Shelley-Anne Stacey and William Vey lived together for three and a half years. They never married and had no children. The court described their union as “unstable” with periods of stability. Stacey moved into Vey’s Richmond Hill home in July 2015. Two years later Vey sold the home and the couple moved into a new home in Alliston, 90 kilometers north of Toronto.
Prior to the sale of the Richmond Hill home Stacey made some improvements, including painting various rooms in the home, repairing walls, and doing some landscaping. The purpose of her work was to make the home ready for sale. She paid for some of the work herself, and the parties also used a joint credit card and a $20,000 line of credit to complete the work.
The Alliston home was purchased in July 2017 for $901,000. Proceeds from the Richmond Hill home was used to fund the purchase. At the time of purchase, the parties signed an agreement which provided they would hold the new property as tenants in common with ownership divided 90/10 in favour of Vey. Stacey co-signed the mortgage as Vey did not qualify for it on his own. Stacey made no financial contribution to the purchase.
In April 2018 the parties discussed the possibility of changing the ownership to 59/41 in favour of Vey, but the agreement was never formalized and 90/10 agreement remained in place. The Alliston property was refinanced in May 2018 but no change in ownership was made. By January 2019 the parties had separated.
The Alliston property was sold in December 2019 at a loss of $150,000, leaving net sale proceeds of $328,991. The parties agreed to take $33,000 each from the proceeds and hold the balance of $263,193 in trust pending their agreement or a court order.
THE TRIAL 2025 ONSC 664
Stacey brought an action against Vey claiming that the purchase of the Alliston home was a joint family venture or alternatively, that Vey was unjustly enriched and she was correspondingly deprived. She also sought $150,000 in damages as compensation for her tort claim of family violence. The family violence claim was severed from the trial as Vey had yet to deal with his appeal of a criminal conviction for sexual assault of Stacey.
The parties self-represented for their 4-day trial in November and December 2024. Stacey alleged that she contributed to the Richmond Hill property and said that she and Vey agreed she would receive one-half of the increase in value of the property. As a result, she expected the Alliston home to be registered 80/20 in Vey’s favour. She also testified that the parties later agreed that the Alliston home would be held 59/41 in Vey’s favour. She quantified her claim as $134,886, less the $33,000 she had previously received.
Vey responded that when a new ownership structure was discussed at the time of the May 2018 refinancing, he advised Stacey that if she took over all the mortgage payments, with a total amount owing of $375,200, then they would share the property 59/41.
The trial judge considered the parties evidence, noting that Stacey’s evidence was coherent and focused and she spoke confidently in her recollection of important events. Vey, on the other hand, had a poor memory frequently answering by saying “I can’t recall” or “I don’t know”. Stacey’s version of the facts was held to be more reliable by the judge.
The judge made various findings of fact including that Vey promised Stacey that $115,000 of the Alliston sale proceeds would be credited to her, and that the new home would be registered 80/20 in Vey’s favour. In August 2018 Stacey emailed Vey complaining that he had not yet gone to the lawyer to the make the agreed change to 59/41. Vey responded saying, “We are selling the house in the Spring as per the 59/41 agreement, once it’s solidified.”
Based on his findings, Justice Douglas found that the parties had agreed on a 59/41 split and that Vey had been unjustly enriched based on the work Stacey at done at the Richmond Hills home and the Alliston home. He determined that a monetary remedy was appropriate.
The court also found that Stacey had established a joint family venture as they had multiple joint accounts, they divided their living expenses between them, on occasions she made his child support payments, and he arranged for her to have access to his accounts to assist him with the management of them.
She was awarded a 41% interest in the Alliston proceeds of sale, the sum of $101,987, with the balance of the sale proceeds to remain in trust pending the resolution of her tort claim.
THE APPEAL 2026 ONCA 564
Vey sought to overturn the findings of unjust enrichment and a joint family venture. While the trial judge found that the parties had agreed to a 59/41 split, the appeal panel reviewed Vey’s written closing submissions where he highlighted his testimony:
“The reason the 59/41 split never got formalized was because after the mortgage was refinanced…she pressured me to sign s 59/41 agreement that did not capture our agreed arrangement that she would assume the entirely of the $375,000 debt herself. The 90/10 title arrangement is the only formal one agreed to and signed.”
The appeal judges characterized Stacey’s contributions to the Richmond Hill property as “modest” and noted that the trial judge failed to consider the $150,000 loss Vey suffered on the sale of that property. They also remarked that Stacey’s contribution to Alliston were also “limited”, albeit she did share the monthly mortgage payments with Vey.
With respect to the finding of a joint family venture, the appeal court determined that the evidence was clear that there’s was a brief relationship that was unstable, with no children or common family obligations.
Despite the trial judge’s description of their relationship as periodically stable, the details of the parties’ relationship were described in some detail in R. v. Vey 2026 ONSC 691 where Justice Annette Cassulo found:
“By all accounts, their time together was tumultuous, marked by breakups, police involvement, reconciliation, couples’ therapy and so forth.” They separated several times while remaining in residence together.
Further, the court held there was no prioritization of the overall welfare of the family unit, and no economic interdependence or integration of finances in planning for their future economic well-being.
While the parties shared some joint accounts, there was significant financial dependence, separation of income, no creation of a common pool of savings and no evidence of any future planning or any joint interests, except for Stacey’s minor interest in Vey’s home.
Finally, the appeal court held that the trial judge erred in finding that the 90/10 interest in the Alliston home had been changed by the parties.
Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the trial orders were set aside and Stacey’s claims were dismissed. The court ordered that Vey was entitled to receive 90% of the proceeds of sale of the Alliston property and Stacey 10%.
HOW COULD THE TRIAL JUDGE GET IT SO WRONG?
You might ask, “how could the trial judge get it so wrong?” According to the Ontario 2023-2024 Annual Report, the overall success rate in Ontario’s appeal court is about 29%. In British Columbia, their 2025 Annual Report indicates that 35% of civil appeals are allowed. Meanwhile, getting leave to appeal in the Supreme Court of Canada is a real challenge, only 6.5% of cases are granted leave, but once you get there the success rate for appellants is 40%.
Appeal courts are there to review for errors in applying the law, interpreting facts, or following proper legal procedures. They also ensure fairness and clarify and shape legal rules so they are applied correctly and consistently across future cases.
**This article was first published in LAW360, a publication of LexisNexis Canada.