Clout v Storry [2025] QSC 311 addressed the removal of a bankrupt executor from her late father’s estate. The Queensland Supreme Court ordered the appointment of an independent administrator, exercising its power under section 52(2) of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld) to remove and replace a personal representative where required for proper estate administration. John Anthony Storry (the deceased) died on 31 August 2018, appointing.

The deceased’s Will, dated 13 December 2016, appointed his daughter Venetia Louise Storry (the second respondent) as Executor of the Estate of John Anthony Storry (the first respondent). Under the Will, the second respondent received a two-thirds interest in the Broseley Road property at Toowong, together with an option to purchase the remaining interests held by her sisters, Amber (the third respondent) and Sweden. The second respondent was also entitled to one-third of the residuary estate.

The third respondent received the deceased’s motor vehicle, a one-sixth interest in the Broseley Road property (“the property”) and a one-third share of the residue. Sweden received substantially the same entitlement as the third respondent, except for the motor vehicle.

In September 2019, the property was transferred into the first respondent’s name as executor. It was alleged that the second and third respondents had continued living at the property following the deceased’s death. However, the evidence on that issue was inconclusive. Subsequently, as a result of a sequestration order made against the second respondent, her beneficial interest in the deceased’s estate vested in the first applicant, who became responsible for realising those assets and administering them for the benefit of her creditors.

The first applicant applied for an order revoking the grant of probate issued to the first respondent on 25 March 2019. The first respondent opposed the application, arguing that it should either be dismissed as an abuse of process or stayed. The dispute arose against the backdrop of extensive litigation commenced by the second respondent in the Federal Court concerning her bankruptcy and related matters.

Background

On or around 25 March 2019, probate was granted to the first respondent in respect of her father’s Will. On 20 September 2019, the Will transferred the deceased’s property into the first respondent’s name as executor. On 18 March 2022, Egan J of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia made a sequestration order in respect of the first respondent’s beneficial entitlement in her father’s estate, vesting in David Lewis Clout as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Venetia Louise Storry by Estate Number WA145 of 2022/3 (the first applicant) under s58 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
 As a result, the first applicant became entitled and obliged to realise the second respondent’s inheritance and administer those assets for the benefit of the bankrupt estate’s creditors. In practical terms, any entitlement the second respondent had under the deceased’s estate formed part of the bankrupt estate and became available to satisfy creditor claims.

Application for Removal

The first applicant sought to revoke the probate and remove first respondent as executor, submitting that a bankrupt was an unsuitable executor and that the estate had remained unresolved for 6 years. The first respondent opposed the application, stating she was pursuing further challenges to the bankruptcy and seeking the removal of the first applicant for alleged misconduct. The first respondent submitted that Treston J should stay the proceedings pending related Federal Court litigation.

Court’s Reasoning

Justice Treston noted that the Court’s power to remove an executor is protective and supervisory, with the primary consideration being the proper administration of the estate rather than the wishes of the appointed executor. Her Honour relied on established authority that as bankruptcy raises concerns about fitness to administer trust and estate property a Court will ordinarily remove a bankrupt executor. Bankruptcy is not an automatic disqualification, but it is a significant factor in support of removal. According to Miller v Cameron (1936) 54 CLR 572, Per Dixon J 580-1:

‘The jurisdiction to remove a trustee is exercised with a view to the interests of the beneficiaries, to the security of the trust property and to an efficient and satisfactory execution of the trusts and a faithful and sound exercise of the powers conferred upon the trustee. In deciding to remove a trustee the Court forms a judgment based upon considerations, possibly large in number and varied in character, which combine to show that the welfare of the beneficiaries is opposed to his continued occupation of the office. Such a judgment must be largely discretionary. A trustee is not to be removed unless circumstances exist which afford ground upon which the jurisdiction may be exercised.’

Baldwin v Greenland[2007] 1 Qd R 117 at [44]

Her Honour noted that:

  • The estate had remained incomplete for over six years.
  • The first respondent had not transferred the property to the beneficiaries in accordance with the Will.
  • The property was of significant value.
  • The evidence regarding payment of outgoings and occupation arrangements was unclear.
  • Proper administration of the estate could not proceed while a bankrupt executor remained in office.

Federal Court Proceedings

Justice Trenton also considered the first respondent’s litigation history. In Storry v Parkyn [2023] FCA 1141, the Full Federal Court declared the first respondent a vexatious litigant pursuant to s 3 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), prohibiting the appellant from instituting proceedings without making an application for leave to institute proceedings. The Federal Court dismissed further applications to remove the first applicant and challenge the sequestration order, and describing the first respondent’s claims as being without merit.

Various factors led to the issuance of a vexatious proceedings order, including:


“73 First, while we acknowledge that as an undischarged bankrupt, Ms. Storry faces restrictions on initiating most proceedings, her status does not prevent us from making this order. In fact, the opposite is true. As outlined above, her bankruptcy has not barred her from starting non-exempt proceedings, even though all her property is held in trust by her bankruptcy trustee under s 58 of the Bankruptcy Act. 


“74 Most importantly, these circumstances clearly demonstrate the Court’s need to act to prevent the waste of resources, undue burden, and inconvenience caused by repetitive and baseless proceedings initiated by Ms. Storry. Although she has already had numerous opportunities to appear in Court, she is not entitled to additional courts’ time for pursuits based on unfounded and quixotic complaints. We are convinced that issuing a vexatious proceedings order is reasonably justified to safeguard the Court’s resources for other litigants.  


75 Furthermore, as summarized in Section E, Ms. Storry’s arguments are riddled with irrelevancies and misconceptions, making them difficult to understand. Trying to interpret and clarify her claims consumes considerable Court time with little to no productive outcome.” 



In addition to those proceedings, the second respondent initiated another case on 26 October 2023, in the Federal Court of Australia, seeking to have the first applicant dismissed as her bankruptcy trustee. Rangiah J dismissed the application on 7 November, 2024, noting no reasonable likelihood of success for the second respondent’s substantive application to remove the first applicant.

What Is a Vexatious Litigant?

A vexatious litigant is a person who repeatedly brings legal proceedings that lack merit, are abusive of the court process, or are used to harass, delay, or burden other parties and the court system. Under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld), as in other jurisdictions, a court may declare a person to be a vexatious litigant and make a Vexatious Proceedings Order. Once declared a vexatious litigant, the person is generally prohibited from commencing new proceedings without first obtaining the Court’s permission.

The Federal Court distinguishes between persistent unrepresented litigants pursuing a genuine grievance and those whose conduct amounts to abuse of process. A proceeding is generally deemed vexatious if it:

  • Is instituted or conducted primarily to annoy, harass, or cause detriment to the other party.
  • Is brought for a collateral or improper purpose rather than to seek a genuine judicial resolution.
  • It is manifestly groundless, hopeless, or so obviously untenable that it has no prospect of success.

Storry v Parkyn (2024) 304 FCR 318

In Storry v Parkyn (2024) 304 FCR 318 and subsequent proceedings, the Federal Court found that the first respondent had commenced an extensive series of unsuccessful proceedings over several years. The Full Court noted an involvement in 24 matters over seven years, including 19 proceedings commenced since 2021. As a result, the order, pursuant to s 37AO(2)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act), prohibited the first respondent from instituting any proceeding in the Federal Court of Australia – without making an application for leave to institute a proceeding in accordance with s 37AR of the FCA Act and obtaining leave.

The Court noted that such orders are exceptional and restrict access to the courts. They may be necessary where repeated litigation consumes court resources and imposes burdens on other parties. Ms Storry had been given multiple opportunities to pursue her claims, but was not entitled to relitigate matters already determined or advance misconceived arguments.

Vexatious Proceedings

The Federal Court explained that proceedings may be regarded as vexatious if they:

  • constitute an abuse of the court process;
  • are commenced to harass, annoy, delay, or cause detriment to another person;
  • are brought without reasonable grounds;
  • Repeatedly raise issues that have already been determined, or
  • are so obviously untenable, groundless, or hopeless that they cannot realistically succeed.

The focus is not solely on the litigant’s intentions. Proceedings may be vexatious due to their objective lack of merit, regardless of subjective belief.

Why the Court Prohibited Further Proceedings

After the Federal Court made a vexatious proceedings order, the second respondent sought leave to commence further proceedings challenging earlier bankruptcy and trustee decisions. The Court refused leave because:

  • her supporting affidavits did not comply with statutory requirements;
  • The proposed claims largely repeated arguments the Court had already rejected.
  • The applications disclosed no reasonable basis for relief, and
  • the proceedings were considered “obviously untenable”, “manifestly groundless” and “utterly hopeless”.

Key Lesson

A vexatious proceedings order does not deprive a person of all access to the courts. Before commencing new proceedings, the litigant must satisfy the Court that the proposed claim has a genuine legal basis. Trustees must not seek to relitigate matters already determined. Such orders balance access to justice with the Court’s responsibility to protect its processes, resources, and other litigants from persistent meritless litigation. Justice Treston considered it unlikely that any remaining challenges would succeed and rejected the argument that the first respondent delay estate administration pending those proceedings.

Independent Administrator Required

David Lewis Clout, as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Venetia Louise Storry by Estate Number WA145 of 2022/3 (first applicant), sought appointment as replacement executor, but Treston J declined to appoint him. Her Honour acknowledged the first applicant’s experience and qualifications, but considered the role of Trustee in bankruptcy created a potential conflict between a trustee’s duty :

  • to maximise the return of the bankrupt estate; and
  • to act impartially between the beneficiaries of the deceased estate.

To avoid any appearance of conflict, Treston J directed that an independent and suitably qualified solicitor be identified and proposed as administrator. When the Court determines that an independent administrator is required, it will usually invite the parties to suggest a suitable candidate, such as a solicitor or Trustee with relevant experience. The Court considers the proposed individual’s qualifications, impartiality, and capacity to administer the estate efficiently. If satisfied, the Court appoints the nominated person as administrator and grants them authority to act in place of the removed executor.

Key Principles

Clout v Storry [2025] QSC 311 reinforces several important estate administration principles:

  • The Court’s overriding concern is the efficient and proper administration of the estate.
  • Bankruptcy is a significant factor supporting the removal of an executor.
  • A bankrupt executor who is also a beneficiary may face inherent conflicts of interest.
  • Repeated and unsuccessful collateral litigation will not justify an indefinite delay in estate administration.
  • Where competing interests exist, the Court may prefer the appointment of an independent professional administrator over a person with competing obligations. 

Clout v Storry [2025] QSC 311 illustrates the Court’s intervention where estate administration has stalled and underscores the importance of appointing personal representatives who are independent and capable of fulfilling fiduciary duties efficiently.

Bankrupt Executor Removed from Estate Administration After Prolonged Delay

In Storry v Clout [2026] QCA 102, the Queensland Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by a bankrupt executor seeking to retain control of her late father’s estate despite bankruptcy and prolonged delay in administration.

Trustee

The deceased died in 2018, leaving his estate principally to his three daughters. Under the Will, the appellant received a two-thirds interest in a Toowong property, while her sisters each received a one-sixth interest. Probate was granted to the appellant in 2019, and the property was transferred into her name as executor.

In 2022, the appellant became bankrupt following a sequestration order—her beneficial entitlement under the estate vested in the first applicant. The second respondent made several unsuccessful attempts to challenge the bankruptcy and was declared a vexatious litigant by the Full Federal Court.

Application to Remove the Executor

Confirming a clear statutory and inherent power to remove and replace an executor under the Succession Act 1981 (Qld), s 6 and the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld), s 80. Treston J held that the existence of that power was not disputed. Rather, the issue was whether it was appropriate to exercise the Court’s supervisory and protective jurisdiction in the circumstances.

Justice Treston concluded that the appellant should be removed as executor because, as a bankrupt, it was inappropriate to continue acting as the legal personal representative of the estate. In reaching that conclusion, her Honour relied on long-established authority recognising that a Court will ordinarily remove a bankrupt executor or Trustee. However, bankruptcy does not automatically disqualify a person from holding the office. The authorities acknowledge that exceptions may exist, but the protection of estate and trust assets remains a significant consideration.

Her Honour emphasised that the question is ultimately one of practicality and proper administration. A bankrupt executor who is also a beneficiary may face an inherent conflict between administering the estate promptly and delaying the realisation of assets while pursuing challenges to their bankruptcy. The evidence showed a substantial delay in administering the estate. More than six and a half years after the grant of probate transferred the estate property into the executor’s name, it still had not been distributed to the beneficiaries. The property’s value was between $1.43 million and $2.24 million. However, there was uncertainty about whether rates and other outgoings were being paid or whether the property was generating any rental income.

Against that background, Treston J considered that the efficient administration and protection of the estate warranted the removal of the bankrupt executor and the appointment of a replacement administrator.

Grounds of Appeal

The second respondent challenged the decision to remove her as executor of her late father’s estate, advancing three principal grounds of appeal.

First, Treston J had incorrectly applied bankruptcy law and relevant authorities by treating the appellant’s bankruptcy as evidence of not being a suitable person to continue acting as executor.

Secondly, her Honour had given insufficient weight to the appellant’s ongoing efforts to challenge the sequestration order, and the proceedings seeking to set aside the order before the Federal Court. Treston J also relied on earlier adjournments and agreements between the parties as support for her position.

Thirdly, Treston J had failed to consider relevant Federal Court authorities concerning the conduct of her Trustee in bankruptcy and had wrongly accepted that the Trustee should remain in office while seeking her removal as executor.

In substance, the appellant’s case was that she should not have been removed as executor while her challenges to the sequestration order remained unresolved. That delays in administering the estate were attributable to disputes involving trust account issues and proceedings before QCAT, which she claimed had been improperly terminated by her Trustee in bankruptcy.

Ongoing Challenge to the Sequestration Order
The appellant argued that she was still actively attempting to overturn the sequestration order — a court order declaring a person bankrupt and placing their estate under the control of a trustee. Because she was pursuing legal avenues to have the bankruptcy set aside, she contended that further steps based on that bankruptcy should be paused.

Powers of the Trustee
When a sequestration order is made, a trustee is appointed to manage the bankrupt person’s financial affairs and estate. The appellant maintained that the Trustee should refrain from exercising powers that arise from the bankruptcy — including applying to have her removed as executor of the estate — while her legal challenges remained unresolved.

Request to Defer Replacement Application
In essence, she submitted that the application to replace her as executor should have been deferred until every available challenge to the bankruptcy had been fully exhausted.

The Court ultimately rejected these arguments, finding that the ongoing and largely unsuccessful attempts to challenge the sequestration order did not justify further delaying the administration of the estate.

Court of Appeal Decision

In Storry v Clout [2026] QCA 102, the Court of Appeal rejected each argument.

The Court of Appeal accepted that bankruptcy does not automatically disqualify a person from acting as executor. However, the Court accepted that bankruptcy does not automatically disqualify a person from acting as executor. However, longstanding authority establishes that a Court will ordinarily remove a bankrupt executor due to concerns regarding the proper administration and protection of the estate’s assets. A principle broadly consistent across Australian jurisdictions, where courts exercise similar powers to remove a bankrupt executor if it is in the estate’s interests. In other common law jurisdictions, courts also favour removal, although statutory provisions and procedures may differ. The underlying concern for the proper and impartial administration of estates is widely recognised—incentives to delay the realisation and distribution of assets while pursuing litigation to overturn the bankruptcy.

Bond JA, Doyle JA, and Kelly J held that repeated and unsuccessful attempts to challenge a sequestration order do not prevent a trustee in bankruptcy from performing statutory duties, nor do they justify delaying estate administration. The Court considered it unlikely that the appellant’s remaining challenges would succeed and found no basis to postpone appointment of a replacement administrator.

Key Takeaways

Storry v Clout [2026] QCA 102 reinforces several practical principles for estate administration:

  • Bankruptcy is a powerful factor weighing in favour of removing an executor.
  • The Court’s primary concern is efficient and proper administration of the estate, rather than the executor’s personal interests.
  • Litigation challenging a bankruptcy will not necessarily prevent a trustee in bankruptcy from exercising powers.
  • Significant delays in administration may, in themselves, justify the appointment of an independent administrator.
  • Where no existing party can administer the estate impartially and effectively, the Court may appoint an independent professional administrator.

The appeal was dismissed, leaving in place the orders revoking probate, removing the appellant as executor, and appointing an independent administrator to complete estate administration.

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