COURT OF APPEAL SUMMARIES (JULY 20 – JULY 24)

By John Polyzogopoulos on July 24, 2026

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Good afternoon.
Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of July 20, 2026.

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In Lang-Newlands v. Newlands, the Court addressed whether the wife’s interest in a family trust should be excluded from her net family property for equalization purposes. Before the marriage, the wife’s father had settled a trust for her benefit, and the shares were later restructured through an estate freeze during the marriage. The Court held that because the trust’s value derived entirely from property the wife beneficially owned before marriage and her father’s $100 contribution to engage the freeze was de minimis, her interest should not be excluded from her net family property. The appeal on that issue was therefore allowed. The Court upheld the trial judge’s spousal support and costs orders.

In Bombardier Inc. v. Alstom Rail Sweden AB, the Court dismissed Bombardier’s appeal from a stay of its Ontario action in favour of ICC arbitration. The Court upheld the motion judge’s finding that it was arguable that Alstom Sweden, although not a named party to the 2020 Blizzard share purchase agreement, could benefit from its arbitration clause as an “Affiliate,” thereby engaging the competence-competence principle under the Peace River framework for determining whether to grant a stay in favour of international arbitration. The Court emphasized that at the stay stage, no final determinations are made regarding the arbitration agreement or the parties to it.

In Association of Architectural Technologists of Ontario v. Ontario Association of Architects, the Court set aside a contempt finding against the Ontario Association of Architects arising from its issuance of licences after a 2023 consent order entered into with the Association of Architectural Technologists of Ontario restricted certain types of licensing titles to be issued by the OAA to its members. The Court held that the motion judge failed to properly determine whether the consent order was clear and unambiguous, which is a necessary precondition for civil contempt. It also found that the OAA’s conduct did not amount to an intentional breach of the order and that the motion judge failed to meaningfully exercise their discretion before imposing contempt as a remedy.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Civil Decisions

Lang-Newlands v. Newlands, 2026 ONCA 530

Keywords: Family Law, Estates, Trusts, Gifts, Net Family Property, Equalization, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, Family Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 152, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, Lang-Newlands v. Newlands, 2024 ONSC 6285, Lang-Newlands v. Newlands, 2025 ONSC 2739, Shinder v. Shinder, 2018 ONCA 717, Thibodeau v. Thibodeau, 2011 ONCA 110, LeVan v. LeVan (2006), 82 O.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.), LeVan v. LeVan, 2008 ONCA 388, R.L. v. M.F., 2025 ONCA 595, Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9, McNamee v. McNamee, 2011 ONCA 533, Townshend v. Townshend, 2012 ONCA 868, Ward v. Ward, 2012 ONCA 462, Genesis Land Development Corp. v. Smoothwater Capital Corporation, 2013 ABQB 509, El Khatib v. Noun, 2023 ONSC 1667, Koughan v. Dow, 2015 PECA 2, Livermore v. Livermore (1992), 43 R.F.L. (3d) 163 (Ont. Gen. Div.), McLean v. Dahl, 2017 ONSC 1288, Gibson v. Gibson, 2011 ONSC 4406, Crawford v. Crawford (1997), 33 R.F.L. (4th) 381 (Ont. C.A.), Serra v. Serra, 2009 ONCA 105, Hickey v. Hickey, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, Halliwell v. Halliwell, 2017 ONCA 349, Climans v. Latner, 2020 ONCA 554, Tadayon v. Mohtashami, 2015 ONCA 777, Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840, Brinkos v. Brinkos (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 225, Black v. Black (1988), 66 O.R. (2d) 643 (H.C.), Reisman v. Reisman, 2014 ONCA 109, Financial Principles of Family Law, Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2021

Bombardier Inc. v. Alstom Rail Sweden AB, 2026 ONCA 528

Keywords: Jurisdiction, International Commercial Arbitration, International Chamber of Commerce, Share Purchase Agreement, competence-competence principle, UNCITRAL Model Law, Contracts, Corporate Separateness, Contract Interpretation, Stay of Proceedings, International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 2, Sch. 5, s. 9, Peace River Hydro Partners v. Petrowest Corp., 2022 SCC 41, Uber Technologies v. Heller, 2020 SCC 16, Husky Food Importers & Distributors Ltd. v. J.H. Whittaker & Sons Limited, 2023 ONCA 260, Lochan v. Binance Holdings Limited, 2024 ONCA 784, Dalimpex Ltd. v. Janicky (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.), Gulf Canada Resources Ltd. v. Arochem International Ltd. (1992), 66 B.C.L.R. (2d) 113 (B.C. C.A.)

Association of Architectural Technologists of Ontario v. Ontario Association of Architects, 2026 ONCA 539

Keywords: Administrative Law, Regulated Professions, Architects, Architectural Technologists, Licensing, Civil Procedure, Orders, Enforcement, Contempt, Architects Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.26, ss. 13.1, 25, General, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 27, O. Reg. 521/24, Association of Architectural Technologists of Ontario Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. Pr. 20, Enhancing Access to Justice Act, 2024, S.O. 2024, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 60.11, Gordon v.Starr (2007), 42 R.F.L. (6th) 366, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Corkery, 2009 ONCA 85, Oliveira v. Oliveira, 2022 ONCA 218, Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, Carter v. Carter, 2026 ONCA 29, Centre commercial Les Rivières ltée v. Jean Bleu inc., 2012 QCCA 1663, Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 ONCA 688, Whitehead v. Tucker, 2025 ONCA 674, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Prescott-Russell Services for Children and Adults v. G. (N.) (2006), 82 O.R. (3d) 686 (C.A.), Jackson v. Jackson, 2016 ONSC 3466, Moncur v. Plante, 2021 ONCA 462, Chong v. Donnelly, 2019 ONCA 799, 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22

Short Civil Decisions

Blau v. Blau, 2026 ONCA 535

Keywords: Family Law, Property, Remedies, Equalization of Net Family Property, Civil Procedure, Costs, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, r. 24(8), Brad-Jay Investments Ltd. v. Szijjarto (2006), 218 O.A.C. 315 (C.A.), Brad-Jay Investments Ltd. v. Szijjarto, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 92, Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9

Halton Standard Condominium Corporation No. 550 v. Del Ridge (Appleby) Inc., 2026 ONCA 536

Keywords: Contracts, Construction, Civil Procedure, Admissions, Limitation Periods, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Final or Interlocutory, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, ss. 4 & 15(2), Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 6, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 51.06

Home Trust Company v. Pitters, 2026 ONCA 534

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Enforcement

Dunn and Drummond Incorporated v. Fisher Environmental Ltd., 2026 ONCA 529

Keywords: Torts, Nuisance, Environmental Contamination, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Amending Pleadings, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Final or Interlocutory, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 20 & 21

He v. Furney, 2026 ONCA 541

Keywords: Family Law, Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Adjournments, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3

CIVIL DECISIONS

Lang-Newlands v. Newlands, 2026 ONCA 530

Van Rensburg, Paciocco, Thorburn, JJ.A.

Counsel:

J. Lisus, H. Niman, D. Gelgoot and J. Liew, for the appellant

J.T. Curry, D. Knoke and A. Franks, for the respondent

facts:

This case involved a high net-worth family law dispute. Before the parties’ marriage, the respondent wife’s father settled a trust that held shares in his business. The wife was the sole beneficiary and would acquire its assets at the age of 39. The shares were worth approximately $16 million at the date of marriage. During the marriage, and before turning 39 years old, the wife received the shares from the trust. Eight years later, the shares were the subject of an estate freeze.

The estate freeze involved the wife’s father settling a new trust for $100 (the “NFT”), the creation of a new holding company, the wife selling her shares to a new holding company and receiving $24.5 million in preferred shares in return. The NFT purchased 100 common shares of the new holding company, and as such, the NFT was entitled to the future growth in the value of the shares held by the holding company. At the time the parties separated, the wife’s 20% interest in the NFT was valued at approximately $134 million.

The husband appealed the final order of the trial judge who excluded the wife’s beneficial interest in the NFT from her net family property for the purpose of equalization. He also appealed the trial judge’s order of his monthly support amount and sought leave to appeal the costs order.

issues:

Did the trial judge err in excluding the wife’s interest in the NFT from her net family property?
Did the trial judge err in ordering less monthly support for the husband than what he was entitled to?
Did the trial judge err in ordering the husband to pay costs in the amount of $2.8 million?

holding:

Appeal allowed in part.

reasoning:

The Court initially addressed the standard of review. The issue of how to characterize the wife’s interest in the NFT under the Family Law Act was a question of law. Determining the value of that interest, and whether an equal division would be unconscionable, were questions of fact or mixed fact and law that were entitled to deference. An award of spousal support should not be overturned absent material error, such as a serious misapprehension of the evidence or an error in law: R.L. v. M.F. at paras. 20-21. A costs award should be set aside only when the trial judge made an error in principle, or if the costs award is clearly wrong: Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd. at para. 27.

1. Yes. The trial judge erred in excluding the wife’s interest in the NFT from her net family property.

Section 4 of the Family Law Act (the “FLA”) distinguishes gifts received before marriage from those received after marriage. The former are “deductions” for the purpose of calculating net family property, such that their value at marriage is deducted from net family property, but any growth is included. In contrast, gifts received after marriage, and any income derived from them, are “excluded property” under the FLA and do not form part of net family property subject to equalization. It was more financially advantageous for the wife if her interest in the NFT was treated as a gift after marriage.

The Court held that the wife’s father made her a valid gift before marriage by transferring the shares to a trust in which the wife was the sole beneficiary. Since the shares put into the estate freeze were all funds the wife’s father gave her before marriage, which were then transferred to the NFT after her marriage to the husband, the only property the wife’s father gave her after her marriage was the $100 fee he paid to effect the estate freeze.In these circumstances, the wife’s father did not give the wife new property after marriage that she did not already possess, nor did he divest himself of anything beyond $100. Characterizing the wife’s entire interest in the NFT as a “gift after marriage” solely because the trust was initially seeded with $100 from her father would allow form to overwhelm function. The value of her interest in the NFT as of the date of separation was included in her net family property, subject to the deduction from her net family property the value of the assets in the NFT at the date of marriage.

2. No. The trial judge made an alternative order for support in the event the NFT was not excluded from the wife’s net family property. Under that alternative order, the husband was to receive retroactive support but no prospective support after he receives his substantial equalization payment. A spousal support order is entitled to significant deference. Once the husband receives the substantial equalization payment to which he was found entitled, he will have sufficient resources for a home which is his most pressing need. The Court saw no error in the amount of support that he will receive.

3. No. The trial judge did not err in ordering the husband to pay costs in the amount of $2.8 million. Section 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act provides that leave is required where the appeal is only as to a discretionary costs order. However, when the disposition on appeal changes the decision under appeal, leave to appeal from a costs order is not necessary. The trial judge ordered the husband to pay costs in the amount of $2.8 million. He did so based on the orders made, the husband’s behaviour before and during the trial, and the fact that the wife was the relatively more successful party at trial and was thus presumptively entitled to costs.

Both parties delivered multiple offers to settle before trial and during the trial proceedings. The trial judge found that had the husband accepted any of the wife’s three pre-trial offers, he would have obtained a more favourable outcome than the outcome at trial. As noted by the trial judge, the husband “refused to accept reasonable offers to settle, made none of his own until a few weeks before trial … spent excessively, and behaved poorly leading up to and during the trial”. The trial judge found that all of the wife’s offers demonstrated a good faith effort to settle the case. The Court does not disagree with the trial judge’s cost order and denies leave to appeal the costs.

Bombardier Inc. v. Alstom Rail Sweden AB, 2026 ONCA 528

Gillese, Madsen and Pomerance JJ.A.

Counsel:

J. Teskey and N. Tawdy, for the appellant

I. Nishisato, H. Meighen, and B. Wray, for the respondent

facts:

The appellant, Bombardier Inc. (“BI”), is a Canadian publicly traded corporation that designs, develops, manufactures and markets transport equipment. The respondent, Alstom Rail Sweden AB (“Alstom Sweden”), is a Swedish company that was formerly a subsidiary of BI known as Bombardier Transportation Sweden AB (“BT Sweden”), until it was acquired by Alstom S.A. and Alstom Holdings (collectively, “Alstom”) in January 2021.

In 2017, BI sold the entire share capital of its direct subsidiary, Bombardier Aerospace (Holdings) Sweden AB (“BAHS”), to BT Sweden under a share purchase agreement (the “2017 BAHS SPA”). The 2017 BAHS SPA included a formula for adjusting the purchase price based on Swedish tax dispute outcomes and a clause giving exclusive jurisdiction to the Ontario courts.

In 2020, Alstom entered into a further sale and purchase agreement (the “2020 Blizzard SPA”) with BI and others to acquire BT Sweden’s parent group. The 2020 Blizzard SPA contained a clause purporting to terminate all tax sharing agreements between the group and BI’s affiliates, an entire agreement clause, and an arbitration clause requiring disputes between “parties” to be arbitrated through the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) under English law. The definition of “Parties” in the 2020 Blizzard SPA was tautological, simply referring to “the parties to this agreement.” Alstom Sweden was not a named party to the 2020 Blizzard SPA, but the agreement defined “Affiliate” broadly to include subsidiaries and holding companies.

In 2021, the Swedish Administrative Court of Appeal ruled in favour of BAHS in tax disputes for 2013–2017. BI sought to adjust the purchase price under the 2017 BAHS SPA, claiming $24,462,275.64 from Alstom Sweden. When Alstom did not pay, BI commenced an action in Ontario. Meanwhile, Alstom had initiated ICC arbitration against BI in 2022 relating to the 2020 Blizzard SPA.

Alstom Sweden moved to stay the Ontario Action in favour of the ICC Arbitration. The motion judge granted the stay, finding that Alstom Sweden had established an arguable case that the four technical prerequisites for a stay set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Peace River Hydro Partners v. Petrowest Corp. were met. The motion judge found it arguable that Alstom Sweden was an “Affiliate” under the 2020 Blizzard SPA and could benefit from its arbitration clause, and that the subject-matter of the Ontario Action fell within the scope of arbitration.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in finding that an arbitration agreement existed between the parties or in finding that Alstom Sweden was entitled to benefit from the 2020 Blizzard SPA arbitration agreement, such that the competence-competence principle was engaged?
Did the motion judge fail to recognize corporate separateness by treating Alstom Sweden and its affiliates as one and the same?
Did the motion judge fail to consider principles relevant to the interpretation of the 2020 Blizzard SPA and fail to read the agreements as a whole, including the binding attornment clause in the 2017 BAHS SPA?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. Under the Peace River framework, the applicant for the stay must show that four “technical prerequisites” are met, as follows: (a) an arbitration agreement exists; (b) court proceedings have been commenced by a ‘party’ to the arbitration agreement; (c) the court proceedings are in respect of a matter that the parties agreed to submit to arbitration; and (d) the party applying for a stay does so before taking any ‘step’ in the court proceedings. The applicant for the stay need only show that there is an “arguable case” that each of the prerequisites is met: Peace River, at para. 84; Husky Food, at para. 28. A finding that there is an arguable case that the prerequisites are met does not presuppose the determination by the arbitral tribunal on either jurisdiction or the substantive dispute. Rather, the underlying assumption is that if the court grants a stay and does not decide an issue in the action, then the arbitrator will decide it: Uber, at para. 38; Husky Food, at para. 17.

BI argued that because Alstom Sweden was not a named party to the 2020 Blizzard SPA, and the recognized circumstances in which a non-party could benefit from an arbitration agreement did not apply, it was an error of law to permit Alstom Sweden to benefit from the arbitration clause. However, determining whether an arbitration agreement existed between the parties to the litigation fell squarely within the first Peace River prerequisite and was determined on an “arguable case” standard. BI’s position effectively posited a “threshold requirement” before the application of the Peace River framework, which was without foundation. The motion judge considered the definition of “Affiliate” in the 2020 Blizzard SPA and found it arguable that Alstom Sweden could be included as an Affiliate entitled to benefit from the arbitration clause. While the motion judge ought also to have articulated his analysis of the arbitration clause, he was clearly alive to it and addressed BI’s argument.

2. No. The motion judge did not fail to recognize corporate separateness. BI argued that the motion judge effectively treated Alstom Sweden and its parent company, Alstom, as one and the same by finding that BI should pursue its claim in the ICC Arbitration. However, this argument largely recast BI’s first submission that Alstom Sweden, as a non-party to the 2020 Blizzard SPA, could not benefit from its arbitration clause. The Court noted that the motion judge did not make any binding determination that Alstom Sweden was an “Affiliate” or that an “Affiliate” could avail of the arbitration clause. He simply found it “arguable” that the prerequisites for a stay were met. The question of whether Alstom Sweden could properly invoke the arbitration clause as an affiliate was left for the ICC to decide.

3. No. While it may have been preferable for the motion judge to expressly address each clause relied upon by the parties, including the attornment clause in the 2017 BAHS SPA, the arbitration clause and the entire agreement clause, he adequately articulated his findings supporting his conclusion that Alstom Sweden had established an arguable case that the prerequisites had been met. The question of whether the Ontario Superior Court of Justice or the ICC had jurisdiction required much more than a superficial review, and the more fulsome review BI urged on the Court belonged in arbitration.

Association of Architectural Technologists of Ontario v. Ontario Association of Architects, 2026 ONCA 539

Sossin, Monahan and Wilson JJ.A

Counsel:

G. A. Hamilton, L. M. Wagner and B. Taylor, for the appellant

V. Wise and V. Brennan, for the respondent

facts:

The AATO is a voluntary professional association for architectural technologists. The Association of Architectural Technologists of Ontario Act(the “Act”) empowers the AATO to regulate the use of professional designations, including “M.A.A.T.O.”, “architectural technician”, “architectural technologist”, “registered building technologist” and “registered building technician”. Only AATO members can use such titles. However, the services provided by AATO members are entirely in the public domain and do not require a licence of any kind to perform. The AATO objected to the Ontario Association of Architects (“OAA”) granting a separate class of limited licences for technologists (i.e., the “Licensed Technologist OAA” licences), arguing that the Act only conferred on the Registrar authority to issue full architect licences. Following discussions between the two organizations, the OAA ultimately agreed that the Act did not authorize the issuance of licences using the internal process created by the 2010-20 Policy, and therefore the OAA consented to the relief sought by the AATO. This resulted in the issuance of the 2023 Consent Order in May 2023.

After the 2023 Consent Order was issued, the OAA sent two notices (the “Regulatory Notices”) to the 150 persons who it had designated as a Licensed Technologist OAA, informing them that their licences were now void and that they were obliged to notify third parties of their change in status. Following receipt of the Regulatory Notices, 39 of the 150 former Licensed Technologists OAA submitted new applications to be licensed under the Act. The Registrar determined that none of the 39 applicants met all of the standard requirements to be licensed as an architect prescribed by the Act and therefore served each applicant with a notice indicating that she proposed to refuse their application and that they had a right to a hearing before the Registration Committee.

All 39 applicants requested a hearing, and the Registration Committee conducted oral hearings between October 2023 and April 2024. Following these hearings, the Registration Committee issued written reasons setting out its assessment of each applicant’s qualifications and its determination as to whether they ought to be exempted from any of the requirements of the Act and, if so, be issued a licence subject to terms, conditions or limitations. Ten applicants were re-licensed. The contempt proceedings which are the subject of this appeal primarily concerned the ten applicants who were re-licensed by the Committee. In July 2024, the AATO brought a motion pursuant to r. 60.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking an order finding the OAA in contempt of the 2023 Consent Order.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in finding that the 2023 Consent Order was not clear and unambiguous?
Did the motion judge err in finding that the OAA intentionally breached the 2023 Consent Order?
Did the motion judge fail to properly exercise his discretion in determining whether it was appropriate to make a finding of contempt?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

Both parties agree that the standard of review for the interpretation of a court order which is the subject of contempt proceedings is correctness: see Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General) at para. 29. The motion judge correctly identified the three elements of civil contempt that a moving party must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in accordance with Carey, at paras. 32-35, namely: (i) the order the alleged contemnor breached must be clear and unequivocal; (ii) the alleged contemnor must have actual knowledge of the order; and (iii) the alleged contemnor must have intentionally disobeyed the order. Although the motion judge recited the requirements that had to be satisfied before making a finding of civil contempt, he failed to apply those requirements in holding the OAA in contempt. The motion judge ignored or misapplied the relevant principles governing motions for civil contempt, which were errors of law sufficient to require that the contempt orders be set aside.

1. Yes. In a contempt proceeding the moving party must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the order that the contemnor is alleged to have breached is clear and unambiguous. The OAA had no obligation to provide a “more reasonable” interpretation of the 2023 Consent Order to avoid a finding of contempt. Rather, the moving party, AATO, bore the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the terms of the order that the OAA was alleged to have breached were clear and unambiguous: Bell ExpressVu at para. 29. The fact that the OAA’s interpretation of the 2023 Consent Order might “surprise a reasonable person” could not provide a basis for finding the OAA in contempt. The motion judge applied the wrong legal test in his interpretation of the 2023 Consent Order, asking how a “reasonable person” would view that order rather than whether the order had been shown beyond a reasonable doubtto be clear and unequivocal: Carey at paras. 32-33. At no point did the motion judge engage directly with the language of the 2023 Consent Order and explain how it stated clearly and unequivocally what should and should not be done. Instead, he interpreted the Order in light of the purpose of the AATO’s underlying lawsuit, rather than the language that was actually used in the Order itself. The motion judge never expressly engaged with this issue, and thus never explained how the 2023 Consent Order clearly and unambiguously prohibited the OAA from issuing licences to former Licensed Technologists OAA based on s. 25 of the Act. In the absence of such a finding, there was no basis upon which to find the OAA in contempt of the 2023 Consent Order.

2. Yes. The Act does not confer any discretion on the Registrar to refuse to issue a licence where directed to do so by the Committee. Absent a finding of unconstitutionality, a court order cannot override the terms of a statute. Thus, the 2023 Consent Order could not possibly be construed as prohibiting the Registrar from issuing licences when required to do so by the Act. Given that the Registrar was legally required by the Act to follow the Committee’s direction, her issuance of licences as directed could not amount to contempt of the 2023 Consent Order. Since the motion judge expressly acknowledged that the Registration Committee did not breach the Order in providing this direction to the Registrar, it is difficult to understand how this conduct could constitute an intentional breach of the 2023 Consent Order.

3. Yes. The power to make a contempt finding is ultimately a matter of judicial discretion: Carey at para. 36. The remedy cannot be reduced to a mere means of enforcing orders and should not be used routinely as a compliance mechanism. Rather, having regard for the seriousness and quasi-criminal nature of the remedy, it should be invoked cautiously. Since compliance with the 2023 Consent Order was a non-issue, it was incumbent on the motion judge to turn his mind to the possibility that a less severe enforcement option such as the issuance of a declaration would have been appropriate in the circumstances, even assuming that the elements of civil contempt were made out. While a motion judge’s exercise of discretion on a contempt motion is normally subject to deference, no such deference is owed when the motion judge fails to properly turn their mind to the existence or nature of that discretion: Carter at para. 46

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Blau v. Blau, 2026 ONCA 535

Sossin, Monahan and Osborne JJ.A.

Counsel:

M. DeGroot, for the appellant

E. Sadvari, for the respondent

Halton Standard Condominium Corporation No. 550 v. Del Ridge (Appleby) Inc., 2026 ONCA 536

Sossin, Monahan and Osborne JJ.A.

Counsel:

P.H. Starkman and X.Y. Wang, for the appellants

D.A. Schmuck, for the respondent

Home Trust Company v. Pitters, 2026 ONCA 534

Sossin, Monahan and Osborne JJ.A.

Counsel:

M.P., acting in person

A. McInnis, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Enforcement

Dunn and Drummond Incorporated v. Fisher Environmental Ltd., 2026 ONCA 529

Sossin, Monahan and Osborne JJ.A.

Counsel:

R.H. Cooper and K. Sullivan, for the appellants/responding parties

T. Farber and J. Cabral-Cardoso, for the respondents/moving parties

He v. Furney, 2026 ONCA 541

Fairburn A.C.J.O., Sossin and Osborne JJ.A.

Counsel:

M.F., acting in person

No one appearing for the appellant, A.F.

A. Wong, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Adjournments, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3

The information contained in our summaries of the decisions is not intended to provide legal advice and does not necessarily cover every matter raised in a decision. For complete information or for specific advice, please read the decision or contact us.

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John PolyzogopoulosBlaney McMurtry LLP416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

CIVIL DECISIONS

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SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

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John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email