On April 30, 2026, the Court of Justice (the Court) delivered its preliminary ruling in CD Tondela and Others, one of its first judgments[1] addressing no-poach restrictions under Article 101 TFEU.[2] The Court held that although no-poach agreements must generally be classified as restrictions “by object”, a specific examination of their context and objectives against the relevant legal and economic background may prove otherwise. The ruling provides useful insight into the treatment of no-poach agreements under EU competition law, an area of increased scrutiny by the Commission and national competition authorities (NCAs).

Link to Background Background

In March 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic proliferated, the Portuguese professional football league (Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional or LPFP) announced the indefinite suspension of the 2019/2020 football season.

Against this backdrop, on April 7, 2020, the clubs competing in the First Division held a meeting with the LPFP, during which they agreed not to hire any player who unilaterally terminated their employment contract due to difficulties linked to the pandemic or any exceptional decision adopted as a result of it, including the extension of the sporting season. The following day, several Second Division clubs endorsed the same commitment.[3]

On May 26, 2020, the Portuguese NCA adopted interim measures suspending the application of the no-poach agreement. On April 28, 2022, it issued a final decision finding that the clubs and the LPFP had infringed Article 101 TFEU and the corresponding national rules. The LPFP and a group of professional football clubs brought an appeal before the Portuguese Competition, Regulation and Supervision Court, which referred several preliminary questions to the Court of Justice.[4] In particular, the referring court inquired whether the agreement at issue (i) could constitute a rule of sporting interest within the meaning of the Wouters/Meca-Medina[5] case law; (ii) met the conditions of appropriateness and proportionality under that framework, making it compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU; and (iii) could be classified as a restriction of competition by object.[6]

Link to No-Poach Agreements Are “By Object” Restrictions. Unless… No-Poach Agreements Are “By Object” Restrictions. Unless…

The Court first analyzed whether the agreement could be qualified as a restriction of competition “by object.” It reiterated that this concept must be interpreted strictly and applies only to forms of coordination revealing a sufficient degree of harm to competition.[7] Relying on a three-pronged assessment, the Court required the referring court to examine the agreement’s (i) content; (ii) economic and legal context; and (iii) objectives.[8]

  • Content. The Court found that the no-poach arrangement constituted a manifest restriction of an essential competitive parameter in professional football, namely the recruitment of players. By agreeing not to recruit players who had terminated their contracts during the COVID-19 pandemic, the clubs coordinated their conduct on the upstream market for the recruitment of professional football players. The Court found that such no-poach agreements can be equivalent to a horizontal agreement for the sharing of “sources of supply” within the meaning of Article 101(1)(c) TFEU.[9]
  • Objectives. The Court observed that an agreement can pursue both an anticompetitive and a procompetitive aim in parallel. While the agreement aimed to restrict competition on the player recruitment market,[14] it also sought to preserve roster stability and ensure the orderly resumption of the 2019/2020 season under fair sporting conditions.[15] The Court concluded that it was ultimately for the referring court to determine, in a precise and reasoned manner, whether the agreement revealed a sufficient degree of harm to qualify as a restriction “by object.”[16]

Link to No-Poach Agreements Under The Meca-Medina Framework No-Poach Agreements Under The Meca-Medina Framework

The Court recalled that restrictions of competition “by object” cannot benefit from the Meca-Medina framework. Such conduct may only escape prohibition if the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU are satisfied.[17]

The Court then examined in which circumstances the Wouters/Meca-Medina framework could apply to an agreement that restricts competition by effect. While sporting rules do not fall automatically outside the scope of competition law, the Wouters/Meca-Medina framework recognizes that sports federations and clubs may adopt rules necessary to ensure the proper functioning and integrity of sporting competitions. An agreement may escape that prohibition where (i) it is justified by the pursuit of a legitimate objective in the public interest; (ii) the specific means used are genuinely necessary for that purpose; and (iii) the inherent restrictive effect does not go beyond what is necessary, in particular by eliminating all competition.[18]

  • Objective. The Court held that ensuring the regularity of sporting competitions constitutes a legitimate objective in the public interest,[19] which may in principle justify the rules implemented by the agreement at issue. 
  • Necessity and proportionality. The Court left it to the referring court to carry out an in-depth examination of the agreement’s suitability for achieving the legitimate objective pursued, whether equally effective but less restrictive alternatives exist, and whether its resulting restrictions on competition remain proportionate in the strict sense, in particular by not eliminating all competition on the market concerned.[20]
  • Implications
  • CD Tondela builds upon prior case law on the treatment of sport-related activities under EU competition law, in particular the Court of Justice’s judgments in European Superleague Company and FIFA. Its findings on no-poach agreements are relevant beyond sports. The judgment confirms a four-step analytical framework for assessing no-poach agreements under Article 101 TFEU:
  • Economic activity. To fall within the scope of EU competition rules, the conduct must constitute an economic activity. European Superleague Company and FIFA confirmed that the practice of sport is subject to EU competition law unless it relates purely to sporting rules with no economic dimension (e.g., national team selection or athlete ranking criteria).[21]
  • Restriction by object. FIFA and CD Tondela confirmed that no-poach restrictions are, in principle, restrictions of competition “by object”.” However, such agreements may escape that classification where their content, economic and legal context, and objective demonstrate that they do not present a sufficient degree of harm to competition.
  • Wouters/Meca-Medina framework. This analysis is only relevant if the agreement restricts competition by effect rather than object. The party invoking this framework must demonstrate that the agreement (i) pursues a legitimate objective in the public interest; (ii) is necessary; and (iii) is proportionate.
  • Article 101(3) TFEU. If Article 101(1) TFEU applies, the agreement may still qualify for an Article 101(3) TFEU exemption if all four cumulative conditions are met: (i) efficiency gains; (ii) fair share for consumers; (iii) indispensability; and (iv) no elimination of competition. The Court confirmed that even restrictions “by object” can in principle be justified under Article 101(3) TFEU.

Link to Increased Antitrust Scrutiny Of Labor Markets Increased Antitrust Scrutiny Of Labor Markets

The CD Tondela judgment is part of an ongoing trend of increased competition law enforcement against labor market restrictions at both EU and national level.[22]

In June 2025, the Commission sanctioned a no-poach agreement for the first time, imposing a €329 million fine in a broader cartel infringement decision in the online food delivery sector.[23] Delivery Hero and Glovo’s shareholding agreement contained limited reciprocal no-hire clauses, which were later expanded into a broader informal understanding not to actively approach each other’s employees. The Commission is also currently investigating possible no-poach agreements in the data center construction sector.[24]

NCAs are also actively scrutinizing labor markets. As highlighted in the Commission’s policy brief, NCAs are often better placed to review such cases because labor markets are traditionally local in scope.[25] Investigations into no-poach agreements have recently been concluded or are currently ongoing in several jurisdictions, including Belgium, Italy, France, Spain, and Poland.[26]

Link to Conclusion Conclusion

The judgment confirms that no-poach agreements must in principle be classified as restrictions of competition “by object.”, while underscoring that this classification is not automatic. Whether a particular agreement reveals a sufficient degree of harm to competition must be assessed in light of its content, objectives, and economic and legal context. The exceptional circumstances of the case, including the “very specific context brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic,” cannot serve as a blanket defense[27]; they may only form part of the contextual analysis, and the burden of proof lies with the party invoking them. Given the increasing enforcement focus on labor market restrictions across the EU, companies should ensure that their recruitment and hiring practices are subject to rigorous competition law review.

[1] See, FIFA, Case C-650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paras.  145-146 (treating certain FIFA transfer rules as similar to a no-poach agreement). 

[2] CD Tondela and Others v.  Autoridade da Concorrência (Case C-133/24) EU:C:2026:291, paras.  4-7.

[3]  CD Tondela and Others (Case C-133/24), opinion of Advocate General Emiliou, EU:C:2025:420, para.  10.

[4] CD Tondela and Others, paras.  17-22.

[5] Meca-Medina established that rules adopted in the sporting context may fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU where they pursue a legitimate objective and any resulting restrictions of competition are inherent in and proportionate to that objective; Meca-Medina and Majcen v.  Commission (Case C-519/04 P) EU:C:2006:492.

[6] Ibid., para.  28.

[7] Ibid., paras.  36-41.

[8] Ibid., para.  43; Opinion of Advocate General Emiliou, para .  33; European Superleague Company (Case C -333/21) EU:C:2023:1011, para.  165; Banco BPN v BIC Português and Others (Case C-298/22) EU:C:2024:638, para.  44.

[9] CD Tondela and Others, paras.  52-55; Opinion of Advocate General Emiliou, paras.  49–54.

[10] CD Tondela and Others, paras.  68 and 73.

[11] CD Tondela and Others, paras.  74-76.

[12] CD Tondela and Others, paras.  59-64; Lehtonen and Castors Braine (Case C-176/96) EU:C:2000:201, paras.  53-55.

[13] CD Tondela and Others, Opinion of Advocate General Emiliou, para.  58.

[14] CD Tondela and Others, paras.  80-81.

[15] Ibid., para.  82.

[16] Ibid., paras.  88–89.

[17] Ibid., paras.  92–93.

[18] Ibid., para.  92.

[19] Ibid., para.  96.

[20] Ibid., paras.  98-99.

[21] European Superleague Company (Case C-333/21) EU:C:2023:1011, para.  83; FIFA (C-650/22) EU:C:2024:824, para.  75. 

[22] In October, 2021, the Commission announced its intention to expand cartel enforcement to cover labor markets, targeting no-poach and wage-fixing agreements (See Margrethe Vestager, “A New Era of Cartel Enforcement”, Italian Antitrust Association Annual Conference, October 22, 2021).  On March 6, 2024, Olivier Guersent, then Director General of DG Competition, stated at the OECD Open Day that the Commission was investigating “four or five” no-poach cases and that it “saw the number of immunity applications rising, […] and that includes no-poach agreements.” (See Olivier Guersent, “Panel 1.  The Consumer Welfare Standard in Enforcement Decisions”, OECD Competition Open Day, March 6, 2024, available here).  On May 3, 2024, the Commission published a policy brief on antitrust in labor markets, emphasizing increased scrutiny of such restrictions.  (See Cleary Gottlieb, Cleary Antitrust Watch Blog, “Turning up the Heat: the Commission’s Interest in Labor Markets,” May 3, 2024, available here).

[23] Food Delivery Services (Case COMP/AT.40795), Commission decision of June 2, 2025.

[24] Commission Press Release IP/24/5926, “Commission carries out unannounced antitrust inspections in the data centre construction sector”, November 18, 2024, available here. 

[25] Commission Competition Policy Brief 2/2024 “Antitrust in Labour Markets,” May 3, 2024, available here.

[26] See e.g., Cleary Antitrust Watch Blog, “French Competition Authority Issues Its First-Ever Decision Sanctioning No-Poach Agreements,” June 11, 2025, available here; Belgian Competition Authority, Press Release 27/2024, “The Belgian Competition Authority fines Securitas, G4S and Seris over 47 million euros to sanction their participation in a complex cartel scheme in the private security sector,” July 3, 2024, available here; Catalan Competition Authority, “The Catalan competition authority has sanctioned an anti-competitive practice in the labour market,” September 27, 2023, available here; Italian Competition Authority, “The Italian Competition Authority investigates Akkodis Italy, Coesia, G.D, I.E.M.A., I.M.A., S.I.A.  and SPAIQ over possible cartel in the labour market,” January 26, 2026, available here; Polish Competition Authority, “Collusions on the labor market – stop! It is illegal!,” July 8, 2024, available here.

[27] CD Tondela and Others, paras.  73-76.