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What to Do When Counsel is Never Available for Urgent Court Applications?

By Georgialee Lang on December 6, 2025
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 One of the recurring frustrations in family law practice is the increasingly common tactic where opposing counsel is mysteriously “unavailable” for any proposed hearing date. The pattern is familiar: counsel ignores written requests for dates, follow-up correspondence is required, and only after a week or more does opposing counsel finally respond — typically to declare unavailability and to offer the first mutually convenient date a month or more away. The delay invariably benefits the obstructing party and prejudices your client.

A recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, Standerwick v.Standerwick, 2025 BCCA 415, provides useful guidance for countering this practice.

The parties were engaged in long-running family litigation with a trial set for March 2026. In August 2025, Julie Standerwick applied for payment of nearly $165,000 in outstanding child and spousal support, arising from a 2019 consent order. Before filing, her counsel requested available hearing dates for July 2025. Richard Standerwick’s counsel responded with dates only in September 2025.

On June 11, 2025, with arrears mounting, the wife unilaterally set the hearing for Aug. 27, 2025. Application materials were served on Aug. 5. Opposing counsel again claimed unavailability. When no September dates could be secured at either the Vancouver or New Westminster registries, the matter proceeded on Aug. 27.

The application began with the husband’s adjournment request. The chambers judge granted the adjournment, but imposed consequential orders: (1) the husband was required to pay $50,000 to the B.C. Family Maintenance Agency by Sept. 12, 2025, and (2) the wife’s counsel was granted leave to book a long chambers date at her convenience, peremptory on her husband.

The husband sought leave to appeal. He argued there was no proper basis for the $50,000 payment or for making the next hearing peremptory. He even contended, incorrectly, that leave to appeal was unnecessary — an argument the Court of Appeal rejected.

Relying on Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Sessions, 2000 BCCA 326 and Vancouver (City) v. Zhang, 2007 BCCA 280, the court reiterated the test for granting leave to appeal: 

Is the issue significant to the practice? 

Is the issue significant to the action itself? 

Is the appeal prima facie meritorious? 

Would the appeal unduly hinder the progress of the action?

The husband argued that a peremptory hearing date interfered with his right to counsel of choice, making the issue significant to family practice. Counsel for the wife countered that even a peremptory date may be adjourned if justified by the circumstances. The court agreed, observingthat both counsel were now available for a November 2025 date — undermining any real prejudice.

The husband further submitted that ordering payment of arrears without a full evidentiary hearing, including on ability to pay, was improper. The court disagreed. Because support obligations were established by a consent order, and because the husband had paid only a minimal amount since 2019, there was ample evidence to justify the interim payment.

Finally, while acknowledging that an appeal would not necessarily delay the overall litigation, the court noted that pursuing it would consume time and resources better directed toward resolving the dispute.

The chambers judge’s discretionary decisions — to adjourn the hearing, to impose reasonable terms and to grant a peremptory date — were not shown to be in error. Leave to appeal was denied.

The Standerwick decision confirms that when opposing counsel engages in strategic delay, the court may empower the diligent party to secure a hearing date even over the objections or unavailability of the other side. It also affirms that meaningful financial consequences — such as interim payments toward undisputed arrears — may properly accompany such procedural rulings. For practitioners confronted with chronic scheduling obstruction, Standerwick offers a principled and practical response.

**This article was first published in LAW360, a publication of LexisNexis Canada.

Lawdiva aka Georgialee Lang

  • Posted in:
    Family
  • Blog:
    Lawdiva's Blog
  • Organization:
    Georgialee Lang Attorney & Arbitrator
  • Article: View Original Source

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