Link to Co-author: Gunner West Co-author: Gunner West
The words of an instrument conveying real property in Texas mean something, of course. But so does the placement of those words … which leads to the result in SRO Land & Minerals, LP v. BNSF Railway Co. A 1901 deed to The Pecos River Rail Road Company conveyed fee simple title to a 100-foot strip, not a railway easement. Because the railroad was abandoned long ago, an easement would have expired, but the fee did not. Surrounding property owners lost their claim to the minerals under the 100-foot strip.
The deed
The granting clause of the deed conveyed “all and singular the right, title, and interest” of Thomas White in “certain pieces or parcels of land” for operating the railroad on “a way and right of way one hundred (100) feet in width” fifty feet on each side of the main track. A later recital stated that the instrument’s “object and intention” was to convey a strip fifty feet on each side of the centerline “and no more.”
Mineral owners along the corridor sued BNSF, contending that the deed conveyed a right of way. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decree of fee simple title in BNSF “insofar and only insofar as said deed conveyed property within the boundaries of the properties owned by” the plaintiffs.
The deed language supports fee title
Under the Texas Property Code, a conveyance passes fee simple title unless express words limit the estate or a lesser estate arises by construction or operation of law. Texas decisions supply two rules for railroad deeds:
- a grant of a “right of way” in or over a tract conveys an easement,
- a grant of a tract or strip of land conveys a fee simple even if a later clause calls the grant a right of way.
The placement of the right-of-way language favored BNSF. The granting clause conveyed White’s entire interest in “pieces or parcels of land”; the right-of-way language followed as a statement of use. The court found nothing in the granting clause creating an easement or otherwise limiting the estate.
The warranty and recitals confirm fee title
The court rejected the mineral owners’ three remaining arguments.
- The warranty clause required the grantor to defend “said premises,” and the habendum grants the railroad “the premises above mentioned and described . . . forever.” The mineral owners construed “premises” as an easement, but the court held that the term applies to either a fee or an easement. Warranting the premises, rather than a right to cross them, supported fee title. `
- A purpose declaration in a later clause neither conditions title nor reduces a fee to an easement. The “object and intention . . . and no more” recital limited the strip’s physical extent —not the estate conveyed.
- “Over” showed an intent not to convey the entire strip. The word used elsewhere meant from one side or extremity of the grantor’s land to the other and had the same meaning here.
The line within the granting clause
The Deed’s purpose language follows “pieces or parcels of land” in the same sentence. The court nevertheless treated it as following “the granting clause’s description of the property conveyed,” drawing the line within the sentence rather than at its end.
The words of conveyance and description establish the grant, while “for the purpose of” describes use. For abandoned-corridor title, the critical question is whether right-of-way language appears after the deed has identified the estate. Where the sentence breaks may matter less than where the granting language ends.
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