seems important. But it was not something we had encountered before in the context of what we discuss on the Blog.
So we thought we’d take a look. Also, the firm’s AI folks had just told us that one of our newly available products could generate 50-state surveys. We’ve never used AI for that kind of thing (or much of anything at all – Bexis is not much of a fan). So we also thought that we’d use that AI feature for a first cut of the survey, and see how good it is at finding the answer to a legal question on a state-by-state basis.
The good thing about AI is that it didn’t take much time – under 10 minutes – to generate what it called a survey. See the end of this post for the rest.
One thing we quickly learned is that the First and Second Restatements of Torts §525 include legal misrepresentations as actionable fraud (“One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law. . . . ”). AI completely missed restatements as a source of law, although occasionally cited to cases that cited them. But once again it is questionable whether this ALI (“Always Liability Increases”) restatement actually restates the law. The proposition that a legal misrepresentation cannot be the basis of a fraud claim has ancient roots.
A representation of what the law will or will not permit to be done is one on which the party to whom it is made has no right to rely; and if he does so it is his folly, and he cannot ask the law to relieve him from the consequences.
Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875). Likewise, the Restatements notwithstanding, rejection of legal misrepresentations as fraud still looks like the majority rule. E.g., United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., 598 U.S. 739, 756 (2023) (“many courts appear to have stated − as a general rule − that misrepresentations of law are not actionable at common law”) (applying similar principles to the False Claims Act) (citation omitted).
Also, this survey is somewhat different from those we usually research on the Blog. Most of our surveys are for issues directly involving prescription medical product liability litigation. This one isn’t (another reason we tried AI). Nearly all of the cases for the proposition that legal statements cannot constitute fraud are not drug/device cases. So here, we’re not trying to be comprehensive. We’re simply looking for a firm indication whether each jurisdiction follows this general rule.
One last caveat: There are a couple of well-recognized exceptions to legal misstatements not being fraud: (1) fiduciary relationship cases, particularly those involving lawyers accused of misleading their clients about legal issues; and (2) “superior knowledge” by the party accused of misrepresentation. Manufacturers and sellers of prescription medical products are not fiduciaries, although doctors might be. “Superior knowledge” can be mushier.
So here we go.
Alabama
Alabama follows the same rule as Illinois. “[T]he alleged misrepresentation in this case was a misstatement of law, which is not actionable.” Johnson v. Sorenson, 914 So.2d 830, 839 (Ala. 2005). Here is a recent example:
Alabama courts have repeatedly held that misrepresentation or concealment as to a matter of law cannot constitute remedial fraud, because everyone is presumed to know the law, and therefore cannot in legal contemplation be deceived by erroneous statements of law. Such representations are ordinarily regarded as mere expressions of opinion on which the hearer has no right to rely. The Alabama Supreme Court recently reiterated that the law is presumed to be known by all.
Gill v. GMAC Insurance Co., 2009 WL 103189, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 14, 2009) (citations omitted).
Alaska
As usual, not much in Alaska. A really old – pre-statehood – case held, back in 1946, that “in the absence of actual fraud, those misled may not complain. They are presumed to know the law equally with those who misstate it.” In Re Town of Sitka, Alaska, 11 Alaska 201, 208 (D. Alaska 1946). A much more recent case, Lightle v. State, Real Estate Commission, 146 P.3d 980, 984 (Alaska 2006), quotes Restatement §525’s language including “law,” but that decision did not address this issue. See Bubbel v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 682 P.2d 374, 382-83 (Alaska 1984) (discussing “the question of whether a claim for relief may arise from a misrepresentation of law,” but reaching a decision on a different issue while “declin[ing] to adopt a flat rule that misrepresentations of law are not actionable in this state”).
Arizona
In Arizona “a misrepresentation of law or of the legal effect of a contract does not constitute actionable fraud.” Barnes v. Lopez, 544 P.2d 694, 697 (Ariz. App. 1976). Accord Pleasants v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 569 P.2d 261, 264 (Ariz. App. 1977) (following Barnes). However, the Arizona Supreme Court has been rather lax in applying that rule, at least in the settlement context. See Love v. Home Transportation Co., 641 P.2d 854, 856 (Ariz. 1982) (to “[a] person . . . untutored in the law” a statement about “illegality” could be an “opinion”). Also, the “broader” scope of the Arizona consumer fraud statute does not include such a limitation. Cearley v. Wieser, 727 P.2d 346, 348 (Ariz. App. 1986).
Arkansas
Arkansas also prohibits fraud claims based on alleged legal misrepresentations.
As a general rule, fraud cannot be predicated upon misrepresentations as to matters of law, nor upon opinions on questions of law based on facts known to both parties alike, nor upon representations as to what the law will not permit to be done. . . . Reasons given for this rule are that every one is presumed to know the law, both civil and criminal, and is bound to take notice of it, and hence has no right to rely on such representations or opinions, and will not be permitted to say that he was misled by them.
Pambianchi v. Howell, 265 S.W.3d 788, 792 (Ark. App. 2007) (quoting Adkins v. Hoskins, 3 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Ark. 1928) (citation omitted). Accord Rice v. Ragsdale, 292 S.W.3d 856, 864 (Ark. App. 2009) (“[a]s a general rule, fraud cannot be predicated upon misrepresentations as to matters of law”).
California
That misstatement of law cannot be fraud in California has been the law for quite some time:
[T]hese representations . . . did not constitute fraud in the legal sense. They were not statements of fact but at most misrepresentations of law. It is well settled that such misrepresentations, at least where there is no relation of trust or confidence between the parties, do not amount to fraud. . . . Whether the true ground for the rule be that everyone is presumed (or rather, bound) to know the law, or that a representation regarding the law constitutes an expression of opinion upon which the party to whom it is addressed has no right to rely, the rule itself is thoroughly well settled.
Haviland v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 158 P. 328, 331 (Cal. 1916) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “[A]bsent special circumstances, misrepresentations of law do not amount to actionable fraud.” Bledsoe v. Watson, 106 Cal. Rptr. 197, 200 (Cal. App. 1973) (citation omitted). Thus, “[i]t is well settled . . . that misrepresentations of the law are not actionable as fraud, including under the mail and wire fraud statutes, because statements of the law are considered merely opinions and may not be relied upon absent special circumstances.” Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 2006). See Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2004) (“fraud cannot be predicated upon misrepresentations of law or misrepresentations as to matters of law” because “[s]tatements of domestic law are normally regarded as expressions of opinion which are generally not actionable in fraud even if they are false”) (RICO case following California law as to the “established common law” of fraud). See also Cal. Civ. Code §1710 (“deceit” involves false assertions of “fact”).
Colorado
In Brodeur v. American Home Assurance Co., 169 P.3d 139 (Colo. 2007), an alleged misrepresentation of authorization for use of a prescription drug could not be the basis of a fraud claim:
[T]he misrepresentation arose from the implication that the [drug] treatment had not already been authorized − an incorrect representation of a matter of law. The misrepresentation that the treatment had not been authorized is an incorrect opinion of the legal meaning and effect of the regulations. Thus, [it] was a misrepresentation of law, not a misrepresentation of fact. . . . As a statement of [defendant’s] opinion on a matter of law, [it] is not actionable under the general rule that requires a misrepresentation of fact.
Id. at 153-54. “[A] representation of law is a statement of opinion as to what the law permits or prohibits, and cannot support an action for fraud.” Id. at 153 (citation omitted).
Connecticut
We’re not at all sure that Connecticut follows the fact/law distinction. Crowther v. Guidone, 441 A.2d 11 (Conn. 1981), held:
To require the representation to be made as a statement of fact, however, is quite different than to require that the statement be factual as opposed to legal. . . . The latter inquiry in which the defendants would have us engage seeks to erect a barrier to shield from liability those defendants whose misrepresentation happens to concern the law. We decline to license such deceit.
Id. at 13.
Delaware
Delaware probably follows the rule that legal statements cannot support fraud claims. “All persons are presumed to know the law, including laypersons,” therefore “courts have declined to recognize a misrepresentation as to a matter of law as a basis for a charge of fraud or deceit in making a contract.” Thomas v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, 2015 WL 5766775, at *2 n.20 (Del. Ch. Sept. 18, 2015). Thomas cited Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Insurance Co., 872 A.2d 611, 629 (Del. Ch. 2005), wherein the chancery court held:
[Plaintiff’s] allegation that the [defendants] assured it [about] complian[ce] with the Internal Revenue Code does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is an opinion as to a matter of law. A misrepresentation as to a matter of law is a statement of opinion only and cannot afford a basis for a charge of fraud or deceit in the making of the contract. This is because all persons are presumed to know the law and therefore cannot be deceived by erroneous statements of law.
Id. at 629 (footnotes omitted). The Delaware Supreme Court did not reject this rule, but reversed the result, holding that the relevant statements “implied facts” that were “known to the maker,” and thus involved more than legal opinions. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Insurance Co., 901 A.2d 106, 115-16 (Del. 2006).
District of Columbia
The District has “recognize[d] . . . the general rule that misrepresentations as to matters of law do not ordinarily support an action for damages.” Hembry v. Parreco, 81 A.2d 77, 79 (D.C. Mun. 1951) (citation omitted). Thus,
[B]ecause the relevant misrepresentation in the instant case was not a misrepresentation of fact upon which [defendant] could base his belief in the legality of his acts; rather, the relevant assurance was a misrepresentation of law. As cases in this jurisdiction have held, “it is the general rule that misrepresentations as to matters of law do not ordinarily support an action for damages.”
Democratic National Committee v. McCord, 416 F. Supp. 505, 507 (D.D.C. 1976) (quoting Hembry).
Florida
Florida follows “the principle that fraud cannot be predicated upon misrepresentations of law or misrepresentations as to matters of law.” Marks v. Fields, 36 So.2d 612, 614 (Fla. 1948) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “It is, of course, well settled in Florida that in order to be actionable a fraudulent misrepresentation must be of a material fact, rather than a mere opinion or a misrepresentation of law.” Chino Electric, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 578 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. App. 1991) (footnote omitted). However, “the modern trend of cases is to find statements of fact implied in otherwise material misrepresentations which have some legal character.” Id.
Georgia
In Georgia, “[t]he law is well settled that fraud cannot be predicated upon misrepresentations of law or misrepresentations as to matters of law.” Parrish v. St. Joseph’s/Candler Health System, Inc., 874 S.E.2d 413, 419 (Ga. App. 2022).
[A] misrepresentation as to a matter of law is a statement of opinion only and can not afford a basis for a charge of fraud or deceit in the making of the contract. This is because all persons are presumed to know the law and therefore cannot be deceived by erroneous statements of law.
BPP069, LLC v. Lindfield Holdings, LLC, 816 S.E.2d 755 (Ga. App. 2018) (quoting and following Lakeside Investments Group v. Allen, 559 S.E.2d 491, 493 (Ga. App. 2002)).
Hawai’i
As with Alaska, the strongest statement in Hawai’i is old enough to predate statehood. See Kyles v. Lantis, 39 Haw. 440, 444 (Haw. 1952) (applying “the well-settled general rule that fraud cannot be predicated upon misrepresentations of law or misrepresentation as to matters of law”). In a RICO case, a Hawai’i court recently followed the “routine” rule that “a legal representation . . . is not an actionable theory of fraud.” Bolos v. Waldorf-Astoria Management LLC, 762 F. Supp.3d 975, 1013 (D. Haw. 2025) (citation omitted). A contrary view was expressed in Elliot Megdal & Associates v. Hawaii Planing Mill, Ltd., 814 F. Supp. 898 (D. Haw. 1993), which refused to follow Kyles and would “abandon the distinction between statements of fact and law.” Id. at 904.
Idaho
An Idaho appellate court has held that reliance on a statement of law sufficient to support a claim of fraud does not exist:
Even if we assume, though, that [defendant] made this false statement to [plaintiff], we hold that [plaintiff] could not justifiably rely on it. Such a statement by [defendant] would have been [plaintiff’s] legal opinion as to [plaintiff’s] rights and status. . . . Such a statement of law is a mere assertion of opinion, upon which [plaintiff] had no right to rely.
Mitchell v. Barendregt, 820 P.2d 707, 714 (Idaho App. 1991).
Illinois
The Illinois Supreme Court case that McKenzie followed stated, with citations for every proposition:
It is understood that misrepresentations or mistakes of law cannot form the basis of a claim for fraud. An erroneous conclusion of the legal effect of known facts constitutes a mistake of law and not of fact. Because all persons are presumed to know the law, a mistake or misrepresentation of law . . . is discoverable by the plaintiff in the exercise of ordinary prudence, [and] cannot form the basis of an action for fraud.
McIntosh v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., 135 N.E.3d 73, 84 (Ill. 2019) (citations omitted).
Indiana
The status of the law/fact distinction for purposes of fraud in Indiana is rather unclear. More than a century ago the Indiana Supreme Court held, “[o]n the question of fraudulent representations, it may be conceded that there is no fraud in a representation as to the law of the state of the domicile of the party to whom the representation is made.” Travelers’ Protective Ass’n v. Smith, 107 N.E. 283, 287 (Ind. 1914). In Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Pokraka, 595 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. 1992), the court questioned the distinction but declined to overrule prior precedent:
The appellate court, citing Travelers’ Protective Ass’n, determined that this was not actionable fraud, in part because it was a misrepresentation of law and not a misrepresentation of fact. Although this precept has never been explicitly repudiated by this Court, . . . we note that the present tendency is strongly in favor of eliminating the distinction between misrepresentations of law and facts . . . . We need not decide whether Travelers continues to be an accurate statement of the law on this issue.
Id. at 249 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
However, no subsequent Indiana decision has followed up on this issue, and lower Indiana courts have continued to apply the distinction. See American United Life Insurance Co. v. Douglas, 808 N.E.2d 690, 703 (Ind. App. 2004) (“in general, a misstatement of law cannot form the basis of fraud because everyone is presumed to know the law and therefore, the allegedly defrauded party cannot justifiably have relied on the misstatements”); Bowman v. City of Indianapolis, 133 F.3d 513, 518 (7th Cir. 1998) (“because the Pokraka court expressly declined to eliminate the distinction, we think it appropriate to apply the law as it currently stands and to leave any major change in doctrine to the Indiana judiciary”).
Iowa
Iowa follows general rule that “[r]epresentations or statements concerning domestic law normally are not regarded as representations of fact and therefore no action for fraud arises even when they are false.” State v. Tyler, 512 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Iowa 1994) (citations omitted).
[T]here is a distinction between a misunderstanding as to the law and false assertions of fact. . . . That a misrepresentation or misunderstanding of the law will not vitiate a contract, where there is no misunderstanding of the facts is well settled. . . . [A]n expression of opinion which is a matter of law cannot constitute false representations or deceit.
International Milling Co. v. Gisch, 137 N.W.2d 625, 631 (Iowa 1965).
Kansas
It’s hard to say what the current law in Kansas is. Back in 1931 the Kansas Supreme Court applied the “rule” that “a misrepresentation on the question of law would not justify the setting aside of the release.” Ertman v. Clemens Coal Co., 297 P. 431, 432 (Kans. 1931). A few years earlier, that court likewise recognized “the well-established proposition . . . that a settlement will not be set aside because one of the parties did not understand its legal effect” because “persons of sound and mature mind are presumed to know the law,” Cramer v. Kansas City Railways Co., 211 P. 118, 119 (Kans. 1922), but with an exception that mistakes of law can be actionable “where the opposite party was in some way instrumental in producing the result.” Id. Similar is Epp v. Hinton, 138 P. 576, 577 (Kan. 1914), where the general rule that “a false representation as to a matter of law will not support an action for deceit, because it is essentially an expression of opinion” was modified with an exception for the “law of another state.” Id. at 577.
All of this law is old, and we haven’t seen anything in a Kansas decision, state or federal court, more recent that is definitive on this point.
Kentucky
The rule in Kentucky was stated by its high court in McDonald v. Goodman, 239 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Ky. 1951).
[M]isrepresentation or concealment as to a matter of law can not constitute actionable fraud because every one is presumed to know the law and therefore can not, in legal contemplation, be deceived by erroneous statements of the law, and such representations are ordinarily regarded as mere expressions of opinion, on which the hearer has no right to rely.
Id. at 99 (quoting Tewmey v. Tewmey’s Assignee, 65 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Ky. 1933)); Moseley v. Owensboro Municipal Housing Commission, 252 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Ky.1952) (“A false representation as to law does not amount to fraud, in the absence of a trust or confidential relation between the parties.”). This rule has been followed by comparatively recent Kentucky appellate precedent.
[A]ppellants assert their fraudulent misrepresentation claims were based upon a legal misrepresentation, rather than a factual misrepresentation . . . . Taken at face value, there are a multitude of problems with this argument. One is that in the absence of a trust or confidential relation between the parties − a relation the appellants have never alleged to have existed herein − a false representation as to the law, and by extension the legal effect of a written instrument, does not amount to fraud.
Reesor v. City of Audubon Park, 2017 WL 2609243, at *5-6 (Ky. App. June 16, 2017) (unpublished) (citations, including to McDonald, and footnote omitted) (emphasis original); In re Backer, 51 F. Appx. 522, 531 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Generally, Kentucky law does not recognize misrepresentations of law, only misrepresentations of fact, unless a confidential or trust relationship exists between the parties.”) (citations omitted); Compressed Gas Corp., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 857 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1988) (a “representation, to the extent that it is a misrepresentation of law, is not actionable in Kentucky”).
Louisiana
Louisiana may not follow the prohibition of fraud claims based on allegations of legal misrepresentations. In Petrohawk Properties, L.P. v. Chesapeake Louisiana, L.P., 689 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2012), the court – generalizing from a Louisiana case involving allegations of lawyer misconduct – held:
[W]e reject [appellant’s] argument that a misrepresentation of law cannot give rise to a fraud claim. Under Louisiana law, the relevant inquiry is whether there was a misrepresentation, suppression, or omission of true information. Indeed, Louisiana courts have found fraud where the underlying false statement was a misrepresentation of law.
Id. at 389 (citing Lupo v. Lupo, 475 So.2d 402 (La. App. 1985) (involving a lawyer deceiving his client)).
But that’s all we’ve been able to find in Louisiana. We also note that Louisiana, uniquely, is a code, rather than common-law, state – and the Louisiana Code provisions concerning fraud, La. Civ. C. §§1953-57, do not distinguish between misrepresentations of fact and of law.
Maine
There is not much recent law in Maine. Dictum in State v. Deschambault, 191 A.2d 114 (Me. 1963), referencing a case from 1883, stated that “a statement of law . . . was not a fact on which to ground deceit.” Id. at 117. But Deschambault was a criminal case. In Weaver v. New England Mutual Life Insurance Co., 52 F.Supp.2d 127 (D. Me. 1999), the court rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on Restatement §525, “or the purpose of expanding the scope of actionable fraud claims.” Id. at 133. “Defendants are correct in its assertion that under Maine law a claim for fraud must be based on a misrepresentation of fact.” Id. But Weaver “did not confine its analysis” to the “conclusions about . . . legal effect” that the defendant argued were the sole bases of the plaintiff’s fraud claim. Id. at 132.
Maryland
In Maryland a defendant that “has acted on the opinion of his attorneys in making a statement,” cannot be liable for fraud “if he did so honestly.” Brashears v. Collison, 115 A.2d 289, 294 (Md. 1955). Citing Brashears, a more recent decision held:
Whether a contract requires the disclosure of a particular matter is a question of contract interpretation and is properly regarded as a legal matter. . . . Seeking and relying upon the advice of an attorney not only constitutes no evidence of fraud, but it is evidence of the contrary.
VF Corp. v. Wrexham Aviation Corp., 715 A.2d 188, 198 (Md. 1998). See Blonder v. Buckhantz, 2006 WL 8456524, at *6 (n.8 D. Md. Feb. 16, 2006) (“legal opinions . . . cannot be as a matter of law, fraudulent statements”; a statement that “is clearly a matter of law which is not fraudulent”).
This precedent suggests that Maryland law does not predicate fraud on alleged legal misstatements, but we cannot state that the rule is firmly established.
Massachusetts
Massachusetts probably allows fraud claims based on allegations of misstatements of law – at least in “business transactions” − as its high court adopted the standard set in Restatement §525:
The elements necessary to maintain an action in deceit are summarized in Restatement: Torts, §525: “One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from action in reliance thereon in a business transaction is liable to the other for the harm caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.”
Graphic Arts Finishers, Inc. v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 255 N.E.2d 793, 796 (Mass. 1970).
Some uncertainty arises because misstatements of law were not at issue in Graphic Arts, and earlier Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court precedent had specifically barred fraud/deceit claims based on legal misrepresentations. See Galassi Mosaic & Tile Co. v. City of Boston, 4 N.E.2d 291, 294 (Mass. 1936) (“It if be assumed that the quoted representation was a misrepresentation as to the effect of the statutory provision . . . and therefore false, the defendant cannot be liable for a false representation of law.”); cf. Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 320 N.E.2d 919, 925 (Mass. App. 1974) (applying “superior knowledge” exception to allow a fraud claim based on a “misrepresentation of law” suggesting the general rule still existed), aff’d on other grounds, 331 N.E.2d 813 (Mass. 1975).
Michigan
The Michigan Supreme Court acknowledged that “[i]t is the general rule that fraud cannot be predicated upon misrepresentations as to matters of law” in Rosenberg v. Cyrowski, 198 N.W. 905, 906 (Mich. 1924) (citation and quotation marks omitted). But Rosenberg involved attorney statements, so an exception applied. Id. at 906-07. The general rule still seems to hold in Michigan. Cummins v. Robinson Township, 770 N.W.2d 421, 435 (Mich. App. 2009) (“alleg[ations] that defendants made intentional, inaccurate statements regarding the law” cannot support “a viable fraud claim”); Dugan v. Vlcko, 2018 WL 5995482, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 15, 2018) (“it is correct that Michigan courts have found that, in most circumstances, misrepresentation of the law is not grounds for fraud claims”) (citations omitted); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Rayborn, 2003 WL 23200248, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 2003) (plaintiff “cannot maintain a claim for fraud based upon [defendant’s] interpretation of federal law. . . . The general rule is that fraud cannot be based upon a misrepresentation of law.”) (citation omitted) (one of several identical decisions).
Minnesota
The Supreme Court of Minnesota followed the rule legal fraud is not actionable, with the usual exceptions, in State v. Edwards, 227 N.W. 495 (Minn. 1929):
[I]gnorance of the law is no excuse. Indeed it is a necessary principle or rule lying at the foundation of government. This rule sounds in policy. . . . It is best to adopt the theory that the rights and responsibility of every one shall be the same as if he, in fact, knew the law. Ordinary vigilance will disclose the truth or falsehood of representations as to matters of law. . . . It does not apply when the relation of trust and confidence is involved. It is sufficient for present purposes to state that the general rule, which controls in this case, may be rendered inapplicable by peculiar facts and circumstances.
Id. at 495-96 (citations omitted). That’s still essentially Minnesota law.
[A]bstract statements of law or pure legal opinions are not actionable; however, a mixed statement of law and fact may be actionable if it amounts to an implied assertion that facts exist that justify the conclusion. . . . A representation of law that is clearly a statement of opinion does not carry an implication of fact and is not actionable.
Hoyt Properties, Inc. v. Production Resource Group., L.L.C., 736 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn. 2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Accord Northernaire Productions, Inc. v. County of Crow Wing, 244 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Minn. 1976) (“[g]enerally, misrepresentation of law is not actionable”) (citation omitted); Lonergan v. Ellison, 2021 WL 5289553, at *3 (Minn. App. Nov. 15, 2021) (“misrepresentations of law are generally not actionable for fraud”) (citation omitted); Gatz v. Frank M. Langenfeld & Sons Construction, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Minn. App. 1984) (“Misrepresentations of law are not actionable.”) (citation omitted).
Mississippi
In Mississippi, “[t]raditionally, a misrepresentation upon which an action for fraud is predicated must be a representation of fact and not a representation of the law.” Johnson v. Brewer, 427 So.2d 118, 121 (Miss. 1983) (citations omitted) (citing Harrison v. Vermillion, 56 So. 2d 811, 814 (Miss. 1952) (“Fraud could not be predicated upon” “the expression of a legal opinion”)).
Missouri
Missouri follows “the rule that one is not permitted to say that he has been misled as to a matter of law,” recognizing common exceptions for “confidential relationship” and “superior knowledge.” White v. Mulvania, 575 S.W.2d 184, 192 (Mo. 1978). Thus, “[t]he general rule is that expressions of opinion, such as to a future event or for matters of law, are not sufficient for a fraud action.” Reis v. Peabody Coal Co., 997 S.W.2d 49, 65 (Mo. App. 1999). “[I]t has been consistently held that an action for fraud cannot be based upon a misrepresentation of law.” Uhle v. Sachs Electric, 831 S.W.2d 774, 778 (Mo. App. 1992) (citation omitted).
The defendants concede the existence of the general rule that an action for fraud (and also an affirmative defense of fraudulent misrepresentation) cannot be based on misrepresentations of law. That rule is based on the principle that everyone is presumed to know the law and is bound to take notice of the law and, therefore, in legal contemplation, cannot be deceived by representations concerning the law or permitted to say he has been misled.
* * * *
[W]e find no error in the trial court’s conclusions that the misrepresentations were not actionable because they were misrepresentations of law.
Lucas v. Enkvetchakul, 812 S.W.2d 256, 260 (Mo. App. 1991) (citation omitted). Accord Bowles v. All Counties Investment Corp., 46 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Mo. App. 2001) (quoting and following Lucas).
Montana
In Montana, “[g]enerally, fraud must be premised upon a misrepresentation of material fact, rather than law.” Ryckman v. Wildwood, Inc., 641 P.2d 467, 471 (Mont. 1982). “[O]ne cannot perpetrate fraud upon another by making any statement or representation as to the scope, operation, or effect of an existing law.” Russell v. Sunburst Refining Co., 272 P. 998, 1005 (Mont. 1928). See Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Anderson, 194 P. 160, 164 (Mont. 1920) (“misrepresentation or opinion expressed . . . as to what the law is relative to their respective rights in the matter, . . . is not a fraudulent misrepresentation”); H&R Block Tax Servs. LLC v. Kutzman, 2010 WL 11531369, at *4 (D. Mont. April 21, 2010) (“Because the Counterclaim only alleges a misrepresentation of an opinion on the law, . . . [it] is dismissed.”).
The usual exceptions apply.
Nebraska
With the usual exceptions, “[i]t is a general rule that misrepresentations as to law will not give rise to an action for fraud and deceit.” Loringer v. Kaplan, 137 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Neb. 1965). “It has frequently been held that a misrepresentation as to the law will not give rise to an action for fraud and deceit and, therefore, cannot be said to constitute conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts.” Kohlbeck v. City of Omaha, 318 N.W.2d 742, 745 (Neb. 1982). “Generally a mistake of law is one upon which a party cannot rely, as all parties are bound to know the law.” Abbott v. Abbott, 195 N.W.2d 204, 208 (Neb. 1972) (citation omitted). See Agrex, Inc. v. City of Superior, 581 N.W.2d 428, 436 (Neb. App. 1998) (quoting and following Kohlbeck).
Nevada
There’s not much in Nevada. Hernandez v. Creative Concepts, Inc., 862 F. Supp.2d 1073 (D. Nev. 2012), recognized, following cases applying California law, that “[a]s a general rule, fraud cannot be predicated upon misrepresentations of law or misrepresentations as to matters of law.” Id. at 1094. That decision listed :four exceptions”: special knowledge, fiduciary relationship, affirmatively obtaining the plaintiff’s confidence, and “some other special reason to expect” reliance. Id.
New Hampshire
The New Hampshire Supreme Court held, in DePalantino v. DePalantino, 658 A.2d 1207, 1209 (N.H. 1995):
Assuming that the plaintiff made these statements, as a matter of law they are insufficient. . . . The statements constitute no more than the plaintiff’s opinion regarding the status of the law. . . . Opinions regarding the status or interpretation of the law, however, generally will not provide the basis for an action for fraud or misrepresentation.
Id. at 1209 (citation omitted).
New Jersey
A century ago, one of the predecessors of the New Jersey Supreme Court held that, “[i]f the only misrepresentation was . . . as to the legal effect of the writing which defendant signed, that was not a fraudulent representation.” Wiebke v. De Wyngaert, 101 A. 410, 410-11 (N.J. Ch. 1917). Citing Wiebke, a less ancient decision held:
[S]tatements of law do not generally constitute fraud. . . . A representation of what the law will or will not permit to be done is one on which the party to whom it is made has no right to rely. It is an opinion. . . . An exception to this rule exists where an expert possessed of superior knowledge.
PH Chaleyer, Inc v. Simon, 91 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D.N.J. 1950) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Chaleyer, in turn, was cited as stating the law of New Jersey in a much more recent decision, that the defendant’s “representations . . . are interpretations of the loan agreement and therefore are statements of law, which cannot constitute fraud.” Wu v. Capital One, N.A., 2014 WL 3673041, at *7 (D.N.J. July 22, 2014), aff’d on other grounds, 617 F. Appx. 214 (3d Cir. 2015).
On the other hand, a New Jersey trial court did cite the Restatement §525’s “or law” language in National Premium Budget Plan Corp. v. National Fire Insurance Co., 234 A.2d 683, 704 (N.J. Super. Law. Div. 1967), aff’d, 254 A.2d 819 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1969), a case having nothing to do with allegations of legally related fraud.
We thought there would be more precedent in New Jersey, but we (and the AI program) didn’t find it.
New Mexico
A pair of New Mexico Supreme Court decisions from the 1950s acknowledge the general rule. Agnew v. Landers, 278 P.2d 970 (N.M. 1954), held:
[T]he authorities seem reasonably uniform to the effect that a misrepresentation of the law cannot constitute actionable fraud. This conclusion is sometimes based upon the theory that fraud cannot be predicated upon the expression of an opinion. We feel that this representation in the instant case is not actionable.
Id. at 977 (citation omitted). Rogers v. Stacy, 318 P.2d 1116, 1118 (N.M. 1957), recognized the general rule that misrepresentations of law are not actionable,” but applied the fiduciary relationship exception. We didn’t find anything more recent that would call those decisions into question.
New York
New York law holds that “a pure opinion of law . . . may not, except in unusual circumstances, base an action in tort,” and “a mixed statement of fact as to what the law is or whether it is applicable,” which can be actionable. National Conversion Corp. v. Cedar Building Corp., 246 N.E.2d 351, 355 (N.Y. 1969). “Hence, in the proper circumstances there may indeed be reliance on a fraudulently expressed statement of the law.” Id. at 356. “[A]ll persons are treated as if they knew the law in passing on the character of their acts” so that “a representation of law which is to be taken as the expression of an opinion only.” Municipal Metallic Bed Manufacturing Corp. v. Dobbs, 171 N.E. 75, 76 (N.Y. 1930). But this rule only applies “[w]hen one knows the facts.” Id.
Thus, under New York law, “a representation based on a good faith misinterpretation of the legal effect of an agreement does not provide a basis for a fraud claim,” but “[e]ven though fraud is generally confined to situations involving misrepresentations of fact, an expression of an intentionally false opinion on a matter of law may be actionable where a relationship of trust exists.” Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
It is “well settled” that “fraud cannot be predicated upon misrepresentations of law or misrepresentations as to matters of law.” Statements, and even misrepresentations, of law are generally regarded as opinions which cannot be relied upon absent special circumstances.
Carolina Casualty Insurance Co. v. Capital Trucking, Inc., 523 F. Supp.3d 661, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Singh v. NYCLT 2009-A Trust, 2016 WL 3962009, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2016), aff’d, 683 F. Appx. 76 (2d Cir. 2017)).
North Carolina
In North Carolina, “fraud cannot be based upon ignorance of the law.” Avriett v. Avriett, 363 S.E.2d 875, 878 (N.C. App.), aff’d, 368 S.E.2d 377 (N.C. 1988) (per curiam). “[I]gnorance of . . . legal effect” is not a basis for a fraud claim. Biesecker v. Biesecker, 302 S.E.2d 826, 829 (N.C. App. 1983) (citations omitted).
Generally speaking, a party cannot attack the making of a contract on the basis of fraud where the proof regarding the misrepresentation or misstatement relates to a matter of law. This is based primarily on the following related principles: that everyone is equally capable of determining the law, is presumed to know the law and is bound to take notice of the law and, therefore, in legal contemplation, cannot be deceived by representations concerning the law or permitted to say he or she has been misled.
Dalton v. Dalton, 596 S.E.2d 331, 333 (N.C. App. 2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Accord Lockerby v. Cross Point NC Partners, LLC, 2023 WL 4918359, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 1, 2023) (“In North Carolina, a plaintiff generally cannot claim that they were misled by a misrepresentation of law.”) (citation omitted); Cross v. Formativ Health Management, 439 F. Supp.3d 616, 627 (E.D.N.C. 2020) (a “party’s statement of a legal position or an assertion about its rights or position under the law is not an actionable misrepresentation”) (citations omitted). Cf. Cross v. Ciox Health, LLC, 438 F. Supp.3d 572, 585 (E.D.N.C. 2020) (“a party’s statement of a legal position or an assertion about its rights or position under the law is not an actionable misrepresentation for purposes of a UDTPA claim”) (citations omitted).
North Dakota
The North Dakota Supreme Court weighed in on legal misrepresentations not being fraud a long time ago. “[I]n so far as the action may be thought to be predicated upon a misrepresentation of law, it cannot be regarded as an action for deceit.” Hellebust v. Bonde, 172 N.W. 812, 813 (N.D. 1919). “The argument is the familiar one that both parties are presumed to know the law, or at least “ignorantia legis neminem excusat,” and that consequently no one is capable of being legally deceived or damaged by a misrepresentation of a matter of law.” Id. at 812. A century later the same court followed Hellebust and held, “[plaintiffs] are charged with knowledge of statutes and ordinances. We conclude that a claim for deceit based on misrepresentation of law is barred as a matter of law.” Arnegard v. Arnegard Township, 908 N.W.2d 737, 751 (N.D. 2018). Accord Jacam Chemical Co. 2013, LLC v. Shepard, 101 F.4th 954, 968 (8th Cir. 2024) (“Generally, a misrepresentation of law is not actionable fraud in tort.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Ohio
Ohio law likewise has endorsed the proposition fraud cannot lie for legal misrepresentations. “[U]nder Ohio law, a representation of law is an opinion and cannot form the basis of an action for fraud in the absence of a fiduciary relationship.” Armatas v. Haws, 110 N.E.3d 759, 763 (Ohio App. 2018) (citation omitted). “It has been long held that, under Ohio law, a representation of law is an opinion and cannot form the basis of an action for fraud in the absence of a fiduciary relationship.” Id.
Plaintiffs’ allegations of “fraud” essentially assert that the defendants somehow represented the loans to be “lawful”. . . . However, under Ohio law, a representation of law is an opinion and cannot form the basis of an action for fraud in the absence of a fiduciary relationship.
Lynch v. Dial Finance Co. No. 1, Inc., 656 N.E.2d 714, 720 (Ohio App. 1995) (citing, inter alia, Aetna Insurance Co. v. Reed, 33 Ohio St. 283, 293-94 (1877)). Accord Barnes v. Reserve Energy Exploration, 68 N.E.3d 133, 141 (Ohio App. 2016) (same); Bergmoser v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC, 268 F. Appx. 392, 395 (6th Cir. 2008) (A legal misrepresentation cannot form the basis of a fraud or intentional misrepresentation claim, as a matter of law.”); Avery v. Joint Township Dist. Memorial Hospital, 286 F. Appx 256, 267 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Ohio courts have determined that a representation of law amounts to an opinion and therefore cannot form the basis for a fraud claim unless there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties.”).
Oklahoma
In Oklahoma, “with limited exceptions, fraud cannot be predicated on misrepresentations of law or misrepresentations as to matters of law.” First National Bank in Durant v. Honey Creek Entertainment Corp., 54 P.3d 100, 104 (Okla. 2002) (citations omitted). “[A] misrepresentation of law affords no grounds of redress or relief on the theory that all men are supposed to know the law.” Nesbitt v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 440 P.2d 738, 743 (Okla. 1968) (citation and quotation marks omitted). An exception exists where the defendant claims a “superior” knowledge of the law. Id. Thus, Oklahoma “recognizes the rule that misrepresentations of law do not form the predicate for an action based on fraud.” Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milburn, 615 F.2d 892, 895 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing Nesbitt).
Oregon
Oregon seems to be all over the lot. Sorensen v. Gardner, 334 P.2d 471 (Or. 1959), first recognized the general rule:
[I]t is argued that the misrepresentations alleged are mere expressions of opinion or representations of law and therefore not actionable. This may be true of [one] representation . . . but [another] representation . . . is one of fact. With respect to the other charges in the complaint, it is a general rule that fraud cannot be predicated upon misrepresentations of law or misrepresentations as to matters of law. Thus, misrepresentations concerning the legal effect of an instrument have been held to be not actionable.
Id. at 473 (citation omitted). But Sorenson went on to hold, in accordance with Restatement §545, that the rule did not apply to “business transactions” where legal representations could be considered facts or “the legal consequences of facts.” Id. at 474. But, in Wochnick v. True, 356 P.2d 515, 518 (Or. 1960), decided shortly after Sorenson, the traditional rule applied:
Plaintiff, in effect, is contending the legal rights bestowed upon her by the documents for which she traded were other than as represented. . . . Therefore, the representation, if made, was a representation of opinion as to the legal effect of the documents in question, and she was not entitled to rely thereon.
Id. at 518. See Travis v. Knappenberger, 87 F. Appx. 24, 26 (9th Cir. 2003) (because plaintiff “was aware of all the facts, . . . defendant’s statement . . . was a legal opinion” requiring summary judgment under Sorenson).
Compare: Denison v. Brown, 2008 WL 483334, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 19, 2008) (“[it] is well established that misrepresentations of the law are not actionable as fraud because statements of the law are considered merely opinions.” (citation and quotation marks omitted); with Criqui v. Pearl Music Co., 599 P.2d 1177, 1179-80 (Or. App. 1979) (“The law no longer precludes actions based on fraudulent representations as to the law. Whether such a misrepresentation is actionable depends on the circumstances.”).
Pennsylvania
In addressing fraudulent concealment, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently held:
[F]raudulent concealment, . . . ordinarily pertains to conduct on the part of the defendant which causes the plaintiff to relax his vigilance or deviate from his right of inquiry into the facts. Generally, the misrepresentations relied on must be misrepresentations of fact and not misrepresentations of law since all are presumed to know the law. This Court has never applied it to an assertion that the defendant misrepresented the current state of the law.
Johnson v. Wetzel, 238 A.3d 1172, 1181-82 (Pa. 2020) (citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted) (emphasis original). To find anything else, we had to go back a long way:
A representation of a rule of law unless made by one supposed to have expert knowledge of the special rule to one who is ignorant of the subject, is inoperative. Except under such circumstances, the truth or falsehood of misrepresentations of law should not be relied upon.
A. P. Landis, Inc., v. Mellinger, 175 A. 745, 746 (Pa. Super. 1934) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Puerto Rico
We found very little (and AI found nothing) on this subject for Puerto Rico. Adrian v. Mesirow Financial Structured Settlements, LLC, 736 F. Supp.2d 404 (D.P.R. 2010), held that the plaintiff “cannot show that her reliance was reasonable because the alleged misrepresentation regarded a matter of law.” Id. at 422. But Adrian was applying South Carolina, rather than Puerto Rico, law.
Rhode Island
We found nothing in Rhode Island except a block quote from Restatement §525 containing the “misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law” language in a case having nothing to do with allegations of legal misstatements. French v. Isham, 801 F. Supp. 913, 921 (D.R.I. 1992).
South Carolina
In South Carolina “misrepresentations as to matters of law are not actionable.” Carolina Chloride, Inc. v. Richland County, 714 S.E.2d 869, 874 (S.C. 2011). “There is no liability for casual statements, representations as to matters of law, or matters which plaintiff could ascertain on his own in the exercise of due diligence.” Isaac v. Onions, 915 S.E.2d 492, 497 (S.C. 2025) (quoting Quail Hill, LLC v. County of Richland, 692 S.E.2d 499, 508 (S.C. 2010). Thus, “our courts have repeatedly recognized the general rule that fraud cannot be predicated on misrepresentations as to matters of law, much less mere mistakes of law.” Anderson County v. Preston, 804 S.E.2d 282, 292 (S.C. App. 2017), vacated on procedural grounds, 831 S.E.2d 911 (S.C. 2019).
South Dakota
South Dakota law bars fraud claims based on alleged legal misstatements.
Plaintiff’s claim for negligence is premised on the allegation that a misrepresentation of law caused its damages. [Plaintiff] cannot avoid that fact by relabeling the name of its claim. Because misrepresentations of law are not actionable, the allegations show [a]n . . . insuperable bar to relief.
Total Auctions & Real Estate, LLC v. S. Dakota Dept. of Revenue & Regulation, 888 N.W.2d 577, 581-82 (S.D. 2016) (citation omitted). The omitted citation was to Meyer v. Santema, 559 N.W.2d 251, 255 (S.D. 1997), which similarly held:
[Plaintiff] is presumed to know the law. . . . [Defendant’s] misrepresentations concerned interpretation and implementation of a . . . matter of law − misrepresentations of law are not actionable.
Id. at 255 (citations omitted).
Tennessee
In Tennessee “a statement of law cannot provide the basis for an intentional misrepresentation claim, except under narrow circumstances.” Adams v. Delk Industries, Inc., 2021 WL 354096, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 2, 2021). Boyce v. LPP Mortgage Ltd., 435 S.W.3d 758 (Tenn. App. 2013), held:
[M]isstatements as to the law do not qualify as material factual misrepresentations[.] It is well settled that a claim of fraud . . . cannot generally be supported by proof of misstatements as to matters of law. . . . The rule, which is in essence an application of the broader principle that fraud must rest on a misrepresentation of a matter of fact . . ., is based on the principle that everyone is equally capable of determining the law, is presumed to know the law and is bound to take notice of the law and, therefore, in legal contemplation, cannot be deceived by representations concerning the law or permitted to say he or she has been misled.
Id. at 773 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The exceptions were “not applicable in this case.” Id. Accord Best Choice Roofing & Home Improvement, Inc. v. Best Choice Roofing Savannah, LLC, 446 F. Supp.3d 258, 276 (M.D. Tenn. 2020) (following Boyce).
Texas
Texas follows “the general rule that misrepresentations involving a point of law or the legal effect of a document will not support an action for fraud” with exceptions for fiduciaries and “superior knowledge. Fina Supply, Inc. v. Abilene National Bank, 726 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Tex. 1987). Thus, “[a] representation as to the legal effect of a document is regarded as a statement of opinion rather than of fact and will not ordinarily support an action for fraud.” Id.
The general rule, often repeated, is that fraud cannot be predicated upon misrepresentations as to matters of law. The reason usually given for the rule is that everyone is presumed to know the law, and hence has no right to rely upon representations made to him by another, and that such representations are to be treated as mere statements of opinions and not of fact.
Safety Casualty Co. v. McGee, 127 S.W.2d 176, 177 (Tex. Comm. 1939) (citations omitted) (cited in Fina). Accord Cromwell v. Anadarko E & P Onshore, LLC, 676 S.W.3d 860, 877 (Tex. App. 2023) (“generally speaking, fraud cannot be predicated upon misrepresentations of law or misrepresentations as to matters of law”) (citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 716 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. 2025) (dismissal of fraud claim not appealed); Visa Inc. v. Sally Beauty Holdings, Inc., 651 S.W.3d 278, 311 (Tex. App. 2021) (“compliance status is a legal opinion, not a “material fact” upon which fraud can be based”) (citations and quotation marks omitted); Evans v. Dynasty Transportation, Inc., 133 S.W.3d 672, 677 (Tex. App. 2003) (“As a general rule, a misrepresentation as to a matter of law is to be regarded as merely an expression of opinion and will not support an action for fraud and deceit.”) (citations omitted); Taub v. Houston Pipeline Co., 75 S.W.3d 606, 621 (Tex. App. 2002) (“Generally, claims of fraud cannot arise from legal opinions.) (citations omitted). There are many more older Texas appellate decisions to the same effect, some finding exceptions and some not.
Utah
Absent an exception, the proposition that “misrepresentations of law” do “not constitute remedial fraud, is “dispositive” under Utah law. Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah 1984). “[S]tatements of opinions as to the legal effect of contracts are not generally a proper basis for a claim of fraud.” Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 1980). “It’s thus settled in Utah that, as a general rule, misrepresentations of law and opinions about the legal effect of contracts are not adequate bases for actionable fraud.” England Logistics, Inc. v. Kelle’s Transport Service, LLC, 559 P.3d 45, 57 (Utah App. 2024) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Vermont
In Winton v. Johnson & Dix Fuel Corp., 515 A.2d 371 (Vt. 1986), the court paid lip service to the rule that statements about legal issues cannot amount to fraud, but emphasized “strong qualifications”:
While representations about the status of the law were held at common law not to be actionable, and actionable only in limited circumstances in Vermont, the rule has long been subject to strong qualifications. An important distinction must be made between representations of legal opinions and representations of fact relating to the law as it exists.
Id. at 373 (citations and footnote omitted). Non-actionable statements “involve[] the legal meaning and effect of a statute, court ruling, document, instrument or other source of law.” Id. at 374. This holding was reiterated and expanded to the Vermont consumer protection statute in Webb v. Leclair, 933 A.2d 177, 182-82 (Vt. 2007).
Virginia
A century ago, the Virginia Supreme Court followed the “well-settled” proposition that:
A representation of what the law will or will not permit to be done is one on which the party to whom it is made has no right to rely; and if he does so it is his folly, and he cannot ask the law to relieve him from the consequences. The truth or falsehood of such a representation can be decided by ordinary vigilance and attention. It is an opinion in regard to the law, and is always understood as such. The law is presumed to be equally within the knowledge of all parties.
Hicks v. Wynn, 119 S.E. 133, 136-37 (Va. 1923) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
This appears still to be Virginia law. See Phillips v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2018 WL 1946925, at *3 (E.D. Va. April 25, 2018) (“A misrepresentation of law does not qualify as a misrepresentation of a material fact.”); Batt v. Manchester Oaks Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 2013 WL 1155519, at *5 (E.D. Va. March 19, 2013) (“such representations amounted, not to statements of fact, but either future promises or representations of law, neither of which constitutes an actionable basis for a fraud claim”); Wells Fargo Bank, National Ass’n v. Smith, 2010 WL 4622176, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 5, 2010) (“A fraud claim cannot rest on a misstatement of the legal effect of a contract.”); Saunders v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 2022 WL 20210733, at *2 (Va. Cir. 2022) (“a misunderstanding of the legal effect of a . . . filing is a misrepresentation of law, the knowledge of which is imputed to both parties, and not a misrepresentation of fact”) – all citing Hicks.
Washington
In Bonded Adjustment Co. v. Anderson, 57 P.2d 1046 (Wash. 1936), the Washington Supreme Court held:
This representation, if made, was one of law and not of fact and could not be a basis for an action for fraud. The general rule is that misrepresentations as to the law, unaccompanied by any misrepresentation or concealment of the fact, cannot be made the basis of a fraud charge.
Id. at 1049 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Accord Hobson v. Union Oil Co., 59 P.2d 929, 932 (Wash. 1936) (“the general rule is that misrepresentations of law cannot form the basis for an action for damages”; applying exception); Prest v. Adams, 252 P. 686, 688 (Wash. 1927) (“The general rule is that misrepresentations as to the law, unaccompanied by any misrepresentation or concealment of the fact, cannot be made the basis of a fraud charge.”).
That seems to be it, which seems strange. None of these cases is indicated as being impaired, and we even checked the “distinguisheds” and found nothing on point. We found a few stray references to the Restatement “or law” language in Washington cases: Kaas v. Privette, 529 P.2d 23, 27 (Wash. App. 1974); Gunnarson v. Transamerica Life Insurance Co., 2014 WL 5782337, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 6, 2014); Asheim v. Pigeon Hole Parking, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 320, 328 (E.D. Wash. 1959), aff’d, 283 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1960) – but none of them involved allegations of legal misstatements, and none mentioned the above precedent.
We wonder if we’re missing something, but it seems like Washington does not allow fraud to be based on allegations of misrepresentation of law.
West Virginia
“Mistake of law alone will not, as a general rule, relieve one of the effect of his contract.” Tolley v. Poteet, 57 S.E. 811, 812 (W. Va. 1907). That’s it, except for rote references to the Restatement §525 “or law” language in opinions that have nothing to do with the legal restatement issue. See Belville v. Ford Motor Co., 13 F. Supp. 3d 528, 545 n.20 (S.D.W. Va. 2014); United States v. Massenburg, 2004 WL 2370694, at *7 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 21, 2004). Whether West Virginia law remains the same after more than a century, we can’t say for sure.
Wisconsin
Bentley v. Fayas, 50 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. 1951), held:
The general principle of law applying to this type of case is . . . that fraud cannot be based upon misrepresentations as to matters of law or expressions of opinion as to what is the law governing a particular transaction. . . . Pursuant to this principle it has been held that fraud cannot be predicated of misrepresentations as to the legal effect of a written instrument. . . . Hence, fraud cannot be based on statements as to the law of insurance and the legal conditions on which the right of recovery on an insurance policy depends. Our conclusion is that there is no liability . . . on a cause of action in tort based upon fraud and deceit.
Bentley v. Fayas, 50 N.W.2d 404, 408 (Wis. 1951) (citation and quotation marks omitted). That’s been the law in Wisconsin ever since. Suskey v. Davidoff, 87 N.W.2d 306, 310 (Wis. 1958) (“the claimed statement was with respect to the legal effect of the document, . . . and hence dealt with a matter of law rather than fact, and . . . [that] statement cannot be held to constitute actionable fraud”) (citations omitted); Nelson v. Taff, 499 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Wis. App. 1993) (“Misrepresentations of law are generally not actionable as fraud. But there are exceptions” such as superior knowledge) (citation omitted); Ritchie v. Clappier, 326 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Wis. App. 1982) (“Misrepresentations of law are generally not actionable as fraud.”) (citation omitted); Radford Co. v. Ruan Transport Corp., 2009 WL 5216985, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 30, 2009) (“representations of law . . . as to what governs a particular transaction . . . are generally not actionable”) (citations omitted); Wojciechowski v. Amoco Oil Co., 483 F. Supp. 109, 114 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (“As a general rule in Wisconsin, fraud cannot be based upon misrepresentations of law.”) (citation omitted)
The Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged the “general rule” that when “the misrepresentation complained of [is] one of law . . . and therefore not the basis of an action” in Rusch v. Wald, 232 N.W. 875, 875 (Wis. 1930), but did not apply it to brokers’ fiduciary relationship with their clients.
Wyoming
Wyoming follows “the well-recognized rule that such statements [“misrepresentations as to matters of law”] relating to matters of law are not ordinarily actionable.” State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Petsch, 261 F.2d 331, 334 (10th Cir. 1958) (citing Burnett v. Taylor, 252 P. 790, 794 (Wyo. 1927) (“misrepresentations of matters of opinion and of law are not actionable”)).
* * * *
As mentioned, we used an AI function designed to generate 50-state surveys. It was only marginally useful, although it didn’t take very long to do. In a couple of instances, it did produce something that our own analog research methods (utilizing key numbers and shepardizing what looked like the key cases) did not. But on far more occasions (most notably Pennsylvania), our tried and true methods unearthed precedents that the AI tool completely missed, and in some cases they were the best precedents in the state.
Nor is the AI tool really ready for prime time. It has no concept of judicial hierarchy, and doesn’t organize string citations by either court level or date. It doesn’t provide page cites. It doesn’t sort federal courts of appeals by state, and compounds that problem by not including the state from which such cases originated. Where it doesn’t find much, AI repeats the same generalized statements over and over again for each state. It doesn’t understand what Restatements are.
Perhaps worst, this AI tool is sycophantic, which causes it to include results as “favorable” that don’t really stand for the specific proposition at all. All in all, our readers would not want to read what the AI program generated.