Law Office of Rob Wiley, P.C.

“With regard to the letter, [Plaintiff]’s allegation is that he asked Chief Justice Jefferson to keep the letter confidential, not that Chief Justice Jefferson actually did so. In fact, [Defendant alleged that Chief Justice Jefferson did not answer the letter himself, establishing that the letter had not remained confidential. With regard to the disciplinary complaint, [Defendant] contends that Texas law requires the Commission on Judicial Conduct to keep such complaints confidential. But this misstates that…
“[Plaintiff was not required to allege how [Defendant] knew of the letter and complaint, only that [Defendant] knew. Having done so, he has sufficiently pleaded that his letter and his disciplinary complaint precipitated [Defendant]’s allegedly untoward conduct.” Anderson, 2016 WL 6647759, at *5 (footnotes omitted).…
“In the context of Garcetti‘s clear instruction, [Plaintiff]’s letter and disciplinary complaint were not created pursuant to his official duties. It is useful to note that [Plaintiff]’s supervisor, Vela, did not ask him, much less require him, to send the letter or to file the disciplinary complaint. [Plaintiff] expressly alleged that he did so “on his own initiative.” He also alleged that he asked Chief Justice Jefferson to “keep the letter confidential” so that no…
“[Defendant] contends that it twice offered [the employee] a reasonable accommodation in the form of clerical work, which offers she ignored or rejected. This first offer was undisputedly made, but made at a time when [she] was unable to return to work and on FMLA leave. [The employee] declined the offer on the advice of her doctor, and [Defendant] does not argue that this initial rejection matters. It instead argues that the offer remained open…
“[The employee’s] claim that she was temporarily totally disabled for the purposes of private disability benefits is not inconsistent with the claim that she could work if provided an accommodation. . . . [Plaintiff argued that] the definition of ‘qualified individual’ in the ADA was not incompatible with the definition of ‘disabled’ within the insurance policy, and it further explained that ‘nothing in the [disability claim forms] indicate that [the employee] represented that she was unable…
“[Defendant] also contends that a written job description in this case establishes that the essential functions of [the employee’s] duties include lifting and pushing more than ten pounds. While written job descriptions warrant deference, ‘this deference is not absolute,’ and we must ask ‘whether the employer actually requires employees in the position to perform the functions that the employer asserts are essential.’ [… C]onsistent with ordinary rules governing summary judgment, a written job description is…
“At oral argument, counsel for [Defendant] suggested we reject the [Plaintiff]’s evidence as self-serving. But this is summary judgment, and we may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.” Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC, — F. App’x —, 2016 WL 5939424, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2016) (internal citations omitted).…
“‘Fact-finders must determine whether a function is ‘essential’ on a case-by-case basis.’ [The employee] testified she couldn’t ‘remember having to lift more than 10 pounds’ as part of her duties, and her colleague . . . has provided a detailed affidavit that, if true, establishes that such exertions are virtually never required. While [Defendant]’s witnesses testified to the contrary, this conflict merely establishes an ‘actual controversy’ of fact rendering summary judgment improper.” Equal Emp’t Opportunity…
“The Defendants also claims [sic] that the Plaintiff could not satisfy the third prong of the prima facie case [for FMLA retaliation] and could not establish a causal connection that her pregnancy caused her to get fired. The Defendants contend that there is no indication [Defendant] was aware that the Plaintiff was pregnant or wanted FMLA and therefore causation cannot exist. However, the [employee’s supervisor’s] declaration coupled with the fact that the Plaintiff was seven…
“[The] declarations and timesheets [produced by Plaintiff] establish that there were weeks in which [Defendant’s] employees worked more than forty hours, and [two employees] both state in their declarations that they were not paid an overtime rate for this work. . . . [N]othing in [another employee’s] declaration refutes Plaintiff’s claim that employees often worked over forty hours a week and were not paid time-and-a-half for those hours. [That employee] states only that she felt…